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Summary introduction 
 
 
 
The establishment of the Financial Action Task Force (commonly known as FATF), 
in 1989 by the governments of the G-7 marked the beginning of the systematic inter-
national fight against money laundering. The first measure undertaken by the FATF in 
1990 was issuing 40 Recommendations meant to safeguard the integrity of the inter-
national financial system by providing effective guidelines on how to prevent criminal 
money from entering banks and other financial institutions. Even if (officially) not 
mandatory, such guidelines represented the cornerstone upon which member jurisdic-
tions started drawing their own national anti-money laundering (AML) framework. At 
the heart of such Recommendations stood the Know Your Customer (KYC) princi-
ples and the Due Diligence verification procedures that ought to be conducted by the 
financial institutions in order to identify both the client and the beneficial owner of the 
assets they are handling. Moreover, in order to be able to spot and, if necessary, report 
suspicions of money laundering, financial intermediaries should be continuously mon-
itoring their clients’ transactional activity and assess whether such activity is in line with 
the initial purpose of the business relationship. Following the events of 9/11, FATF 
issued nine additional recommendations meant to prevent terrorism financing. The 
Recommendations were then reviewed in 2003 and in 2012 to ensure that they remain 
up to date and relevant, and can be universally applicable.  
  In order to be able to observe the above mentioned AML duties banks and other 
financial intermediaries need to deploy resources to target money laundering and ter-
rorism financing by installing IT dedicated tools and training employees accordingly. 
One important change regarding the compliance procedures was brought by the shift 
from a rule-based approach to a risk-based approach. As such, between 2007 and 2009, 
the FATF has issued a series of guidance notes regarding the relevant sectors in order 
to assist both public authorities and the private sector in applying a risk-based ap-
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proach. The switch to a risk-based approach was the proof that governments under-
stood that the “one size fits all” approach to AML regulation was deemed to be inef-
fective and burdensome, given the different scopes, sizes, products, markets and cli-
ents served by the various financial intermediaries. With this new perspective, the leg-
islator allowed the financial intermediaries to tailor their internal AML policy according 
to the potential risks they face. The risk-based approach allows for important cost 
reductions since banks can allocate their investigative resources more efficiently, but it 
can also create dilemmas, as there is no clear rule to apply when running investigations: 
i.e. there are many instances in which risk cannot be clearly defined and quantified. 
Hence, banks were required to develop a deeper investigative expertise in order to be 
able to make sound decisions concerning highly uncertain cases. This was achieved by 
hiring trained AML experts, capable of dealing with issues that do not directly pertain 
to the core business of the bank. 
  Integrating a new resource into the banking processes can pose significant or-
ganisational problems. Studies ran in the UK, France and Belgium and focusing on the 
figure of the compliance officer analysed his specific tasks and role inside the bank; 
such studies also underlined how challenging is the reconciliation of business growing 
objectives with AML compliance obligations.  As a consequence, business oriented 
employees will often find themselves in conflict with their colleagues from the com-
pliance department, and everybody will feel the pressure of the management in one 
way or another, depending on the rigidity of the regulator toward the bank. The 
scheme below summarizes the relationships as well as the role of each actor involved 
in the bank’s AML compliance process.  
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  Bearing in mind the depicted anti-money laundering framework and the internal 
communicational flows between the various actors, this thesis sets out to investigate 
the extent to which the compliance function has been integrated with the banking 
culture. As such, the main research question is whether after almost 20 years of AML 
legislation, banks and more exactly relationship managers accepted compliance as part 
of their day-by-day working routine. Each of the following chapters will cover specific 
aspects that are supposed to unveil the problems and challenges experienced by both 
relationship managers and compliance officers.  
 The first chapter will put the reader at ease with the Swiss AML regulatory 
framework by explaining the due-diligence requirements imposed on the banking in-
stitutions.  
 The second chapter intends to give an idea about the size and importance of 
the AML phenomenon in Switzerland by briefly discussing the statistics regarding the 
number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) received yearly by the Swiss Financial 
Intelligence Unit, the suspicious factors behind the financial intermediaries’ decision 
to file a SAR as well as the supposedly committed predicate offences. Moreover, we 
discuss the efficiency of the anti-money laundering reporting system by presenting data 
on the actual status of the SARs as well as the number of prosecutions. 
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 The third chapter starts tackling the main research question, by investigating 
the banks’ perception of their vulnerability to money laundering operations as well as 
their motivation to participate in the AML fight. We believe that such data is a good 
indicator of the banks’ willingness and determination to integrate compliance duties in 
their daily operations. In addition, we try to quantify the banks’ efforts in counteracting 
the money laundering phenomenon by documenting several Know Your Client and 
reporting procedures they have implemented. 
 With the forth chapter we begin investigating the relationship between the 
compliance officer and the relationship manager, as perceived by the compliance of-
ficers. First, the chapter will thoroughly discuss the specific tasks and objectives of 
each of the two actors that are likely to lead to a conflict. Then, by running a logistic 
regression I provide empirical evidence about the factors determining the occurrence 
of such organisational conflict. This chapter is intended to bring to surface the chal-
lenges faced by compliance officers when working upon disseminating a money laun-
dering risk adverse attitude among their colleagues. 
  The fifth chapter continues to focus on the interaction between the compli-
ance officer and the relationship manager, but this time from the relationship man-
ager’s perspective. By employing a different methodology (i.e. interviews), I collect 
evidence about the difficulties encountered by the relationship manager when adapting 
to an AML compliant culture. Since the compliance officer’s work will largely depend 
on the input received from the relationship manager, it is very important to understand 
how the latter assimilated the changes brought by the AML regulations, how he man-
aged to transmit them to the client and which are the factors that are preventing a 
smooth collaboration with the compliance department. 
 I chose to study the banking system, not only because 28 of the FATF’s 40 
Recommendations regard exclusively this sector, but also because of its vulnerability 
to money laundering operations. Despite the myriad of options to launder ill-gotten 
profits that do not necessarily imply the use of banks as a primary laundering channel, 
we argue that in an era in which cash transactions are less and less frequent, the criminal 
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money will (at a certain stage of the laundering process) finally reach the banking sys-
tem anyway. Moreover, as we will show in Chapter 2, the majority of the Suspicious 
Activity Reports received by the Financial Intelligence Unit come from the banking 
system; this is an indicator of both the importance of the banking system and of the 
significant resources devoted by banks to reporting procedures. 
  Beside the important share of the banking system in the country’s GDP1, there 
are other several reasons for which studying the case of Switzerland is particularly in-
teresting for understanding the extent to which the AML compliance duties have been 
integrated into the banking culture. First, foreign governments have continuously crit-
icized Switzerland for having a superficial approach when it comes to AML compli-
ance. This has been mainly due to the Banking Secrecy Principle, even if the latter does 
not apply in case of investigations related to criminal funds. Secondly, since the major-
ity of Swiss banks offer private banking and wealth management services, the trust 
between the client and the relationship manager and the respect for one’s privacy is 
pivotal for a successful relationship. Very often, these two can become friends, making 
it even more difficult for the relationship manager to suspect and report the client’s 
transactions. Thirdly, since more than 75% of the assets managed in Switzerland be-
long to non-residents, banks must dedicate significant resources to the due diligence 
checks. As compared to local clients, running due-diligence checks on foreign clients 
can prove quite demanding as the bank is forced to rely on information that is more 
difficult to verify. Last but not least, the Swiss AML reporting system is based on the 
existence of a “well-founded” suspicion. Differently than the quasi automatic reporting 
that banks in other countries are required to do (that is mostly the case for transactions 
above a certain treshold), Swiss banks must first run an “in-house” investigation and 
gather sufficient objective proofs before reporting to the authorities. 
This study is part of a four-year research project ran jointly between the Faculty 
of Economics and Faculty of Communications at the University of Lugano. The pro-
ject members included three Full Professors (one of Finance, one of Communication 
and one of Law), one post-doc researcher and one PhD student. The research project 
                                                                
1 Estimated at approx. 9.5% as per 2014 OECD data 
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enjoyed the support of an External Advisory Committee formed by: one board mem-
ber of the Swiss Bankers Association, one FINMA consultant, MROS’s Vice-Head 
and a Senior Vice President of a local bank.  
Considering both the scale and the scope of the study, it is the first one of this 
type in Switzerland. Moreover, is the first one to empirically assess the conflict or at 
least the tensioned relationship between the compliance officer and the relationship 
manager. Last but not least, given the size and importance of the Swiss financial centre 
on a global level, we believe that this study’s findings can be representative of the 
challenges and problems faced by banks in other countries. 
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1. Compliance duties under the Swiss 
Anti-money laundering framework 
 
 
 
 
 
There are several publications that describe the organisation and functioning of the 
Swiss AML system. Pieth et al. (2003) and Preller (2008), offer a comprehensive de-
scription of the AML regulation implemented in Switzerland focusing on the law pro-
visions, the organisation of the Swiss Financial Intelligence Unit and the management 
of the Suspicious Activity reports. In her paper, Balleyguier (2003) describes and ana-
lyzes three areas connected to the AML fight: (1) the supervised financial institutions 
with a focus on the non-bank and non-insurance financial institutions, (2) the mix of 
direct and indirect supervision that has been enacted in this field and thirdly, (3) the 
relevant AML customer due diligence requirements. Muller-Studer (2003) studies the 
function of the self-regulating organisations, responsible of defining their own regula-
tions regarding the implementation of the due diligence duties by their affiliates. How-
ever, since these organisations only adapt the general AML rules to the specific needs 
and characteristics of the affiliated members, the author concludes that the Swiss con-
cept of self-regulation is restricted and can be defined as controlled self-regulation. 
The Swiss AML framework started to take shape in 1977, when the Swiss Bank-
ers Association’s ‘Agreement on the Swiss banks’ Code of Conduct with regard to the 
exercise of Due Diligence’ (CDB) was issued. Although the said Agreement does not 
have any regulatory power, it enumerates the minimal due diligence standards regard-
ing the identification of clients and beneficial owners that banks should observe in 
their course of business. Moreover, the agreement prohibits banks from actively as-
sisting their clients with tax evasion and the flight of capital. Designated investigators 
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and a CDB Supervisory Board assess breaches of the Agreement, and offences are 
punishable by fines up to CHF 10 million. The CDB is revised and updated every five 
years, with the last version coming into force in 2016.   
Two decades after the CDB, the Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering 
and Terrorism Financing in the Financial Sector (AMLA) was enacted and became 
effective from the 1st of April 1998. The AMLA designates the provisions to combat 
the crimes of money laundering2 and terrorism financing3 -as defined by Art. 305bis and 
Art. 260quinquies of the Swiss Criminal Code- including: duties of the financial interme-
diaries, of the supervisory, control and reporting authorities, the organisation of self-
regulating entities, the grounds for national and international administrative assistance 
and the criminal procedures in case of non-compliance.  
The national body supervising the implementation of AMLA is the Swiss Finan-
cial Market Supervisory Authority, also known as FINMA. The latter was ‘born’ on 
the 1st of January 2009 from the merger of three existing supervising authorities: The 
Swiss Federal Banking Commission, the Federal Office of Private Insurance and the 
Anti-Money Laundering Control Authority. Financed by the institutions it regulates, 
FINMA is mandated to protect financial market clients and is responsible for ensuring 
that Switzerland’s financial markets function effectively. By adopting a systematic risk-
oriented approach, FINMA authorises, supervises and, where necessary, enforces any 
financial market legislation. 
The AMLA is a framework law, in the sense that it sets out the principles that 
subsequently have to be adapted by the authorities to the concrete business activities 
they are supervising. A significant part of the AMLA is dedicated to the due diligence 
and reporting duties imposed on the financial intermediaries in relation to the handling 
of third party assets. As such, all the natural persons or legal entities that are subject to 
the law are required to:  
                                                                
2 According to Art. 305bis, any person who carries out an act that is aimed at frustrating the identification of the 
origin, the tracing or the forfeiture of assets which he knows or must assume originate from a felony or aggravated 
tax misdemeanor is liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty. 
3 According to Art. 260quinquies, any person who collects or provides funds with a view to financing a violent crime 
that is intended to intimidate the public or to coerce a state or international organisation into carrying out or not 
carrying out an act is liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a monetary penalty. 
3 
 
1. Verify the identity of the contracting partner and of the ultimate beneficial 
owner (Art. 3 and Art. 4); 
2. Repeat the verification if doubt arises as to the identity of the contracting part-
ner and/or of the ultimate beneficial owner (Art. 5); 
3. Identify the nature and purpose of the business relationship wanted by the 
customer (Art. 6, paragraph 1); 
4. Clarify the economic background and the purpose of a business relation-
ship/transaction if it appears unusual, if it bears a high risk, if there are indications of 
money laundering or terrorism financing or if the names of the involved persons ap-
pear on an official Sanction List (Art. 6, paragraph 2); 
5. Keep records of transactions carried out for a minimum of ten years (Art. 7)  
6. Provide adequate AML training to the staff (Art. 8) 
 
As far as the internal monitoring systems put in place are concerned, the Swiss 
legislator opted for a risk-based approach to AML, leaving the financial intermediaries 
the possibility to tailor their supervision depending on their type of customers, prod-
ucts and markets targeted. 
A peculiarity of the Swiss AML reporting system is that it is based on the notion 
of ‘reasonable suspicion’. As such, if the financial intermediary knows or has reasona-
ble grounds to suspect that the funds originate from a felony or aggravated tax misde-
meanour4, they belong to a criminal organisation or they serve the purpose of financing 
terrorist acts, it must immediately file a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) with the 
Money Laundering Reporting Office (MROS, see Art. 9). The latter is a member of 
the Egmont Group5 and functions like a filtration point between the financial inter-
mediaries and the prosecution authorities, conducting a first investigation on the SARs 
received and deciding whether to drop the case or forward it to the law enforcement 
                                                                
4 An aggravated tax misdemeanor is any of the offences set out in Article 186 of the Federal Act of 14 December 
19903 on Direct Federal Taxation and Article 59 paragraph 1 clause one of the Federal Act of 14 December 19904 
on the Harmonisation of Direct Federal Taxation at Cantonal and Communal Levels, if the tax evaded in any tax 
period exceeds 300 000 francs. 
5 The Egmont Group is an informal international network of financial intelligence units. Formed in 1995, the goal 
of the Egmont Group is to provide a forum for FIUs around the world to improve cooperation in the fight against 
money laundering and financing of terrorism and to foster the implementation of domestic programs in this field. 
4 
 
authorities for further analysis. In any case, MROS’s work is somehow simplified by 
the initial ‘in-house’ investigation run by the banks. As mentioned earlier, contrary to 
other countries which request banks to automatically file a report in certain instances, 
in Switzerland banks should gather sufficient objective proofs before reporting to the 
authorities. However, since the notion of ‘suspicion’ is extremely subjective and is not 
always possible for the financial intermediaries to obtain enough elements to justify a 
suspicion, the legislator provided them with the right to report any indications that 
assets may originate from a felony (Criminal Code, art 305ter). A SAR sent by virtue of 
the right to report entails a simple suspicion, whereas a SAR sent by virtue of the duty 
to report entails a reasonable/grounded suspicion.  
Once a SAR has been filed, the financial intermediary is prohibited from inform-
ing the persons or third parties concerned (Art. 10a). Moreover, if MROS informs the 
financial intermediary that the case has been forwarded to the prosecuting authorities, 
the assets that were the object of the SAR must be frozen until further notifications 
from the authorities are received, but at most for five working days from the time the 
financial intermediary was informed that the case has been forwarded to the prosecut-
ing authorities (Art. 10). If the financial intermediary is contacted by MROS, it must 
provide all the information available that is connected with the client/transaction trig-
gering the SAR.  
The AMLA’s provisions are further detailed in a directive issued by FINMA, the 
Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance6 (MLO FINMA). More precisely, the MLO pro-
vides clear guidelines for each type of financial intermediary: banks, securities dealers, 
fund management companies, insurance institutions and domestic group companies 
of a financial intermediary. It also includes a list of 38 potential indicators of money 
laundering and terrorism financing activities. Regarding the tasks of the AML compli-
ance department, the Ordinance deems it responsible for: (a) defining and implement-
ing the internal AML policy; (b) advising and assisting line managers and the senior 
executive body in implementing the AML regulations; (c) planning and overseeing 
                                                                
6 Updated the last time on the 3rd of June 2015, applicable from the 1st of January 2016 
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AML training activities; (d) defining the parameters for and analysing the alerts gener-
ated by the transaction monitoring system; (e) providing all the necessary information 
that the executive body responsible for making decisions regarding the initiation or 
continuation of high risk relations needs. 
Complying with all the duties imposed by the several pieces of regulation de-
scribed above is a significant administrative and financial burden for the financial in-
termediaries. Beside the considerable investments in IT tools for transaction monitor-
ing and criminal screening purposes, the most valuable resource for a bank in the fight 
against money laundering is its compliance department. The trained specialists working 
inside the department are supposed to act as a watch-dog, protecting the bank’s repu-
tation by making sure that no criminal money enters the bank and that the management 
is well aware of the risks associated with the existing clients. 
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2.  Fighting money laundering in 
Switzerland: relevant numbers 
 
 
 
 
Every spring MROS publishes a detailed report containing information about the 
number, the origin and the outcome of the SARs received during the previous year. 
Moreover, it puts in evidence several typologies of money laundering schemes, dis-
cussing the critical aspects that financial intermediaries should consider during their 
day-to-day operations. By briefly analysing the data available in MROS’s past Annual 
Reports, this section will try to give an idea about the size of the suspicious activity 
reporting performed by the Swiss financial sector. 
Table 2.1 reports the number of SARs received by MROS during the years 2005-
2015 from the main categories of Swiss financial intermediaries. During this timeframe, 
the number of SARs more than doubled, with the peak increase registered between 
2009 and 2011, in 2014 and then again in 2015. The first two increases are to be at-
tributed to specific events such as the amendment of AMLA relating to financial in-
termediaries’ exclusion from criminal and civil liability in 2009 (meaning that financial 
intermediaries no longer have to act “with the diligence required in the circumstances”, 
but only “in good faith”) and the political events in the Middle East and North Africa 
associated with the Arab Spring in 2011. As MROS noted, there have been some clus-
ter cases which generated multiple SARs during both 2014 and 2015 (given the high 
media exposure of the Swiss banks involved, we believe it is safe to assume such cluster 
cases were related to the 1MDB, Petrobras or the FIFA scandals). Nevertheless, the 
significant increase registered in these two years is to be rather attributed to a height-
ened awareness on the financial intermediaries’ side towards money laundering fight. 
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In the same time, the gradual transition to the “White Money Strategy7” might have 
raised many worries that the deposited assets were not tax-compliant and hence 
pushed many intermediaries to fill-in a SAR.  
 
Table 2. 1: Number of SARs sent to MROS, by financial intermediary, by year 
Financial in-
termediary  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Bank 294 359 492 573 603 822 1080 1050 1123 1495 2159 
Payment ser-
vices 
348 164 231 185 168 184 379 363 74 107 58 
Fiduciary 31 45 23 37 36 58 62 65 69 49 48 
Asset manager 18 6 8 19 30 40 27 49 74 40 45 
Insurance 9 18 13 15 9 9 11 9 19 11 12 
Attorney 8 1 7 10 11 13 31 12 9 10 6 
Other  21 26 21 12 39 33 35 37 43 41 39 
Total 729 619 795 851 896 1159 1625 1585 1411 1753 2367 
Others include: Supervisory authority, Casino, Foreign Exchange trader, Securities trader, Currency exchange, Loan, leasing, 
factoring and non-recourse financing, Credit Card Company, Commodity and Precious metal trader, Self-reporting organi-
sation, Distributor of Investment funds and Other financial intermediaries 
Source: MROS Annual Report 2015 
 
The banking sector is the most “productive” sector when it comes to suspicious 
reporting, delivering every year about 65% of the total number of SARs received by 
MROS, except for 2014 and 2015 when the percentage reached all-time high peaks of 
85% and 91% respectively. The second highest number of SARs is sent by the payment 
services providers; however, with the obtainment of a banking license by PostFinance 
AG (the financial services unit of Swiss Post) many SARs the latter used to submit as 
a financial services provider are now submitted as a bank (hence the decrease visible 
since 2012). Another type of financial intermediaries sending a significant number of 
SARs to MROS are the fiduciaries/asset managers. Until 2010, they jointly contributed 
an average of 8-10% of the yearly SARs, but in recent years such percentage dropped 
to nearly 4-5%. MROS itself could not give a reason for such decrease especially since 
                                                                
7 The “White Money” strategy was intended to prevent the use of the Swiss financial system for circumventing 
home country tax laws by international clients. A discussion paper concerning the strategy for a tax-compliant and 
competitive financial center was initially launched in February 2012 by the Swiss Federal Council. One year later, 
the same Council launched two consultations on combating money laundering and enhanced due diligence obliga-
tions regarding taxation. These proposals concerned, among others, the introduction of qualified tax fraud as a 
predicate offence to money laundering, the adoption of a risk-based approach with regards to unofficial assets and 
the execution of a full review by the end of 2014 to be concluded with the existing of undeclared clients.  
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in the case of a reasonable suspicion, both the asset manager/fiduciary as well as the 
custodian bank must submit a SAR. 
Due to the type of clients served, some Swiss banks tend to report more suspi-
cious cases than others. Table 2.2 below shows that most of the SARs come from 
major banks and foreign-controlled banks, with a yearly average of 30 and 32 percent-
age respectively in the total number of SARs sent by the banking sector. Such high 
percentage can be explained not only by their larger client base, but also by the fact 
that many of their clients are domiciled abroad (hence, the likelihood to be associated 
with riskier, less transparent activities is higher). Cantonal banks send an yearly average 
of about 7% of the total SARs even if they account for 30% of the total assets under 
management in Switzerland; such percentage is in line with both the type of clients 
(mostly Swiss-domiciled) and the low-risk products (mortgage and savings) offered by 
these banks. 
 
Table 2. 2: Number of SARs sent to MROS, by type of bank, by year 
Type of bank 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Major bank 44 143 213 196 167 214 310 308 324 474 763 
Foreign-con-
trolled bank 
173 102 120 134 188 290 388 348 240 383 575 
Asset manage-
ment bank 
38 53 69 55 72 55 155 127 113 155 303 
Other bank 5 8 15 16 14 99 27 42 230 214 212 
Raiffeisen 
bank 
3 6 19 107 93 49 60 64 79 134 125 
Cantonal bank 23 31 41 47 46 79 75 80 72 75 125 
Private bank 3 14 8 5 8 7 26 60 52 39 38 
Regional and 
savings bank 
4 1 3 5 10 25 15 19 6 14 11 
Branch of fo-
reign bank 
1 1 4 8 5 4 21 2 5 3 7 
Total 294 359 492 573 603 822 1080 1050 1123 1495 2159 
Foreign-controlled banks are banks under the Swiss law, where the main shareholder is non-Swiss or where a   foreign 
shareholder has a controlling interest in the bank. 
Cantonal banks are Swiss government-owned commercial banks, which are provided by the canton in which they  are 
based with a guarantee for the assets held there.  
Source: MROS Annual Report 2015 
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As far as the suspicion triggering the SAR is concerned, from Table 2.3 emerges 
that every year an average of 27% of the total cases are to be attributed to media cov-
erage, followed by third-party information (23.5%) and information received from the 
prosecuting authorities (12.8%).  
Table 2. 3: Factors arousing suspicion for the SARs sent to MROS, by year 
Source 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Media report 83 195 209 192 219 378 483 455 457 494 815 
Third-party informa-
tion 
128 108 131 218 267 257 391 414 367 515 578 
PA information 90 41 64 128 94 186 218 203 196 213 420 
Cash transaction 299 116 166 103 70 67 172 178 106 84 82 
Economic back-
ground 
49 55 71 108 80 147 145 153 124 128 73 
Transitory account 6 13 90 13 29 16 16 33 23 22 23 
Transaction monito-
ring 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 101 168 
Internal information 10 8 7 23 36 24 26 25 50 34 34 
Forgery (docu-
ments/money) 
15 19 10 18 44 22 34 28 18 29 5 
Currency exchange 6 12 11 9 9 23 14 16 10 13 6 
High-risk country 3 1 1 2 2 3 81 1 3 10 2 
Opening of account 9 13 21 13 9 13 5 13 5 5 16 
Cheque transaction 8 4 4 1 7 4 20 18 11 9 9 
Others 23 34 10 23 30 10 20 48 36 96 136 
Total 729 619 795 851 896 1159 1625 1585 1411 1753 2367 
Media - media reports reveal that one of the people involved in the financial transaction is connected with illegal activities; Infor-
mation from prosecution authorities - Prosecution authorities initiate proceedings against an individual connected with the fi-
nancial intermediary’s client; Third-party information – information is received from outside sources or from within a business 
about clients who could pose problems. 
Source: MROS Annual Report 2015 
 
To perform open media screening, most banks have installed an internal system 
that regularly checks potential matches between new entries in criminal databases (such 
as Worldcheck) and their client database. Such systems are an important support for 
the banks and for the relationship managers, as they offer information about any po-
tential criminal activity conducted by the client. On the other hand, the fact that a bank 
becomes aware of such potential only when the client is either suspected, investigated 
or convicted reveals the existing knowledge gap concerning the background of its cli-
ents. The fact that around 68.3% of the SARs are triggered by external sources and not 
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not by the financial intermediaries’ in-house screening activities underlines the poor 
efficiency of the transaction monitoring systems installed and hence the scarce effec-
tiveness of the measures adopted for counteracting money laundering. As such, very 
often the SAR is sent once the crime was committed and hence the laundering was 
already accomplished (and hence is in the news) rather than before or during the 
“washing” of the illegally-obtained funds.  
Another important point to be mentioned is the number of SARs filed due to 
suspicious cash transactions. Whereas in the past the use of cash was a significant ele-
ment triggering a SAR (40% of the cases registered in 2005 to 20% of the cases regis-
tered in 2007), in recent years the percentage has decreased to less than 10% (in 2014 
only 4.8% and in 2015 only 3.5% of the cases). There are various factors that had an 
influence on the use of cash such as: set-up of a strict threshold for payments in cash8, 
the continuous development of other payment methods (online banking, etc.) and the 
stricter controls performed at the Swiss borders. 
In each SAR, financial intermediaries must explain the facts that raised a suspi-
cion such that they decided to contact the MROS. Table 2.4 below provides an over-
view of the suspected predicate offences as per the submitted SARs. It is important to 
note however that “MROS’s legal assessment of the suspected predicate offence is 
based solely on the financial intermediary’s assumption as well as on MROS’s own 
assessment of the facts. When a SAR is forwarded to a prosecuting authority, it is 
bound neither to the findings of the financial intermediary nor to MROS’s legal assess-
ment” (MROS, 2015:29). In all years but 2015, fraud was the most frequently suspected 
predicate offence, with an annual average of 29.3% of the SARs. The second most 
suspected predicate offence was bribery with an annual average of approximately 
11.6% except for 2014 and 2015 when it reached 20.3% and 25.1% respectively of the 
annual SARs. MROS noted however that in 2015, one case cluster generated 273 SARs, 
98% of which cited bribery as the suspected predicate offence. Money laundering is 
                                                                
8 In Switzerland, dealers accepting cash payments amounting to more than CHF 100’000 must conduct due-dili-
gence checks such as identifying the customer and the beneficial owner. However such threshold is much higher if 
one thinks that in Italy for example, since 2011, cash payments of more than EUR 1000 per transaction are not 
allowed. 
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the third most cited predicate offence with an annual average of around 9% of the 
total yearly SARs, followed by the offence of embezzlement and criminal organization 
with an average of 7.5% and 5.6% respectively. Terrorism financing is suspected on 
average in 1.3% of the annual SARs, with the exception of 2013, when the percentage 
amounted to 2.3% due to a cluster case which generated alone 25 SARs (see MROS 
Annual Report 2013).  
 
Table 2. 4: Suspected predicate offences for the SARs sent to MROS, by year 
Predicate offence 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Fraud 126 213 247 295 307 450 497 479 374 448 447 
Bribery 52 47 101 81 65 60 158 167 172 357 594 
Money laundering 37 45 54 57 81 129 252 209 93 182 164 
Embezzlement  40 27 32 67 88 51 124 156 159 157 197 
Fraudulent misuse of 
a computer 
  18 33 22 49 51 39 121 104 142 
Criminal organi-
zation 
41 31 20 48 83 42 101 98 104 94 120 
Drugs 20 14 34 35 32 114 161 97 52 39 54 
Criminal misma-
nagement 
10 11 21 12 20 44 25 34 28 49 219 
Document forgery 10 17 10 22 37 28 56 38 15 45 43 
Other property offen-
ces 
12 13 22 22 36 10 7 34 41 25 75 
Theft  9 8 4 3 4 12 19 7 7 53 36 
Terrorism financing 20 8 6 9 7 13 10 15 33 9 38 
Human traffic 
/sexual offences 
1  3 4 3 3 1 19 4 9 7 
Non classifiable 346 173 205 138 90 115 131 160 156 100 109 
Others 5 12 18 25 21 39 32 33 51 53 77 
Total 729 619 795 851 896 1159 1625 1585 1411 1753 2367 
The not classifiable category includes cases where a variety of possible predicate offences are suspected. 
Source: MROS Annual Report 2015 
 
For many years, foreign governments have criticised the Swiss financial interme-
diaries’ commitment in fighting money laundering, claiming that too few SARs are 
filled in compared to the size of the Swiss financial sector. For example, FinCen, the 
US Financial Intelligence Unit, receives an average of 1.3 million SARs per year plus 
more than 14 million of Cash Transaction Reports; the National Crime Agency in the 
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UK must deal with an average of 300.000 SARs per year. However, these countries 
have admitted that it is almost impossible for them to thoroughly analyse so many 
reports given the limitations they face in terms of resources. Moreover, in most of the 
cases, the reports received are just false alerts, sent by the financial intermediaries with-
out necessarily having a founded suspicion. In that regard, they do not reflect a risk-
based approach but rather a defensive and automated reporting. On the other hand, 
as mentioned earlier, the Swiss financial intermediaries will first run an in-house inves-
tigation to gather sufficient objective elements or to better “substantiate” their suspi-
cion before sending a SAR.  
An indicator of the SARs’ quality received by MROS is the percentage of reports 
that it forwards to the law enforcement agencies after having done a first check (see 
Table 2.5). Every year an average of almost 81% of the SARs received by MROS were 
sent for further investigation to the law enforcement agencies, with the lowest percent-
age of 70% in 2005 and 2015 and the highest percentage of 91% in 2011. Most of such 
forwarded SARs were those submitted by banks, which analysis is more detailed since 
they have more resources dedicated to the reporting activity (the average forwarding 
rate for this type of financial intermediary is 87%).  
Table 2. 5: Percentage of SARs forwarded to the prosecuting authorities, by financial inter-
mediary type, by year 
Proportion of 
SARs forwarded 
2005 
% 
2006 
% 
2007 
% 
2008 
% 
2009 
% 
2010 
% 
2011 
% 
2012 
% 
2013 
% 
2014 
%    
2015 
% 
Bank 92 94 92 87 91 91 93 89 82 76 72 
Payment services 46 57 52 61 85 82 86 81 51 51 53 
Fiduciary 100 89 83 92 86 79 86 72 80 78 42 
Asset manager 83 33 75 53 83 78 93 86 87 80 89 
Insurance 89 72 62 87 67 44 64 78 79 46 33 
Attorney 75 0 86 80 100 69 94 75 56 60 50 
Others 93 75 80 83 78 50 80 58 62 61 69 
Total SARs  
forwarded (%) 
70 82 79 81 89 87 91 86 79 74 71 
Total SARs  
Received (%) 
729 619 795 851 896 1159 1625 1585 1411 1753 2367 
Others include: Supervisory authority, Casino, Foreign Exchange trader, Securities trader, Currency exchange, Loan, leasing, 
factoring and non-recourse financing, Credit Card Company, Commodity and Precious metal trader, Self-reporting organi-
sation, Distributor of Investment funds and Other FI. 
Source: MROS Annual Report 2015 
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  In recent years, the percentage of forwarded SARs by MROS fell below 80%; 
however, such drop is not to be attributed to a lower quality of the reports but rather 
to a combination of factors influencing MROS’s work such as: additional personnel 
hired, more authority to gather information granted to MROS as of the end of 2013, 
and no deadline to provide a feedback for voluntary SARs9. All these factors give 
MROS “the capacity to analyse SARs in greater detail and filter out cases that are un-
substantial or cannot be proven with a reasonable amount of effort” (MROS, 2015:12). 
   When it comes to the amount of assets involved in the SARs received by MROS, 
we can notice a sevenfold increase from CHF 681 Mio in 2005 to CHF 4.83 Bn in 
2015 (see Table 2.6). With the exception of 2006 and 2010, the evolution of the assets 
involved in the SARs is positively correlated with the total number of SARs and the 
various peaks are a consequence of the same events mentioned earlier (see also Table 
2.1. for comparison). Moreover, the increase in total assets involved hasn’t been pro-
portional to the increase of the total SARs, as in several instances a relatively low num-
ber of SARs concerned a significant amount of assets. For example, in 2011 the num-
ber of SARs increased by 40.2% compared to 2010 but the total assets involved in-
creased by 287%: such increase was due to 25 SARS involving assets worth approxi-
mately CHF 2.26 Bn. Another important observation that can be made from the data 
in Table 2.6 is that on average MROS forwards around 81% of the SARs it receives 
yearly, but these forwarded SARs refer to approximately 91% of the total assets initially 
reported.  
Table 2. 6: Total assets value at time of report to MROS, by year 
Assets value  
in CHF millions 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Received SARs 681 815 921 1872 2229 847 3281 3151 2979 3341 4827 
Forwarded SARs 614 746 899 1804 2164 715 3223 2832 2796 2852 3564 
 
Forwarded SARs’ 
assets in Total 
Assets (as %) 
90 92 98 96 97 84 98 90 94 85 74 
Source: MROS Annual Reports 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2015 
                                                                
9 Voluntary SARs are those sent by the financial intermediaries by virtue of the right to report given by Art 305ter 
of the Criminal Code.  
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   Another indicator of the SARs’ quality is the number of follow-up investigations 
and convictions. Table 2.7 below evidences the actual status of the SARs forwarded 
by MROS to the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland (OAG), and the can-
tonal prosecution authorities during the period 2006-2015. In most of the cases, the 
authorities haven’t reached a final decision as the SARs are either still pending (41.4%) 
or suspended (31.8%). Instead, around 21.9% of the cases were dismissed. A final de-
cision was reached by the courts in 4.9% of the cases: 10 acquittals from the charge of 
money laundering, 11 acquittals from all charges (no charge of money laundering), 303 
convictions including that of money laundering, and 188 convictions for offences 
other than money laundering. When distributed among the 10 years period, an annual 
average of 49 convictions were issued in connection with the average number of SARs 
sent, hence meaning that only 3.75% of the average yearly SARs are closed with a 
verdict.  
   The picture regarding the status of the forwarded SARs is somehow similar 
when considering the offence of Terrorism financing. According to the data included 
in Table 2.8 below in 72.7% of the cases a conclusion hasn’t been reached yet as they 
are either pending (52.5%) or suspended (20.2%). Moreover, 26.3% of the SARs have 
been dismissed by the public prosecutor, whereas a verdict was issued only in 1% of 
the cases. The prosecution rate for terrorism financing is lower than the one for other 
offences, confirming thus the complexity of such cases that often require the collabo-
ration of other countries’ intelligence 
 
Table 2. 7: Status of forwarded SARs by authority/canton: 2006 to 2015 
Status/Level Pending Dismissal Suspension 
Temporary 
suspension 
Acquittal Verdict Total 
Confederation 1939 699 1061 284 2 28 4031 
Canton 2428 1616 1773 238 19 463 6537 
Total (abso-
lute) 
4367 2315 2834 522 21 491 10568 
Total (%) 41.4% 21.9% 26.9% 4.9% 0.2% 4.7% 100% 
Source: MROS Annual Report 2015 
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Table 2. 8: Status of forwarded SARs in connection with the financing of 
terrorism: 2006 to 2015 
Status Pending Dismissal Suspension 
Temporary 
suspension 
Verdict Total 
 52 26 12 8 1 99 
Total (%) 52.5% 26.3% 12.1% 8.1% 1% 100% 
Source: MROS Annual Report 2015 
 
   Whereas the two estimated prosecution rates might seem too low when com-
pared to the amount of resources invested in the reporting process, there are various 
elements to which one must pay attention in evaluating the effectiveness of the Swiss 
SAR reporting system. First of all, the number of convictions included in MROS’s 
Annual Report might be different than the actual ones because MROS is not notified 
about the convictions which are not related to the offences of criminal organisation, 
money laundering, lack of due diligence and terrorism financing  (as defined by Articles 
260ter p.1, Art. 305bis, Art. 305ter and Art. 260quinquies of the Swiss Criminal Code) and 
even when the convictions are related to the mentioned offences, not always the pros-
ecution authorities fulfil their reporting duties towards MROS. Secondly, several SARs 
may refer to the same individual who was charged with just one offence; alternatively, 
one SAR can lead to multiple charges being laid against one or more individuals. 
Thirdly, no data is provided on the total assets involved in the convictions made, hence 
one cannot conclude on the importance of the case being successfully closed by the 
authorities when compared to the volume of assets involved in all SARs. Lastly, as 
MROS provides just cumulative data over a 10 years period, it is not possible to un-
derstand whether most of the convictions were issued in recent years and hence the 
reporting system became more efficient or vice versa.  
 Beside the MROS’s data limitations discussed above, it must be underlined that 
at a Swiss level there is no federal office or department providing consistent data on 
money laundering related offences. There are various instances in which a prosecution 
can be the result of other factors than a SAR as for example – a case opened as a 
consequence of an action conducted by the Custom agents or as a result of a request 
for mutual assistance from foreign public prosecutors. Identifying such cases would 
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allow us to better differentiate and hence conclude on the contribution of the SAR 
Reporting system to money laundering related crimes identification and prosecution.  
 A characteristic of the Swiss legal system and criminal procedure is the enforce-
ment of the ne bis in idem principle (i.e. no legal action can be instituted twice for the 
same cause of action). Since the majority of the assets managed in Switzerland belong 
to international clients, it can happen that criminal proceedings are conducted on the 
same individual in another country and the case is assessed there. As such, the foreign 
authorities are assisted by the Swiss authorities through mutual assistance, and pro-
ceedings in Switzerland are abandoned based on the aforesaid principle (MROS, 2015). 
 The number of convictions in Switzerland can also be influenced by the lack of 
response under the request of Swiss authorities for mutual assistance. The chances of 
obtaining information from abroad vary from one country to the other and in the past, 
proceedings were abandoned more often because the network of global FIUs was lim-
ited and their powers regarding mutual assistance were more restricted (MROS 2015). 
Table 2.9 below provides details on the number of natural persons and legal entities 
mentioned in enquiries between MROS and foreign FIUs. Every year from 2005 to 
2015, the number of incoming requests from Foreign FIUs has been higher than the 
outgoing requests from MROS. Moreover, with the exception of 2014, the number of 
incoming inquiries has been constantly increasing since 2007, signalling hence the 
growing interconnectivity of the global financial sector.   
 
Table 2. 9: Number of natural persons/legal entities mentioned in inquiries be-
tween MROS and foreign FIUs, by year 
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
MROS inquiries 1143 1106 886 1075 1614 1033 999 1066 1471 1630 2144 
 
Foreign FIUs in-
quiries 
1569 1693 1510 1562 1930 1937 2174 2400 3092 2968 3621 
Source: MROS Annual Report 2015 
  
 The lack of data concerning the amount of confiscated assets and the total num-
ber of convictions makes it impossible to understand how often a suspected predicate 
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offence translates into a prosecution and hence understand whether the efforts of the 
financial intermediaries are worth. Nevertheless, the findings presented in this chapter 
provide evidence that the SAR Reporting system has several advantages as it allows 
the authorities to: gather relevant financial and personal data on certain “suspected” 
individuals, enhance their mutual exchanges with the international counterparties and 
punish money-laundering related crimes. Moreover, the overall view of the suspected 
predicate offences show how the SAR Reporting system can contribute to the detec-
tion of various types of crimes which go beyond the simple act of money laundering 
or terrorism financing. 
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3. Banks’ internal compliance practices 
and motivations for fighting money 
laundering: The Swiss case 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The inception of FATF determined many countries to implement an AML framework 
that requires financial intermediaries to properly identify their clients, thoroughly mon-
itor their transactions and report any money laundering attempt.  
Whereas Switzerland has been among the first countries to adopt an AML 
framework with the early  (voluntary) CDB in 1977 followed by the mandatory AMLA 
in 1998, existing studies have barely discussed the changes brought by such legislation 
and how the Swiss banks stood up to the challenge. At the same time, earlier studies 
conducted by scholars in the UK, France and Belgium had (already) investigated the 
way in which local banks organised their resources to cope with the specific legislative 
requirements, underlying the difficulties experienced by the actors involved in the day-
by-day compliance activities. The striking feature of these studies is that even if they 
were run in different times (i.e. with several years of difference) they bring to light 
similar problems. That is to say, actors complain about their forced involvement in the 
‘AML battle’, the significant resources deployed in the compliance process and the few 
benefits it actually brings to the bank, the lack of investigative skills as well as the 
internal tensions created by the introduction of specific verification and reporting pro-
cedures. On the other hand however, there are also noticeable differences between 
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these countries even if their legislations share the common nucleus of FATF’s10 40 
Recommendations. For example, the underlying predicate offences to money launder-
ing as well as the organisation of the reporting process or the duties of the local FIU 
can be different.  
 As such, this chapter is intended to give a picture about: (1) how do local banks 
assess Switzerland’s vulnerability to money laundering crimes, (2) what motivates them 
to allocate resources to AML compliance and hence actively counteract money laun-
dering attempts and (3) what specific measures they have implemented to identify and 
report suspicious cases. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that our study was not 
concerned with measuring banks’ compliance with the AML law. We were interested 
in understanding where Switzerland stands with regard to other countries, and whether 
there are common practices applied by banks.  
We collected data from AML compliance officers by means of an on-line survey 
distributed to a total of 139 banks in Zurich, Geneva and Ticino (the three most im-
portant financial hubs in Switzerland). At the end of the survey period, 52 responses 
were received. The survey was divided in four parts, for a total of 30 questions. 
The results presented in this chapter about the banks’ beliefs and motivations 
regarding the AML framework as well as their compliance practices are meant to “set 
the stage” for the next two chapters, in which we will investigate how the compliance 
function has been integrated into the banking culture and what kind of relationship 
has developed between the various departments (i.e. compliance vs. the commercial 
one).  
After this brief introduction, the second section will review the existent literature 
on AML compliance. Section three enumerates the research questions, whereas section 
four and five describe and discuss the data collection process and the methodological 
aspects. Section six is divided in several subsections discussing the results of the survey: 
(1) the banks’ perception regarding Switzerland’s vulnerability to money laundering 
                                                                
10    FATF or the Financial Action Task Force is an intergovernmental body which objectives are to set standards 
and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money launder-
ing, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. 
(http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/) 
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operations, the perceived clarity and success of AMLA; (2) the current AML process 
inside the Swiss banks with a focus on the monitoring and reporting procedures and 
(3) banks’ motivation for fighting money laundering as well as the perceived benefits 
and burdens of AML compliance. The potential limitations of our study are discussed 
in part seven and the concluding remarks are made in the last section.  
 
3.2. AML compliance in the literature 
 
 
In their comparative study of the AML framework in Switzerland, UK, US and Singa-
pore, Pieth et al. (2003) underline that each national legal system consists of at least 
three layers: (1) the written laws and regulations, (2) the adoption of these laws in in-
ternal policies, procedures and compliance and (3) the corporate culture which guar-
antees that the regulations actually influence the behaviour of the banking staff. The 
majority of the studies in the AML field analyse the first two layers; the research re-
garding the third layer has been rather limited.  
Regarding the first layer, we observe that the events of 9/11 pushed many coun-
tries to update their national AML framework or, upon FATF’s pressure, to introduce 
one in some of those countries where it was missing completely. In each case, the 
FATF’s 49 ‘universal’ recommendations were incorporated into national regulations 
by taking into account the specificities of the country. This wave of regulatory updates 
gained attention among researchers who started to analyse the nature of these laws and 
their fit in the national political and socio-economical context. As such, we find pub-
lications discussing in detail various national AML systems in relation to the interna-
tionally proposed recommendations. Beside the studies of Verhage (2011) and Favarel-
Garrigues et al. (2008) mentioned earlier, other studies focusing on industrialized coun-
tries include: Veng et al. (2007) which describes UK’s AML domestic measures, provide 
a classification of the money laundering offences and analyse the roles played by the 
Serious Organised Crime Agency, the Financial Services Authority and the Joint 
Money Laundering Steering Group;  Johnson (2002), Preston (2002) and Van Cleef 
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(2004) focus on the PATRIOT Act as US’s reaction post 9/11’s events, Blöcker (2003, 
2005) analyses the AML duties imposed in Germany on professionals dealing with 
assets while Murphy (2003) discusses Canada's laws on money laundering and pro-
ceeds of crime. Researchers have also shown interest toward the AML developments 
taking place in emerging countries - South Africa (de Koker, 2002), China (Ping, 2003) 
Mexico (Vargas et al., 2003), Turkey (Günes, 2009, Türkşen et al., 2011), Hong Kong 
(Kwok, 2008) etc. Last but not least, Mugarura (2013) analysed the regulatory environ-
ment in less developed countries to evaluate their readiness to AML regimes imple-
mentation, whereas Zagaris (2007) discussed the problems connected to the imple-
mentation of standard AML procedures to non-financial transactions, "parallel bank-
ing systems" and Islamic financial systems in countries such as UAE, Afghanistan, 
Somalia. 
As FATF’s encouragement for cooperation continued to gain popularity, coun-
tries were stimulated into a kind of competition regarding the comprehensiveness of 
their AML laws in terms of the 49 Recommendations. The regular Mutual Evaluations 
carried out by FATF created a clear ranking as to where every member stands in terms 
of compliance with each recommendation and what should be done in order to im-
prove the existing deficiencies. Several comparative studies of AML regulations have 
analysed these differences.  
One of these studies is the one of Pieth et al. (2003) mentioned earlier on. Moti-
vated by the negative comments regarding the Swiss involvement in the money laun-
dering fight, they analysed the ‘letter of the law’ and the functioning of the reporting 
systems in Switzerland, UK, US and Singapore. The authors concluded that the US 
and UK place far more emphasis on an “early reporting system” that favours the build-
ing up of a data base of intelligence for future tactical use by police, whereas in Swit-
zerland and Singapore considerable efforts are made in screening and understanding 
the profile of the clients and their transactions. An immediate consequence of this in-
depth knowledge of the client is the filtering out of weak cases such that fewer suspi-
cious cases are reported to the authorities.  
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This quality of the Swiss monitoring and reporting system is later also confirmed 
by Chaikin (2009). Another comparison regarding the law provisions, the organisation 
of the FIU and the management of the SARs in Switzerland, UK and Germany was 
done by Preller (2008). Her findings concerning the SAR management in Germany 
and Switzerland are similar with the ones of the previously mentioned studies, plus a 
remark that, unlike the Swiss FIU, the German and the English ones work as policing 
agencies and this ensures a smoother integration of the intelligence knowledge relevant 
to the prosecution authorities. 
The second layer mentioned by Pieth refers to the translation of national AML 
laws into internal corporate policies that must be adopted by all financial intermediar-
ies. Considering the limitations that the Government faces in terms of both resources 
and access to financial information the best solution proved to be the transfer of mon-
itoring and reporting tasks to the financial sector. As Gallo et al. (2005: 329) put it “a 
war against money laundering and terrorism financing cannot be fought by govern-
ment forces alone, the entire intelligence gathering and target acquisition process is in 
the hands of the private sector. There are no reconnaissance troops scouting forward, 
no spy planes overhead, it is a war that relies on information supplied by the financial 
industry”. In few words, the financial intermediaries were left with the duty to fight 
the money laundering phenomenon at the front line. As expected, this shift of respon-
sibility from the public to the private sector created several problems.  
First of all, the financial intermediaries lack the police’s investigative skills (Ver-
hage, 2011). In fact, the financial professions were not meant to identify and manage 
suspicious transactions. Instead, bankers are known for having developed a culture of 
privacy and non-interference in the financial transactions of their clients (Favarel-Gar-
rigues et al. 2011). Furthermore, as observed by Davies (2007) the financial sector has 
a different approach than the one of the law enforcement agencies when it comes to 
money and financial opportunities: professional financiers are paid to make substantial 
returns for their institutions, dealing in a market where money, be it clean or “dirty” is 
the most important “raw material”. Now they must learn to distrust this raw material. 
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Secondly, in order to cover this knowledge gap, banks and other financial insti-
tutions set up compliance departments, hired specialists in the field, trained the per-
sonnel and installed transaction-monitoring software systems. Besides covering the in-
itial set-up costs, the well-functioning of the compliance apparatus requires continuous 
investment by the banks. From their study of the Swiss wealth management industry 
conducted in 2003, Bührer et al. (2005) found that compliance costs connected with 
the prevention of money laundering vary from 8.374 CHF per employee for small 
banks to 5.059 CHF per employee for large banks, while securities dealers in the wealth 
management and securities trading pay as much as 4.936 CHF  and 145 CHF per em-
ployee. Moreover, a periodic survey carried out by KPMG measuring the efforts of 
the banks in the global AML fight constantly report an increase in the costs of AML 
compliance for the coming years, with the respondents indicating an expected increase 
of 61%, 58% and 45% respectively (see KPMG 2004, 2007, 2011). It is important to 
mention though, that such cost projections are only indications of the important in-
vestments required by AML compliance. First, as underlined by van Duyne et al. (2016) 
the percentages indicated by the respondents can be little more than subjective projec-
tions or guesses without baseline numbers. As such, they can under- or over-estimate 
the reality. Secondly, AML-associated compliance costs go beyond those items visible 
in the financial intermediary’s Profit and Loss statement and that allow for a mathe-
matical calculus (such as the salary of the compliance officers and the set-up and man-
agement of compliance IT). Very often, in managing the reporting of complex cases 
other departments such as the legal or the top-management are also involved in the 
decision-making process. Moreover, there are other costs that are very difficult to 
quantify and to predict: for example, training of client facing employees, redesign of 
specific bank-documentation to take into consideration compliance matters, manage-
ment of conflict that can arise between compliance and relationship managers.  
Pieth’s third pillar is believed to be the most challenging element of an effective 
AML policy: the development of a corporate culture such that the actual purpose of 
the policy -be it fighting criminality, or simply protecting reputation- is achieved. A 
study by Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2008) presented an extensive list of factors 
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that determine the adoption of a compliant culture; for example: the possibility to pass 
on costs to third parties, the imposed sanctions and penalties in case of misbehaviour, 
the alignment and convergence between the business’s interests with those of the gov-
ernment, the degree of cooperation and procedural fairness displayed by the lawmaker, 
the industry and the size of the firm and the expectations of the public, to name just a 
few. Although referred to compliance in general, these factors are pertinent also for 
the AML compliance policy. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that, depending 
on the organisational structure, the following factors will all influence compliance: 
knowledge of the law, type of ownership, costs of compliance, the proximity of the 
firm to inspectors, workforce resistance or pressure (Genn, 1993). 
 
3.3. Research questions  
 
 
 
This study relates to, but in important ways differs from and adds to two previous 
studies. Favarel-Garrigues et al. (2008, 2011) surveys a broad range of participants in-
volved in the AML fight in France: law enforcement agencies, FIU, associations of 
professionals, compliance officers working inside banking institutions, in order to un-
derstand the new relationship that the AML fight has created between the government 
and the banks. They also analysed the French banks’ incentives and efforts in stopping 
money laundering. Similarly, Verhage (2011) draws a picture of the Belgian AML Com-
plex and Compliance industry. The primary focus of her survey however, is the figure 
of the compliance officer and more precisely his role inside the bank and his views on 
the AML regulation in place.  
Previous publications focusing on Switzerland were limited to describing the 
Swiss AML framework, without collecting empirical evidence about the banks’ reac-
tion to these changes. In order to cover this knowledge gap but also as a way of com-
parison with current practices in other countries, we proposed the following three re-
search questions (RQ). First of all, since banks (as well as other types of financial in-
termediaries) have been ‘dragged’ by the Governments into counteracting the money 
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laundering phenomenon, we were interested in understanding, given their day-by-day 
experience, how they assess Switzerland’s vulnerability to money laundering transac-
tions (RQ1). Secondly, even if the AML is compulsory and entails significant costs for 
the bank, there are also benefits from adopting a compliant behaviour. Hence, we in-
vestigated what are the drivers determining the banks to invest in the AML fight 
(RQ2). Last but not least, given the risk-based approach embedded into the Swiss 
AMLA, we documented the significant compliance measures that banks have put in 
place to fight money laundering (RQ3). 
 
3.4. Data collection 
 
 
 
Previous research in the field of AML compliance acknowledged the limited availability 
and comparability of private data. According to Verhage (2011) corporations can be 
very reluctant to provide data to outsiders such as researchers, especially when the 
subject matter is very delicate. Indeed, it is very rare that a bank will choose to publish 
information about its internal AML policy, and even in such a case, it will be limited 
to what it is required to do by law. This problem pushed many authors to choose the 
survey as a data collection method: Masciandaro et al. (2001), Webb (2004), Bührer et 
al. (2005), Verhage (2009), Harvey and Lau (2009). 
Faced with these limitations, we decided to use the survey as a data collection 
method too. We developed a first draft survey that took into consideration the char-
acteristics of the Swiss AML framework. This draft version contained 50 questions. 
We solicited feedback from several academic researchers and specialists involved in 
the Swiss AML system for survey content and structure. We also contacted one survey 
research specialist in order to obtain advice about how to minimise biases induced by 
the questionnaire and maximise the response rate.  
The final version of the questionnaire had 30 questions and was divided into 
four sections (The complete questionnaire can be found in Annex 1):  
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1. The first section was dedicated to general information about the respondent 
and the banking institution for which he was working.  
2. The second section asked practical questions about the internal AML policy. 
However, in order to minimise biased answers, we tried to avoid questions that could 
be understood as verifying the banks’ compliance with AMLA’s requirements. Instead, 
we were interested in evaluating certain AML practices and behaviours that AMLA left 
at the discretion of the bank.  
3. The next section focused on the compliance process inside the bank: collect-
ing information about the client, deciding whether to report him to MROS and how 
useful the banks considered MROS’s feedback.  
4.  The fourth and last part referred to general topics connected to the crime of 
money laundering and the role that the financial institutions have in counteracting this 
crime. 
The on-line questionnaire was to be completed by the compliance officer of the 
bank. If this person was not available, we required that a person who had enough 
knowledge about AMLA and about his institution’s internal AML policy completed 
the survey. The questionnaire was available on-line for a period of eight weeks. The 
respondents were given the possibility to complete the questionnaire in English, Ger-
man, French or Italian. 
From the Swiss Bankers Association’s (SBA) Member List we selected all the 
banking institutions that have their Swiss headquarters in one of the three principal 
financial hubs in Switzerland: the cantons of Zurich, Geneva and Ticino. A total of 
139 banks were contacted for participating in the survey; this means almost 40% of 
the total banking institutions operating in Switzerland.   
The survey was delivered according to the Dillman (2007) procedure: a cover 
letter explaining the objective of the study sent one week before the questionnaire 
became available on-line, a letter containing the details for accessing the online plat-
form, a first reminder after three weeks and a second and final reminder after other 
three weeks. In each of these four communications we mentioned the support of the 
SBA regarding our study in order to encourage the banks to participate in the survey. 
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At the end of the survey, we conducted a total of nine interviews with different 
specialists interested in the Swiss AML system: four compliance officers, two MROS 
officials, two relationship managers and one executive member of the SBA. These in-
terviews served two different purposes: first of all, the interviews with the compliance 
officers provided insight and depth to our understanding about the survey responses; 
secondly, since the majority of the questions asked to the other specialists were similar 
to those in the questionnaire, we were able to have a better picture about how the 
different actors involved in the AML fight think about the same issues. All the inter-
views were conducted in person and were arranged with the agreement that the identity 
of the banks and individuals will remain anonymous. 
In addition to the survey and the interviews, we separately collected data from 
the Swiss National Bank’s database about the total assets of the banks in the survey. 
 
 
1.1. Methodology 
 
 
The key difference between this study and the existing research consists in the 
methodology employed in order to map out significant differences between the per-
ceptions held by the respondents. More precisely, we coded the data collected from 
the survey as ordinal or interval, depending on the type of questions: we coded the 
answers related to questions asking the respondent to rank certain characteristics in 
ascending order from 1 to 6, while for those questions measuring the extent to which 
the respondents agreed with a certain statement we used a 5-points Likert scale going 
from -2 (not at all) to +2 (large extent). Moreover, in order to have an idea about what 
the respondents think on average about the various AML matters for each question 
we computed a score going from 1 to 6 for the ordinal data and from -2 to +2 for the 
interval data (as in Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005). 
In a further stage, the sample was divided according to several characteristics of 
the respondents and of the banking institutions for which they were working. For the 
29 
 
banking institutions we considered: (1) the canton of residence, (2) the type of owner-
ship, (3) the size, (4) the percentage of foreign assets under management relative to the 
total assets under management. We also checked whether the bank (5) has sent at least 
a SAR in the previous year and if it (6) has been sanctioned for breaching any of the 
mandatory AML requirements.  
For the respondent we took into account his/her compliance tenure and the 
daily working time dedicated to AML matters. This differentiation is intended to de-
termine whether and how the accumulated professional experience can influence the 
beliefs that a compliance officer holds about certain AML matters. The literature on 
AML compliance has noted that the specific due-diligence duties may go against the 
bank’s raison d’être to make profits (see Verhage, 2011; Favarel-Garrigues et. al, 2008; 
Subbotina, 2009). This is because banks must commit sizeable resources to carry out 
all the CDD procedures. In addition, banks lose business by rejecting clients, whereas, 
in some cases it will be the clients who will decide to leave the bank, scared by all the 
(sometimes unnecessary) compliance requests. Since not all compliance officers admit 
that the AML law threatens the bank’s profitability, we differentiated between those 
who perceived a conflict between the AML compliance duties and the profit maximi-
zation-function of the bank from those who did not.  
For each question of the survey conditional averages were reported and t-tests 
were carried out in order to map out significant differences among the groups. 
 
 
3.6. Results 
 
 3.6.1. Respondents 
 
 
At the end of the survey period, 52 web-questionnaires were returned, even if not all 
of them were complete. Prior to the survey, we decided to leave respondents the choice 
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of not answering questions with which they did not feel comfortable. A limited re-
sponse rate was however expected given the delicate topic of the survey and the well-
known discretion of Swiss banks. 
Tables 3.1 to 3.3 present summary information about the professionals that sub-
mitted the questionnaire and the institutions they represent. The reported statistics are 
calculated on the non-missing values for each particular characteristic. Table 3.1 di-
vides the banks according to their type and the canton where they are domiciled. The 
total rate of response was 37.4% and the highest number of responses -in absolute 
terms- came from the banks domiciled in the canton of Zürich, followed by Geneva 
and Ticino. As for the type of bank, the majority of responses came from foreign-
controlled banks (65.4%), followed by banks that specialize in stock exchange, securi-
ties and asset management (15.4%), cantonal banks (5.8%), major banks (3.8%), pri-
vate bankers (3.8%) and other banking institutions (5.8%). 
Table 3. 1: Number of banks in the population and in the sample by canton and by type of 
bank 
    Sample % of Total Population % of Total 
Panel A: By canton N % N % 
Geneva  15 29 50 36 
Zurich 28 54 71 51 
Ticino 9 17 18 13 
TOTAL 52 100% 139 100% 
     
Panel B: By type of bank N % N % 
Cantonal Banks 3 6 3 2 
Big Banks 2 4 2 1 
Banks specialising in stock exchange 8 15 28 20 
Other banking institutions 3 6 6 4 
Foreign controlled banks 34 65 84 60 
Regional and savings banks 0 0 1 1 
Branches of foreign banks 0 0 5 4 
Institutions with a special business field 0 0 1 1 
Private bankers 2 4 9 6 
TOTAL 52 100% 139 100% 
A bank is deemed to be foreign-controlled if foreigners with a qualified participation in the bank directly or indirectly 
hold more than half of its voting shares, or if they exercise a controlling interest in any other matter  
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As expected, the majority of the banks manage mainly assets of foreign origin 
(65.4%, i.e. 34 out of 48 banks, see Table 3.2). Moreover, almost 60% (i.e. 27 out of 
46) of the banks in our sample reported to the MROS at least one time the year before 
our study. Finally, a total of 6 banks (out of a total of 46) admitted to have been sanc-
tioned for breaching AML requirements. 
 
Table 3. 2: Bank Characteristics 
Variable Category Count Description 
Ownership 
Swiss (CH) 18 Indicates whether the controlling shareholder of 
the bank is Swiss or foreign Foreign (F) 34 
Assets under man-
agement (AUM) 
CH 14 Indicates whether the percentage of foreign AUM 
is greater than 50% of the total AUM of the bank F 34 
Size 
Small 25 This measure considers the bank’s total assets. 
The sample is divided at the 50% quintile. Large 25 
Suspicious Activity 
Report (SAR) 
No 19 Indicates whether the bank has transmitted at 
least one SAR to the MROS in the year 2011 Yes 27 
Sanctioned 
No 40 Indicates whether the bank has been sanctioned 
for AML breaches in the last five year Yes 6 
              
 
Table 3. 3: Respondent Characteristics 
Variable Category Count Description 
Tenure 
Short 26 Indicates whether the respondent has been working 
for less than 5 years (short tenure) or more than 5 
years (long tenure) in the actual department. Long 26 
AML tasks 
Full 16 Indicates whether the respondent dedicates more 
than 50% of his working time to AML matters Part 36 
Contradiction 
Yes 18 Indicates whether the respondent perceives a contra-
diction between AML compliance requirements and 
the commercial interests of the bank No 30 
 
Regarding the compliance officers’ tenure the sample is perfectly balanced, 
whereas as far as the time dedicated to AML during the day is concerned, only one 
third of the respondents dedicate more than 50% of their daily working time to such 
tasks (or shortly “full time” vs. “part-time” compliance officers, see Table 3.3). This 
could be an indicator of the limited resources that especially small banks have when it 
comes to compliance. While bigger banks have dedicated AML departments, medium-
sized banks usually centralize all professionals taking care of legal matters and rule 
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observance in a department called generically “Compliance department”. As one RM 
explained post-survey “Small banks, with fewer employees and a reduced client base, 
will usually have an attorney managing all the legal problems” [RM1].  
Moreover, 38% of the surveyed compliance officers (i.e. 18 out of 48) confessed 
that they perceive a contradiction between AML compliance and the commercial in-
terests of the bank. This perceived contradiction can make the compliance officer ex-
perience a role uncertainty, as he has the duty to apply strict AML policies that can 
limit certain business opportunities but he also needs to acknowledge the bank’s need 
to develop business so it can create value for the shareholders. In such situation, we 
believe that the compliance officer is more likely to experience doubts regarding the 
advantages of compliance.  
 
 
 
3.6.2. Switzerland’s vulnerability to money laundering 
 
 
The respondents’ perceptions about both Switzerland’s vulnerability to money laun-
dering operations, and the clarity and effectiveness of AMLA, are very likely to influ-
ence the compliance with the AML measures in place. First of all, the resources in-
vested in compliance will depend on the extent to which banks perceive the danger of 
being used for money laundering purposes. Secondly, if the law is clear and easy to put 
in practice then it is more likely for the regulated community to be compliant, whereas 
if the drafting is defective or leaves room for misinterpretation, the perceived legiti-
macy of the regulations will be affected (Kagan and Scholz, 1984).  
On a scale from 1 to 5, respondents judged AMLA to be very clear on average 
(3.9 points, see Table A.5 for differences among the three cantons). In addition, 75% 
(39 banks) of the respondents considered AMLA to be successful in its inherent pur-
pose (see Table A.1). However, almost the same percentage (70%; 36 banks) of re-
spondents considered Switzerland to be vulnerable to money laundering operations. 
Typically, one would observe vulnerability as a result of a deficient law or a scarce 
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enforcement. On the other hand, vulnerability is a subjective term, such that, despite 
a well-functioning law, certain compliance officers can still consider their banks vul-
nerable to money laundering attempts. The conditional analysis discussed in the next 
paragraph will shed more light on this aspect. It should also be noted that, fearing 
further regulatory tightening, some respondents might have refrained from expressing 
a negative judgment regarding AMLA.  
Since the banks’ suspicion of money laundering is frequently aroused by the 
news read in the media (See Table 2.3 in Chapter 2) it is useful to understand whether 
the belief that Switzerland is vulnerable to money laundering operations is due to pro-
fessional experience or to media coverage. Conditional analysis in Panel B (Table A.1, 
column 4, row 1) confirms the hypothesis that professional experience is, most likely, 
the explanation: there is a positive and significant difference between the perceptions 
held in this regard by full-time compliance officers and part-time compliance officers. 
We see that the time spent on AML problems by the respondents marks a significant 
difference also in the way in which AMLA’s success is perceived: both full-time and 
long tenured compliance officers consider AMLA to be more successful (Table A.1, 
column 3, row 2). In addition, small banks perceive the money laundering danger to a 
smaller extent since they usually serve only a limited number of clients that were ref-
ereed either by a professional company (e.g. corporate trustees, external asset manag-
ers, etc.) or an existing client (column 5, row 1). Finally, the compliance officer’s having 
filed a SAR seems to significantly influence his perception about Switzerland’s vulner-
ability to money laundering: the fact that his suspicion was strong enough to translate 
into a SAR is an indication that the system is vulnerable to these crimes (hence, the 
difference compared to those compliance officers that didn’t sent a SAR, see Panel B, 
column 9, row 1).   
From our post-survey interviews we learn that the belief about Switzerland’s 
vulnerability to money laundering is not shared by all the professionals. According to 
one compliance officer, foreigners continue to misinterpret the way of doing banking 
in Switzerland nowadays, and he underlines that “the time when certain things could 
be done in Switzerland is over (. . .). If I would be in need of laundering money, I 
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wouldn’t come here” [CO3]. Likewise, relationship managers laugh about the foreign-
ers’ imagination regarding the “magical” transactions that can be carried in Switzerland 
which seem to be fuelled by the 007 series in which James Bond deposits his money 
into a Swiss bank. On MROS’s side, the following has been underlined: “Switzerland 
is not necessarily more vulnerable to money laundering compared to other countries. 
Our AML legislation is ahead other similar legislations and it works well” [MROS1] 
and that the problem is “that many clients are foreign and this makes it difficult to 
investigate the real source of the funds” [MROS2].   
To understand how the laundering could take place, we asked which financial 
instruments are most likely to be used by money launderers. From Figure 1 we see that 
transactions involving real estate were prevalently mentioned, followed by interna-
tional wire transfers, operations using the current account and cash operations. As one 
compliance officer explained, it is much easier to produce documents justifying a real-
estate transaction, especially when the buying and selling activities are very intense in 
this sector. In addition, depending on the culture of the clients one would expect to 
see different operations in cash (e.g. in canton Ticino many operations are concluded 
in cash, due to the Italians’ propensity to use it [CO2]). 
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3.6.3 A picture of the AML process inside Swiss banks 
 
 
3.6.3.1. Discretional CDD and KYC duties 
 
 
Table 3.4 reports banks’ behaviour concerning certain CDD and KYC duties that 
FINMA’s MLO left at the discretion of the financial intermediaries, depending on the 
cases they encounter. That is to say, in cases of clients or operations that, by their 
nature, carry a higher money laundering risk, banks are required to ask for additional 
clarifications, using, among others means, the available sources of investigations (see 
Row 1 and 3). Likewise, a bank is required to appropriately weight the risks of main-
taining a business relation with a client that has not been personally identified (see Row 
4). Finally, after having identified the client and his business intentions, if the reasons 
why he chooses Switzerland for opening an account are not obvious, the bank is enti-
tled to suspect him of money laundering and should ask for additional information to 
clarify this point (see Row 2). As it emerges from Table 3.4, in all the cases, the majority 
of the banks choose to be over-compliant.  
 
Table 3. 4: Banks’ internal practices regarding discretional Customer  
Due-Diligence Practices 
       The following table reports the number of banks answering the question:  How often does your bank? 
 Always Usually Half of the 
time 
Seldom Never AVG  
Verify the profile of the client against 
lists of persons 
48 2 0 1 0 1.90 
Verify the clients' reasons to open an 
account in a foreign jurisdiction 
27 17 0 1 0 1.56 
Screen transactions against lists of per-
sons, entities, countries 
41 5 0 1 1 1.75 
Accept clients that have not been per-
sonally identified 
1† 3† 3 21 20 -1.17 
Respondents were asked to indicate how often they take an action in each case. Columns (1) to (5) present the number of 
respondents choosing that particular answer. The average rating in Column (6) is based on the following weights: 2 for “Al-
ways”, 1 for “Usually”, 0 for “Half of the time”, -1 for “Seldom” and -2 for “Never”.   
† These 4 banks, by their nature, deal only with institutional investors, for whom identification is not always necessary. 
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There are two potential explanations for this behaviour. The first one is con-
nected to the risk-based approach that financial institutions are required to apply when 
implementing the AML requirements. On one hand, giving banks the power to decide 
how to tailor their decision making depending on their customer base type, their prod-
ucts and the markets in which they operate, is, without any doubt, an unquestionable 
advantage, as it allows them to focus their resources only on those cases that deserve 
special attention. On the other hand, the flexibility associated with the risk-based ap-
proach disguises the regulators’ inability to provide a substantial guidance in the risk 
definition process and this can lead to potential frictions between AML stakeholders 
and regulators (Demetis et al. 2007). The second explanation is the fear of repression, 
which implies legal sanctions and reputational damages. This may push banks to do 
more than required or to do all that is needed to “cover their backs” (Harvey and Lau, 
2009), as the fear of being punished turns the risk-based approach into a risk avoiding 
approach. In fact, when asked whether they consider their internal AML policy to be 
stricter than other Swiss banks’ AML policy 64% of the respondents considered this 
to be the case (see Table A.1, row 3).   
In line with the AML-related training practices observed in other countries -see 
Webb (2004) for the case of UK - more than 75% of the banks train their employees 
every one or two years with regard to the main AML practices (Table 3.5). 
 
    Table 3. 5: Banks’ AML training practices 
The following table reports the number of banks answering the question:  How often do you train rele-
vant employees with regard to the following issues? 
 Never 
Just 
once 
Every 1-
2 years 
Every 6 
months 
Total  
(1) Identification and reporting of transactions that 
must be reported to Government authorities 
1 3 40 5 49 
(2) Examples of different forms of money launder-
ing involving the banks' products 
1 2 39 8 50 
(3) Internal policies to prevent money laundering 1 3 36 9 49 
(4) Trade based money laundering 5 2 32 3 42 
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3.6.3.2 Reporting suspicious activities 
 
 
 
One specificity of the Swiss AML reporting system is that it “was designed in such a 
way that the financial intermediaries are part of the system and not subordinates; they 
are urged to reason, to make choices and justify their decision to send a SAR. [. . .] the 
system was built in this particular way in order to protect the value of privacy and not 
to hide things, as it has been often accused” [MROS1]. In fact, many “supposedly 
suspicious cases” do not reach the MROS because the financial intermediaries’ in-
house investigations do not provide enough objective elements to substantiate the sus-
picion [CO1]. The logic consequence of this “reasoned” reporting system is that the 
number of SARs received annually by the MROS is considerably lower when com-
pared with other countries (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
On the other hand, giving the financial intermediaries the responsibility to justify 
the reasonableness of their suspicion leaves a lot of room for interpretation. In their 
semantic analysis of the verb “to suspect”, Rigotti and Palmieri (2014) conclude that a 
suspicion can be based on facts/acts that are observable or it can be limited to a simple 
hunch. To mitigate this individual bias, there will be more than one person deciding 
whether to report a client.  
                    Table 3. 6: Banks’ Suspicious Activity Reporting practices 
The following table reports the number of banks answering the ques-
tion: Through how many layers of decision making a SAR must pass 
before being transmitted to MROS? 
 
Answer Count % of Total 
One layer 8 15 
Two layers 26 50 
Three layers 9 17 
Four layers 1 2 
Five layers 1 2 
Total 52 100 % 
 
In fact, we see that only 15% of the banks in the sample claimed that the decision 
to transmit a SAR will be taken by a single individual, whereas in 50% and 17% of the 
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instances it will be considered at two, respectively three different levels of authority 
(see Table 3.6). Sometimes, it will even take four (2%) or five (2%) distinct layers of 
agreement before informing MROS11. It must be emphasized that not all the banks 
can accommodate the bureaucracy costs connected to a manifold decision making pro-
cess. For small banks, the decision to report a suspicious case will be taken either by 
the relationship manager/asset manager or by the compliance officer. Medium banks 
will resort to the conclusion of the relationship manager taken jointly with the compli-
ance officer and sometimes with the executive board. Finally, bigger banks will rely on 
the opinion of the AML responsible, the head of compliance, a reputational risk com-
mittee and, depending on the client, the executive management. 
Previous studies have discussed the practice of “defensive filing” or “umbrella 
reports”, meaning that financial intermediaries will report every time they have the 
merest suspicion of money laundering (see Harvey, 2004; Levi, 2007, Favarel-Gar-
rigues et al., 2008). In the same time, Verhage (2011) found that banks are looking for 
a balance regarding the number of reports forwarded to the FIU, even if they do not 
have any benchmark to help them in this respect. In contrast, 75% of the banks in our 
sample consider the number of forwarded SARs to be fair, i.e. everything that should 
be reported is reported (see Table 3.7). During the interviews, the compliance officers 
denied the practice of “umbrella reporting”, stating that they “never had the tendency 
to easily report a client, but this does not mean underestimating the facts or covering 
those situations in which we had a strong suspect” [CO1].   
 
Table 3. 7: Banks’ opinion regarding the number of SARs sent to MROS 
The table reports the number of banks answering the question: To what extent do you 
think your institution is under or over reporting suspicious activities to MROS? 
 
Answer Count % of Total 
(1) Under reporting 1 2 
(2) 1 2 
(3) Fair reporting 39 75 
(4) 2 4 
(5) Over reporting 0 0 
Total 43 83% 
Average scoring         2,98 
                                                                
11 This is usually the case when an important client is involved and the reputational risks at stake are 
very significant. 
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  With regard to the life of a SAR after leaving the bank, we notice an almost 
unilateral communication flow between the MROS and the reporting bank. That is to say, 
MROS can ask the bank additional information about the reported client (cf. to the inter-
views with MROS analysts and the compliance officers) and communicate the final result 
of its investigation without any detailed feedback about the bank’s judgements or compli-
ance actions. The survey’s answers confirm the meagre utility of MROS’s feedback, with 
only 30% of the banks considering it useful in carrying out the due AML tasks (see Table 
3.8). This problem has not been encountered only in Switzerland. An early study by the 
European Commission (2008) pointed out that the feedback from the FIU to the report-
ing entities may be limited because: FIUs are understaffed and cannot timely provide so 
many answers; ongoing investigations may be put at risk; or strict secrecy laws prevent 
FIUs from disclosing specific feedback. Considering all these problems, the FIU is likely 
to be a kind of “black box” with compliance officers having small or no clue at all about 
the outcome of their reports (Verhage, 2011). On the other hand, MROS admits that the 
quality of the received SARs is good, i.e. one can really see the efforts made by the financial 
intermediaries in documenting their suspicions [MROS1, MROS2].   
 
       Table 3. 8: Banks’ opinions regarding the usefulness of MROS’s feedback 
The following table reports the number of banks answering the question: To what extent 
do you consider the information and feedback (technical assistance) provided by MROS 
and prosecuting authorities to be useful in carrying out your AML tasks? 
 
 Large extent or 
Certain extent 
Not 
sure 
Limited extent 
or Not at all 
No answer 
Answer 16 4 20 12 
 
 
3.6.4. Why do banks involve in the AML fight? 
 
 
Given the interdependence of the global financial system, governments understood 
that the fight against money laundering can only be fought by coordinating their efforts 
internationally. Together with the design of a national AML framework, lawmakers 
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tried to increase public awareness by underlining the dangers associated with the facil-
itation of money laundering. More specifically, they claim that if criminals are given 
the possibility to launder ill-gotten profits and hence perpetuate crime, the stability of 
the financial sector will be shaken and the economy and society as a whole will be put 
at peril. However, proven evidence of such effects is very limited and several scholars 
have discussed the size of this danger. For example, van Duyne et. al (2010) surveyed 
the existing research on the size of the money laundering phenomenon, challenging 
the conceptual flaws of the two most famous econometrical models employed in this 
sense: the one of Schneider (2007) and the one of Unger and Walker (2009). The pain 
point of the first model is the assumption that underground economy concerns only 
revenues hidden in cash, whereas the second model suffers from the use of arithmetic 
averages as central tendency instead of the median. In the same paper, van Duyne et 
al. (2010) encouraged researches and authorities to reflect upon the real effects that 
money laundering can have on the economy and on the financial system’s stability. In 
this regard they questioned the potential inflationary effect that hidden money (typi-
cally estimated at 5% of the GDP by IMF) can have on the state budget given that 
such money are spent on consumer goods which are also taxed. Moreover, they un-
derlined the ridiculously small numbers of banks (most of which were not even inter-
nationally known) that actually went bankrupt for facilitating money laundering. Some 
years later, Halliday, Levi and Reuter (2014) also reviewed the available scientific re-
search on the relationship between proceeds of crime, money laundering and macro-
economic financial stability and concluded that besides being narrowly targeted, well-
evidenced impact mostly involves tiny economies, such as those of Caribbean and 
South Pacific states.  
Taking note of the empirical gaps evidenced above, if one is to stick to the gen-
eral belief that “crime is bad”, it is safe to assume that every actor engaging in the AML 
fight believes that the crime of money laundering must be eradicated. Nevertheless, in 
times of shrinking profits and increasing compliance costs, the banks’ motivations to 
invest resources in AML can have different origins. The existing literature has often 
cited the reputational risk, apart from the legal obligation, as the banks’ most important 
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motivation for investing in AML. In this case, reputational risk is given by the proba-
bility to incur losses due to a damaged corporate image. This type of loss is difficult to 
quantify, but one can easily imagine that a depositor will not be happy to find out that 
his bank has been abetting criminals and that a public authority is investigating and 
eventually confiscating part of the assets deposited herein.  
Whereas Swiss banks have experienced several episodes of “legal irregulari-
ties”12, none of them reported a loss of clients such that to be forced to shut down 
operations. However, we believe that the recent (global) shift toward increased trans-
parency has pushed banks to place more value on their reputation (especially since 
clients are no longer willing to pay a price for the banking secrecy).  
Our results confirm the above hypothesis, since reputational risks score the 
highest among the reasons of why banks get involved in the AML fight (4.88 points 
on average, on a scale from 1 to 613), see Table A.2, Panel A, row 1). This score is 
significantly higher for banks that manage local assets (5.38 points) and banks that have 
not sent a SAR in the year prior to our study (5.21 points; see conditional analyses in 
Panel B, row 1, columns 7 and 9). A possible explanation regarding the latter would be 
that if a bank thoroughly considers its reputational risks, it can refrain from accepting 
those clients whose situation is not 100% clear. This will spare them the subsequent 
burden of harshly monitoring these clients and eventually sending a SAR.  
We think that for those banks that choose to focus on local clients reputational 
issues at stake are higher since the trust placed with the bank is higher given the smaller 
social distance. Moreover, the scores registered in Table A.2 Panel B, column 6 show 
that for Swiss-owned banks reputational risks are more important than for foreign-
owned banks (even if not significant). In fact, the recent money laundering scandals 
involving Swiss branches of foreign banks (e.g. HSBC, 2012 and BNP Paribas, 2014) 
seem to confirm the fact that, despite Switzerland’s efforts to implement forefront 
                                                                
12 For example the Chiasso Scandal that led to the introduction of the “Agreement on the Swiss banks’ Code of 
Conduct with regard to  the Exercise of Due Diligence” in 1997, the HSBC money laundering case settled with the 
payment of fine of GBP 28 Mio, the UBS tax evasion scandal regarding US persons in 2008, or the recent 1MDB 
fraud involving two smaller Swiss banks – BSI and Falcon Bank (2016) 
13) Six points were assigned if the reason was ranked as first, five if ranked as second, four if ranked as third and so 
on. The final score is the weighted average of all the ranks that every single reason got. 
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AML legislation, foreign investors still believe they can exploit the banking secrecy for 
criminal purposes or at least apply less rigid AML principles. 
In the second place banks ranked regulatory risk (4.02 points) defined as the 
probability of incurring a loss due to the bank’s being fined or suspended by the en-
forcement authorities. Previous research has shown that large banks follow riskier 
strategies than smaller banks (Boyd et. al 1993, Schnabel 2009). This can be due to the 
fact that they are more likely to be bailed out in case of failure (i.e. they are considered 
to be “too big to fail”). However, this fact has come to the public attention during the 
current financial crisis and many governments took action by making banking regula-
tion more rigorous. In panel B row 2, column 5 we see that larger banks assign a sig-
nificantly higher importance to regulatory risk; this is because bigger banks are now 
more monitored and so, more likely to be sanctioned in case of misbehaviour. This is 
consistent with Scholz and Gray (1990) who found that larger firms may be more at-
tentive to law enforcement, since they are more visible. In addition, the authors also 
claim that larger firms can better mitigate the risks brought to their attention during 
inspections, given the greater availability of managerial and investment resources that 
they potentially enjoy.  
Reputational risk and regulatory risk are very connected between them. If a bank 
is sanctioned for facilitating money laundering operations its reputation will be tainted. 
As Harvey (2004) noted, the loss of reputation can translate into direct costs (loss of 
income), indirect costs (clients leaving the bank) and opportunity costs (foregone busi-
ness opportunities). For more than 75% of the banks in our sample these reputational 
damages are a valid motivation for considering the investment in AML compliance 
beneficial (see Table A.3, Panel A, row 1). In addition, full-time compliance officers 
perceive a greater benefit of using compliance as a shield against reputational damages 
(see Panel B, column 4).  
The next important motivation that push financial institutions to get involved in 
the AML battle is the protection of the banking system’s integrity (3.63 points) and the 
avoidance of criminal charges (3.60 points, see Table A.2, rows 5 and 6). The failure 
of a single bank in observing AML obligations can have spill-over effects on the rest 
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of the banking system. As a consequence, banks will seek not only to protect their own 
reputation but also that of the whole banking system. In Belgium, banks claimed that 
financial institutions which get involved with money laundering should be severely 
punished by means of penal sanctions, blacklisting, license revocation, etc. (Verhage, 
2011).  
One of the most influential papers in criminology is the one of Becker (1968) 
who applies the traditional expected utility model to crime. As such, an individual’s 
decision to offend is a function of the perceived certainty and severity of the sanctions 
to be imposed, weighted against the expected profits. In addition, Grasmick et al. 
(1990) and Pogarsky, Piquero and Paternoster (2004) found that these perceptions are 
influenced by the individual’s past involvement in illegal behaviour. The results regis-
tered in Table A.2 Panel B, column 10 show that sanctioning does have a deterring 
effect on the banks’ behaviour, given that previously-sanctioned banks assign a signif-
icantly greater importance to the avoidance of criminal charges. 
Despite the fact that money laundering perpetuates crime and undermines the 
legal economy, banks assign limited importance to the social and moral concerns stem-
ming from the AML fight (2.65 points, see Table A.2 row 3). As noted above, if one 
has been sanctioned, he will completely change his perception about offending (see 
conditional averages in Panel B, column 10). It can be argued that banks are not con-
cerned with social and moral matters, since these are not directly impacting their object 
of profit. But if laundering is to take place inside the bank itself, then AML compliance 
will raise the awareness of this risk and will help the bank to effectively deal with it. In 
fact, this is acknowledged in 85% of the cases (see Table A.3, Panel A, row 2). More-
over, conditional analysis in Panel B, shows that this kind of benefit associated with 
AML compliance is more obvious to long-tenured compliance officers (column 3), 
smaller banks (column 5) and previously sanctioned banks (column 10). Consistent 
with our beliefs, the perceived advantages of AML legislation are smaller for those 
compliance officers who experience a role uncertainty: to whom the enactment of the 
AML legislation raises some doubts as to whether they should behave like the long-
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arm of the police and probably limit certain business opportunities (column 8). How-
ever, it seems that the avoidance of criminal charges -an inherent but also pragmatic 
reason for diverting resources to the AML fight- is enough of a motivation for prefer-
ring the certain AML compliance over uncertain profitability objectives (Table A.2, 
Panel B, column 8).   
Finally, banks do not seem to value the marketing opportunities given by the 
information collected for the KYC and CDD procedures (2.21 points, see Table A.2, 
Panel A, row 4) even if several authors stated that the obligation to construct a com-
plete profile of the client could be used by the bank to offer those products that better 
suit the needs of the client. However, this might not to be the case for Swiss banks. 
Since they offer predominantly private banking and asset management services, they 
already collect a considerable amount of information about their clients. Moreover, the 
type of information requested by AMLA will not necessarily prove useful in increasing 
the profitability of the single relationship. In fact, we see in Table A.3 row 3 that only 
36% of the respondents consider that compliance can prove useful for marketing pur-
poses and foster the development of new products. For smaller banks managing fewer 
clients, collecting even more information than they usually do can be useful since it 
can help them to offer better-targeted products (see conditional analysis in Panel B, 
column 5).  
The findings above indicate a clear tendency of the banking system to look after 
its own good – i.e. protecting its reputation – rather than caring about catching crimi-
nals who perpetuate crime in society. This preference for preventing something bad 
(reputation damage, sanctions, financial loss) rather than obtaining something good 
(hamper money laundering, catch criminals) has been observed also by Verhage (2011). 
On the other hand, it is fair to underline that investigating and catching criminals has 
always been the task of the authorities. They are the ones who are responsible for 
enacting laws and applying sanctions meant to deter people from offending.  
All in all, the diversity exhibited by the respondents’ answers with regard to the 
motivations for AML compliance corresponds to the image pictured by Favarel-Gar-
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rigues et al. (2008) in France: “in the fight against ‘dirty money’, some players are seek-
ing to combat terrorism (the police and some compliance officers), while others are 
seeking to preserve the international financial system (the IMF, the Basel Committee). 
Within the banks, compliance officers seek to protect their firms against regulatory 
sanctions”.  
 
 
3.6.5. Costs associated with the AML compliance 
 
 
Almost every research paper tackling the subject of money laundering brings into dis-
cussion the costs associated with its counteraction. The economic costs of AML com-
pliance that a financial institution must bear can be divided in tangible costs -all the 
physical and human capital needed to perform the due diligence tasks- and intangible 
costs -given by the inconvenience created to bank’s relationship with its clients (John-
ston et al. ,2006; Masciandaro et al., 2001). Analysing these costs from a broader per-
spective, Geiger and Wuensch (2007) noticed that the AML mechanism increases the 
direct costs of legitimate market transactions, hindering the working of the ‘invisible 
hand’ and reducing the wealth of nations. 
 
  Table 3. 9: Banks’ estimated AML compliance costs 
The following table reports the number of banks answering the question:  
Estimated AML compliance costs in proportion to the total costs of the bank 
 
 
Count % of Total 
Less than 5% 18 35 
Between 5 and 10% 12 23 
Between 11 and 20% 1 2 
More than 20% 0 0 
No answer 21 40 
Total 42 100 
 
Table 3.9 reports the answers about the estimated AML compliance costs in 
proportion to the total costs of the bank. About 35% of the sampled respondents 
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estimated this proportion at less than five percent, 23% placed it somewhere between 
five and ten percent, 40% chose not to respond, whereas one respondent representing 
2% of the sample said this proportion lies between 11 and 20%. These numbers are in 
line with the findings of Franks et al. (1997) who surveyed both securities firms and 
investment management firms and reported total average compliance costs (i.e. com-
pliance costs plus incremental compliance costs14) of respectively 3,1% and 7,9% of 
their net operating expenses. The high percentage of non-response to this question 
could be due to the fact that banks find it very difficult to quantify this type of costs 
(consistent with Harvey, 2004) or because the respondents were not enough ac-
quainted with the matter. Furthermore, it might also be the case that firms are reluctant 
to divulge the amount spent on compliance (Harvey and Lau, 2009).  
The descriptive data reported in Table A.3, row 6 show that almost 60% of the 
respondents perceive AML compliance costs as negatively impacting the bank. More-
over, the burden of these costs is significantly higher for the banks that have been 
sanctioned and the banks that reported to MROS in the previous year (see conditional 
analyses reported in Panel B column 9 and 10). These results indirectly suggest that 
reporting and non-compliance are expensive, even if for different reasons. In fact, as 
emphasized earlier, the AML reporting process inside the Swiss banks can be very 
time-consuming: the compliance officers need to gather documents justifying their 
suspicion, analyse them and then together with the management decide whether a SAR 
should be sent.  
Other negative effects of AML compliance that indirectly translate into costs are 
(a) the slowing down of the business and (b) the potential loss of clients due to the 
monitoring and reporting procedures (Verhage, 2011). In our study, the presence of 
these effects was acknowledged by the compliance officers in proportion of 40% and 
27%, respectively (see Table A.3 rows 4 and 5). The conditional analysis in Panel B 
report three interesting differences. First of all, foreign-controlled banks confide a sig-
nificantly higher loss of clients due to AMLA compliance (row 5, column 6). Secondly, 
                                                                
14 Incremental compliance costs are defined as the amount by which compliance costs exceed the costs that would 
be incurred in the course of normal good business practice. 
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we see that the AML compliance’s side effects are significantly more obvious to those 
compliance officers who perceive a contradiction between AML rule observance and 
the commercial interests of the bank (row 5, column 8). Thirdly, these negative effects 
are also higher for the SAR reporting banks, reconfirming thus the burden associated 
with the reporting process (column 9). 
Finally, narrowing down the focus to what the respondents think about the bur-
den associated with the collection of all the documents required by the AML due-
diligence procedures, we see that the opinions are somehow mixed. Asking the client 
to provide all the justifying documents for his transactions (e.g. selling a house, buying 
an expensive watch) before giving the authorization to proceed can prove very time 
consuming. In fact, even if almost 90% of the compliance officers in our sample con-
sider this to be normal business practice, half of them think that it can nevertheless 
become an administrative burden (see Table A.4, rows 2 and 3). As both compliance 
officers and relationship managers explained, the hardest part of the due-diligence pro-
cess is the initiation of a new business relationship. Knowing very little about the client 
and the way in which he built his fortune, they try to gather as much information as 
necessary to construct a valid profile of the client they are about to take in. Beside 
financial information, banks also need to obtain personal details about the client: place 
of birth, studies, professional experience, fiscal domicile, marital status, relevant polit-
ical/economical/religious/social connections. It is not always easy to get all this infor-
mation from the client. In fact, the relationship managers told us that “certain clients 
are very talkative and give more than what we ask, whereas some of them don’t under-
stand why we need to know all these things. One client told me ‘I want to give you 
(n.n. to the bank) my money, why do you need to know how many children I have?’” 
[RM2]. 
As suggested by Verhage’s (2011) findings, the typical due-diligence questions 
could be considered as a violation to one’s privacy. As opposed to Belgium where there 
is no banking secrecy, we were curious to understand whether the due-diligence pro-
cess raises the same concern for the Swiss professionals who put so much emphasis 
on one’s privacy. Our results indicate that only 17% of the sample considers them as 
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intrusive (see Table A.4, row 2). The explanation is that in order to be able to offer the 
typical ‘holistic, long term’ Swiss specific products and services, the banks would, in 
any case, need to collect such personal information. 
From the conditional results reported in Panel B we see that those banks which 
handle mainly Swiss assets are significantly more likely to consider the due-diligence 
procedures as a normal business procedure (column 7, row 2), while the opposite is 
true for foreign-controlled banks (column 6, row 2). In addition, such foreign-con-
trolled banks also indicated (to a significantly greater extent) that requiring justifying 
documents from the client might be intruding to one’s privacy (column 6, row 1). The 
latter is true also for banks that have been reporting suspicious activities to MROS 
(column 9, row 1). Following our earlier results, due to the costs associated with sub-
mitting a SAR, banks that have reported to MROS are more likely to consider the due 
diligence tasks as an administrative burden (column 9, row 3). At last, another statisti-
cally significant difference indicate that requiring documents for CDD procedures is 
more of an administrative burden for those compliance officers who believe that such 
procedures go against the profit-maximization function of the bank (column 8).  
 
3.7. Limitations 
 
 
 
In light of the results presented above, we must acknowledge some limitations con-
nected to the use of a questionnaire as a mean for data collection.  First of all, surveys 
measure beliefs, feelings and perceptions, which can be different from the behaviour 
in the real life. Furthermore, respondents may be affected by the “social desirability 
bias”, considering the delicate nature of the money laundering subject and the potential 
reputational damages connected to certain answers. We tried to address these prob-
lems when constructing our survey and deciding upon the strategy with which we 
would approach the respondents. As such, the questions to the respondent were for-
mulated in a way to collect information about certain general AML procedures and not 
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about specific practices. In any case, we left the respondent with the option of not 
answering a question, if uncomfortable with it.   
Another problem connected with the questionnaire-data is that it is barely quan-
tifiable and the use of conventional scales has been often criticized for their inability 
to measure the absolute magnitude of the differences between their points. Neverthe-
less, the validity of the methodology we employ has already been validated in other 
published works, in other fields (see for example Graham et al., 2005)  
Finally, the small sample size makes sample representativeness to the population 
questionable. To mitigate these concerns, Table 3.1 reports data about the entire pop-
ulation of banks that are members of the SBA and are based in one of the three cantons 
(Ticino, Geneva or Zurich). One can notice that the distribution of the three categories 
that represent more than 80% of the total banks in both the population and the sample 
is pretty similar (see categories 3 to 5), which allows us to safely generalize our results 
to the entire population. The only type of bank for which we have no observation in 
our sample is “branch of a foreign bank”. Nevertheless, we do not expect major dif-
ferences in their behaviours towards AML compliance, given that foreign banks open-
ing branches in Switzerland are obliged to follow both their home country’s regulations 
and the Swiss ones. Moreover, we believe that possible differences/characteristics at-
tributed to this bank category are captured by the foreign-controlled banks.  
 
3.8. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
This chapter was meant to give a first picture about how banks consider their role and 
efforts in the fight against money laundering, how they organized themselves to cope 
with client verification and reporting task and which are the costs they must bear. We 
highlight three important matters with which the majority of the sample seems to 
agree.  
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First, banks acknowledge Switzerland’s vulnerability to money laundering oper-
ations and indicate real estate transactions and wire transfers as the most used instru-
ment for disguising criminal money. In the same time however, the Swiss AMLA was 
perceived as being enough clear and successful in counteracting this crime. This some-
how paradoxical finding has two potential explanations: (1) banks fear tighter regula-
tion, so they declare themselves satisfied with AMLA or (2) even if AMLA is believed 
to be effective, criminals will always try to find a way to launder money. Hence, even 
if the threat has not materialised because it is kept at bay by AML regime, the vulner-
ability still remains. Both alternatives were confirmed during the post-survey inter-
views.  
Secondly, banks ranked reputational risks as the most important incentive to 
fight money laundering, whereas civic duties were ranked as the last one. As such, there 
is a clear discrepancy between the objectives of the banks for investing in AML com-
pliance and the Government’s ones. This finding is line with what has been previously 
observed by Harvey (2004) Masciandaro et al. (2001), and Verhage (2011), indicating 
that banks are meant to make profits, not to catch criminals. However, while making 
profits banks must keep risks at an acceptable level - reputational risks are among those 
avoidable risks. 
Thirdly, even if committing to the due-diligence procedures is seen as a regular 
business procedure, the banks nevertheless incur significant AML compliance costs 
that reach an average of 5% of their total annual costs. The fact that the majority of 
the compliance officers participating in the survey acknowledged the costs and the 
administrative burden associated with AML compliance has important implications for 
the organisational integration of the compliance department. Since compliance is a cost 
center (Gallo et al., 2005), there will often be conflicts between the commercial and the 
compliance departments. Moreover, from our conditional analyses we noticed that 
those compliance officers who think that the AML requirements go against the profit 
maximization of the bank perceive the benefits associated with compliance to a smaller 
extent and vice versa. 
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This last finding gives room for further investigation regarding the integration 
of the compliance function into the banking culture and the interaction schemes it has 
created inside the organisation. This will be discussed over the next two chapters. 
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4.  Reconciling anti-money laundering 
compliance duties with the commercial 
objectives of the bank 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction: compliance and banking 
 
 
The introduction of the anti-money laundering (AML) legislation twenty years ago has 
significantly changed the way in which banks were used to do business. The shift of 
responsibility for combating money laundering from the authorities to the financial 
sector imposed several duties on the financial intermediaries. As such, they have to run 
several checks before establishing a new business relationship, to attentively supervise 
their clients’ transactions and to make additional investigations if they observe any 
possible attempt of money laundering. To fulfil these requirements, banks have hired 
compliance specialists, whose main task is to protect their institution from regulatory 
sanctions by providing advice and implementing AML risk management systems that 
correspond to the business focus of the institution. Furthermore, the compliance of-
ficer analyses the alerts regarding suspicious transactions and provides guidance for 
the management and the other employees. Finally, he is an important connection point 
between the policy makers and the bank -or, as some authors called him, a “gate-
keeper” or a “police auxiliary”. While the work of the compliance department is vital 
for an effective management of the bank’s risks, the amounts of money that are in-
vested in compliance systems and personnel training are not negligible (see previous 
chapter). On top of these tangible costs, banks have to consider also the incidence of 
the intangible costs given, for example, by the foregone business opportunities due to 
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increased bureaucracy and privacy violation (Masciandaro et al., 2001, Johnston et al., 
2006). 
In some cases, these costs can become a significant burden for the bank, jeop-
ardising its profitability. Finding the right balance between the duty to comply with 
AML requirements on one hand and the need to boost the bank’s profits on the other 
hand, can create tensions between the defenders of these two different objectives, i.e. 
the compliance officer (hereafter CO) and the relationship manager15 (hereafter RM). 
What follows is that very often these two professionals will hold conflicting views 
about how certain suspicious cases should be assessed. Sometimes, a transaction/busi-
ness relationship does not follow certain predefined parameters in terms of timing, 
amounts involved, available official documents, etc.; this deviation, which in most of 
the cases is not due to criminal activities but to the specific business or country, can 
seem suspicious to the CO. As such, the latter might give a negative advice to the 
account opening/on-boarding of a new client. By refusing clients or breaking off trans-
actions that the RM considers to be legally and economically viable, the CO can find 
himself in conflict with the RM. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide evidence about the influence that the AML 
compliance ̶ profit maximisation tension has on the occurrence of a conflict between 
the CO and the RM. At this point, the conflict is looked at from the CO’s perspective. 
In the next chapter we will present the results regarding the same problems, as per-
ceived by the RM. 
Studying the relation between the CO and the RM is important for at least three 
reasons. First, as previous studies in the AML compliance field have underlined,  the 
CO faces significant challenges when proposing compliance solutions that effectively 
mitigate the money laundering risk while supporting the profit making business of the 
institution (de Koker, 2006; Gully-Hart, 2005; Subbotina, 2009; Verhage, 2011). Sec-
ondly, implementing these solutions in practice can prove difficult and can create dis-
putes between the various parties involved in the process. In fact, a recent survey by 
                                                                
15 This term is frequently used in the private banking sector and it designates the person working at the 
front desk and managing the clients’ business relationship with the bank (i.e. sales person).  
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the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics (2012) concluded that compliance 
professionals are very likely to endure an unhealthy level of stress, as they are in conflict 
with many of their colleagues. Finally, identifying the drivers of this conflict is im-
portant, especially since the continuous update of banking regulation ̶ including AML 
guidelines ̶ keeps compliance matters high on the banks’ agenda for the near future 
(Ernst&Young, 2012).  
 In order to collect data about the RM-CO conflict, we use a web-based ques-
tionnaire. The latter was developed after consulting several compliance specialists, 
RMs and the law enforcement agency. Using the Swiss Bankers Association’s (SBA) 
member list, a total of 139 banks active in the cantons of Ticino, Geneva and Zurich  ̶  
the three most important Swiss financial hubs  ̶  were contacted for participating in the 
survey. Subsequently, we specified a logistic regression model in order to understand 
how the following variables influence the probability of a conflict between the CO and 
the RM:  
1. Contradiction: the perceived contradiction between AML compliance and 
the commercial interests of the bank;  
2. AML-dominance: the extent to which the AML duties should prevail when 
compared to profit opportunities;  
3. Foreign assets: the percentage of the foreign assets under management in the 
bank’s total assets under management and  
4. Decision: the decisional authority assigned to the CO.  
The model specification does not take into account any behavioural, cultural or 
organisation-specific factors. Its aim is to investigate whether the conflict is due to the 
requirements imposed by the AML law.  
At the end of the survey period, 46 COs provided information about past con-
flicts with their colleagues ‘at the front’. The regression’s results confirm that those 
COs who perceive a contradiction between the AML compliance requirements and 
the bank’s profit maximisation function are more likely to experience a conflict with 
their colleagues working at the front office. Variables (2), (3) and (4) instead prove not 
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to be good predictors of the CO-RM conflict, due to the fact that they are not statisti-
cally significant.   
These findings have important implications for both the banking institutions and 
the regulating entities. On the one hand, for the banks this conflict represents a cost 
given by the delay in decisions, distortion of information and the decreased employee 
performance due to low satisfaction. On the other hand, the amount of compliance 
that the lawmaker should expect to be observed depends on the costs that the banks 
are willing to bear.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: the second section reviews im-
portant findings in the field of organisational conflict and presents the reasons why the 
compliance department’s role may lead to conflicts with the front office; the third sec-
tion presents the data collection method. The fourth section defines the logistic model 
and the explanatory variables. The results are discussed in the fifth section whereas the 
potential limitations of the study are outlined in the sixth section. Finally, conclusions 
and some recommendations are evidenced in the last section.   
 
4.2. AML compliance and the potential for internal conflicts 
 
4.2.1. Organizational conflict 
 
 
According to Brickley et al. (2002: 1822) a corporation can be defined as “a collection 
of individuals. Or more precisely, it is a set of contracts (both explicit and implicit) that 
bind together individuals with different, often conflicting interests”. Hence, beyond 
any legal form and possible economic purpose, the most important dimension of a 
company is given by its people. The corporate culture that develops inside each com-
pany is supposed to create a common ground for all the employees, such that they 
share the same behaviours, values and beliefs. More precisely, according to Hofstede 
et al. (1990) organisational culture can manifest at different levels of depth that can be 
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described as an onion diagram: symbols, heroes, rituals and values. In this context, 
organisational conflict can be defined as a dispute that occurs when interests, goals or 
values of different individuals or groups are incompatible with each other (Henry, 
2009).  
After thoroughly reviewing the existent literature on organisational behaviour 
and management, Rahim (2001) observed that there are two main criteria according to 
which organisational conflicts can be classified: the source of the conflict and the organ-
isational levels at which this may originate. With regard to the first criterion, he mentions 
several sources of conflict: the incompatibility of feelings and emotions regarding a 
certain issue (Amason, 1996); the disagreements on the tasks to be completed (Eisen-
hardt et al., 1997); the inconsistency between the preferences for the allocation of a 
scarce resource; the differences in values or ideologies on certain issues (Druckman et. 
al, 1998); the divergent preferences over the decision outcome, etc.  
Secondly, inside an organisation conflict may occur at different levels: within the 
same individual, between two or more individuals, between the individual and the 
group, and between groups. 
Last but not least, conflict can be either vertical or horizontal; the former occurs 
within groups of different hierarchical levels, for example managers and subordinates, 
whereas the latter occurs between individuals of the same level, such as managers of 
different departments within the same organisation. 
In his paper, Corwin (1969) studied the occurrence of a conflict based on several 
organisational characteristics: structural differentiation, participation in the authority 
system, regulating procedures, heterogeneity and stability and interpersonal structure. 
Contrary to classical organisation theorists like Taylor, Weber and Fayol who, in 
the late ‘40s prescribed organisational structures in such a way that members would be 
unlikely to involve in conflict, modern advocates of organisational theory recognize 
both a negative and positive side of conflict. Conflict can be functional when it stim-
ulates innovation, synergistic solutions to common problems, improvements in organ-
isational decision making and the clarification of points of view. But conflict can be 
dysfunctional when it causes job stress, burnout and dissatisfaction, fosters distrust 
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and suspicion, increases resistance to change, reduces job performance and loyalty 
(Rahim, 2001). Moreover, previous studies found that factors like a strong corporate 
culture, as measured by the consistency of perceptions of company values (Gordon 
and DiTomaso, 1992), the correlation between the attention to an employee’s needs 
and task accomplishment (Hansen and Wernerfelt, 1989) and the strategic decision 
speed (Baum and Wally, 2003), to name just a few, are all influencing the performance 
of a company.  
 
 
4.2.2. Banks, AML regulation and internal conflicts 
 
 
Benston and Smith Jr. (1975) defined the financial intermediaries as commercial firms 
producing specialized financial commodities for the individuals who wish to buy them. 
Moreover, as any firm operating under productive efficiency, a financial intermediary 
will try to produce the maximum quantity of financial goods at the lowest cost in order 
maximise its profit. Among the ordinary operating costs, the costs imposed by regula-
tion may represent a significant constrain, especially since banking is one of the most 
regulated industries. For a bank, the regulatory costs are determined by the total costs 
incurred for complying with the requirements of a legislation that can refer to: meeting 
capital requirements, providing the proper disclosure to the clients, restrictions about 
selling certain investment products, reporting suspicious money laundering transac-
tions, etc.  
In almost every bank, the responsibility of keeping these regulatory costs under 
control by proposing and implementing those compliance policies that correspond to 
the bank’s commercial profile was assigned to the compliance department. Even if 
AML compliance is the object of interest here, many of the problematic issues dis-
cussed below could potentially relate to compliance in general. Moreover, even though 
the study focuses on Switzerland, several results find support in the international liter-
ature.     
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There are several characteristics that a CO should possess in order to effectively 
carry out the duties mentioned above. First of all, it is necessary that (s)he has a solid 
legal background, which makes it easier for him/her to understand the specific legal 
language. Secondly, a CO must possess strong investigative and analytical skills in or-
der to decide which suspicious cases should be forwarded to the Money Laundering 
Reporting Office in Switzerland (MROS). Thirdly, when presented with a case, the CO 
should always objectively analyse the facts, and take a decision based on the results of 
his investigative research. Finally, on top of these professional requirements, there are 
also some personal competences that make the CO’s work more effective: “to be com-
municative, discretion, immunity to stress and integrity” (Verhage, 2011:55).  
In practice, the implementation of the AML regulations is likely to create an 
internal conflict for several reasons. The most obvious reason has to do with the profit-
maximisation function of the bank. The presence of the compliance department will 
influence this function in two ways: first, because compliance is a ‘cost centre’ that 
needs to be minimised, and secondly, because its inherent role inside the bank can limit 
certain profit opportunities. The economic costs of AML compliance can be divided 
in tangible costs  ̶  referring to all the physical and human capital needed to perform the 
due diligence tasks, and intangible costs  ̶  given by the inconvenience created to bank’s 
relationship with its clients (Masciandaro et al., 2001 and Johnston et al., 2006). As 
Verhage (2011) noted, money is by definition abstract, i.e. its value is not dependent 
on the identity of its owner. As such, money laundering does not harm the commercial 
interests of the bank: clean or dirty, money can all be part of the bank’s investment 
schemes. Instead, the harm comes from the fact that doing money laundering is illegal. 
A bank that facilitates money laundering faces important regulatory sanctions, can lose 
its operating licence and can experience significant reputational damages.  
Bearing in mind these premises the CO is facing both an intra- and inter-per-
sonal conflict. The intrapersonal conflict stems from the fact that as an employee of 
the bank, he cannot be indifferent to the business opportunities that generate profit 
for his employer but at the same time he cannot allow illegal money to enter the bank.  
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The interpersonal dimension is the one at which an organisational conflict can 
mostly manifest itself. As members of the same institution the CO and the RM share 
a common goal: contribute to the bank’s profitability. Nevertheless, as members of 
different departments, they have different functions, pursue different objectives and 
as such, they can hold different points of view. In fact, the RM is expected to expand 
his portfolio of clients and bringing new money to the bank in terms of assets under 
management (AUM) whereas the CO is concerned with protecting the reputation of 
the bank by assuring complete rule observance. Several studies have reported that the 
presence of the CO is translated into an additional layer of control and increased bu-
reaucracy (Pieth et al., 2003; Webb, 2004; Masciandaro et al., 2001). Moreover, Gamson 
(1966) suggested that specialisations (supported by the authority of distinctive compe-
tences) are perceived as targets for hostility and as such, they are positively associated 
with the incidence of conflict. 
In her study of the Belgian AML Complex, Verhage (2011:68) observed that 
since “compliance remains a battle between commercial interests on the one hand and 
rule observance on the other hand (. . .) it has an inherent contradictory characteristic”. 
Similarly, Favarel-Garrigues et al. (2008:9) noted that “the tension inherent in the AML 
fight between the commercial ethos and regulatory injunctions can, on the practical 
level, create dilemmas”. To some extent, the presence of the CO is hindering the RM’s 
opportunities of doing business by rejecting those clients whose financial situation is 
not clear (e.g. complex operations, offshore accounts, shell companies). However, this 
loss is not attributed to the illegal money that was forbidden from entering the bank. 
Instead, is the long time needed for the verification and certification of the client pro-
file and the origin of his funds that can scare clients off and make them leave the bank. 
Another determinant of the conflict between COs and RMs is the asymmetric 
degree of interdependence. According to Kumar et al. (1995) asymmetric interdepend-
ence is verified when parties have different levels of dependence on each other which 
can affect the level of trust and commitment of the groups. The CO is required to 
analyse the alerts generated by the transaction monitoring system and to ask the RM 
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for additional documentation. He then combines this information with the details ob-
tained from other sources and decides whether to report the client to MROS. In some 
cases, the decision to send a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) will belong to the exec-
utive board (e.g. if important clients are at stake and the reputational risks must be 
thoroughly considered). As such, a unilateral dependence develops between the CO 
and the RM since the former does not need the approval of the latter to carry out his 
investigation. Moreover, the RM is responsible for dealing with those clients that were 
reported and whose assets were frozen if they show up at the bank’s desk. As the law 
forbids the RM to inform his clients about the SAR, the RM is left with the problem 
of inventing various excuses why the clients cannot have access to their funds (e.g. 
“problems with the payment system”).  
Another problem with compliance is that it cannot be assessed in terms of turn-
over (Verhage, 2011; Demetis and Angell, 2007); as such, the added value of this de-
partment is indeterminable and therefore debatable, especially in times of economic 
austerity. While the performance of the RMs can be easily evaluated by looking at the 
amount of new AUM, evaluating the compliance department’s performance is not 
straightforward. The best solution is to look at the reputational damages that were 
avoided due to the CO’s ability in identifying and mitigating the risk of money laun-
dering. Even though is impossible to measure the exact cost of reputational damage, 
Harvey (2004:336) suggested that “it can result in direct costs (loss of income), indirect 
costs (client withdrawal and possible legal costs) and opportunity costs (foregone busi-
ness opportunities)”. 
 
4.3. Research questions and Data Collection 
 
Building upon the observations of Verhage and Favarel-Garrigues et al. mentioned 
above, this article sets out to provide empirical evidence about the internal conflicts 
generated by the specific requirements of the AML legislation. 
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First, we are interested in testing whether the perceived contradiction between 
rule observance and the commercial ethos of a bank significantly influences the occur-
rence of a conflict between the RM and the CO.  
Secondly, we will consider whether the CO’s propensity to strictly applying the 
AML provision without considering the commercial component of the transaction 
makes him more likely to be in conflict with the RM.  
Thirdly, we will also control whether the decision authority assigned to the CO 
has any role in mitigating this conflict.  
Finally, since foreign assets must undertake additional controls (and thus the 
decision making process is more complex) before being accepted, we check whether a 
higher percentage of foreign AUM is associated with a higher probability of CO-RM 
conflict. 
The data used for this study comes from the on-line survey distributed to 139 
Swiss banks. Details regarding the survey design, content and distribution can be found 
in Chapter 3.3. 
 
 
4.4. Survey sample and population 
 
 
Even if a total of 52 on-line questionnaires were submitted, not all of them were com-
pleted. We collected 46 answers with regard to the CO-RM conflict (i.e. a 33.1% re-
sponse rate). Table 3.1 exhibited in the previous chapter reports detailed information 
about the type of banking institutions16 in which the COs worked at the time of the 
survey. As we can see, the majority (67.4%) represented foreign-controlled banks17, 
while 17.4% of the COs worked in banks that specialise in stock exchange, securities 
                                                                
16 The types of responding banks are defined using the Swiss National Bank’s official classification 
http://www.snb.ch/en/system/glossary#__F 
17 A bank is deemed to be foreign-controlled if foreigners with a qualified participation in the bank directly or 
indirectly hold more than half of its voting shares, or if they exercise a controlling interest in any other matter 
(www.snb.ch)   
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and asset management business. Finally, the rest of 15.2% of the sample represent COs 
working in cantonal banks (6.5%), major banks (2.2%) private bankers (2.2%) and 
other banking institutions (4.3%). When considering the canton of residence, we see 
that almost 57% of the banks were based in Zurich, whereas 28.26% were based in 
Geneva and only 15.22% in the Italian canton, Ticino. 
Beside data about the sample, Table 3.1. contains data about the entire popula-
tion of banks based in one of the three cantons and that are members of the SBA. By 
analysing their distributions, we can evaluate the extent in which the sample is a good 
representation of the population and thus, with what degree of confidence we can 
generalise the results of the sample to the entire population. Regarding the canton of 
residence, the banks in our sample have a similar distribution to the ones in the whole 
population (see Panel A). The same holds true with respect to the type of bank, with 
some minor exceptions (see Panel B). The latter refer to the branches of foreign banks, 
private bankers18 and cantonal banks. Regarding the first category, we do not expect 
major differences in the conduct exhibited with regard to AML compliance, given that 
foreign bank branches in Switzerland are obliged to follow both their home country’s 
regulation and the Swiss one. As such, we believe that the possible differences/char-
acteristics attributed to this category are captured by the foreign-controlled banks. Sec-
ondly, we collect data from all the cantonal banks. Finally, we have only one observa-
tion about private bankers, compared to the nine available in the population. Despite 
these small differences, the distribution of the three categories that represent more 
than 80% of the total banks in both the population and the sample is quite similar (see 
categories 3 to 5). Hence, we can safely generalise our results to the entire population. 
 
4.5. Empirical methodology 
 
 
This chapter is concerned with understanding whether certain characteristics of the 
CO can determine him to have a conflictual relation with his colleagues working ‘at 
                                                                
18 Private bankers work in the field of asset management; their partners are jointly and severally liable (www.snb.ch)  
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the front’. Logistic regression has been increasingly used by researchers for studies in 
social science related fields which aim was to test the presence or absence of a certain 
event. Since the data we collect is either binary or ordinal, we use a logistic regression 
to check how the odds19 of a CO-RM change depending on how strong the CO’s 
beliefs regarding certain matters are. We develop the following logistic model: 
 
Log CO-RM conflicti= β0+ β1Contradictioni+ β2AML_prevalencei+ β3Decision_authorityi 
+ β4Foreign_AUMi+εi, where: 
 
CO-RM conflicti is a binary variable representing a positive “yes” (1) or a negative 
“no” (0) answer to the question “Did you ever have any conflictual discussion with your colleagues 
from the sales department (i.e. front desk)?” 
Contradiction is an ordinal variable corresponding to respondents’ answers to the 
question “To what extent do you consider that there is a contradictory position between the AML 
compliance and the commercial interests of the bank?” The possible values are: 2 for “Large 
Extent”, 1 for “Certain Extent”, 0 for “Not sure”, -1 for “Limited Extent”, -2 for “Not 
at all”.  
AML_prevalence is an ordinal variable corresponding to respondents’ answers to the 
questions “To what extent do you consider that the requirements stemming from the AML law 
should prevail when compared to the commercial interests of your institution?”. The possible values 
are: 2 for “Large Extent”, 1 for “Certain Extent”, 0 for “Not sure”, -1 for “Limited 
Extent”, -2 for “Not at all”. 
Decision-authorityi is an ordinal variable corresponding to respondents’ answers to 
the questions “To what extent you consider that you are given enough authority to make day to day 
decisions on problems that arouse routinely in the course of applying AML law provisions?”. The 
possible values are: 2 for “Large Extent”, 1 for “Certain Extent”, 0 for “Not sure”, -1 
for “Limited Extent”, -2 for “Not at all”. 
                                                                
19     The odds is the ratio of the probability that the event will happen to the probability that the event 
will not happen (source: Wikipedia) 
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Foreign_AUMi  is an ordinal variable indicating the proportion of foreign AUM inside 
their institution : 1 for “0%”, 2 for “less than 10%”, 3 for “10 to 25%”, 4 for “25 to 
50%”, 5 for “50 to 75%” and 6 for “more than 75%”.  
 
The first explanatory variable (Contradiction) is meant to measure the CO’s per-
ceptions regarding one of the most debated conflicts of interest determined by the 
application of AML regulations. The compliance requirements limit certain business 
opportunities presented to the RM and, in times of economic turmoil, this limitation 
makes it even harder for banks to grow. Under this assumption, we expect that the 
stronger the acknowledgement of a contradiction between rule observance and profit 
maximisation the higher the probability of a conflict between the RM and the CO.  
From the interviews conducted prior to the survey we learned that a RM finds 
it more difficult to interact with a CO if he is too conventional when it comes to ap-
plying the law provisions. This conservative behaviour was more obvious in the case 
of those COs with a legal educational background as they lacked the economic 
knowledge to understand the bank’s commercial needs. We introduced the AML_prev-
alence variable to account for the CO’s propensity to strictly apply the AML regulation. 
We expect the variable’s coefficient to be positively related to the occurrence of a con-
flict. 
The variable Decision_authority measures the extent to which the CO can inde-
pendently decide upon daily AML-related matters. To ensure an effective implemen-
tation of the law, the lawmaker dictated that the compliance unit should be linked to 
the executive board; this provision was also supposed to limit potential conflicts of 
interest (see The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001). As a consequence, 
we assume that if one has a high degree of decisional authority, there are fewer oppor-
tunities for the others to challenge his decisions (i.e. we will observe a negative coeffi-
cient).  
The last explanatory variable (Foreign_AUM) accounts for the percentage of for-
eign assets relative to the bank’s total AUM. The risk-based approach requires the 
banks to give special attention to those clients/transactions connected to a high risk 
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jurisdiction/economic activity. As such, we expect more debate between the CO and 
the RM over the acceptance of foreign funds since it is easier to verify the origin of 
the local funds.  
The limitations of the model together with the potential biases of the model are 
addressed in a separate section.  
 
4.6. Results 
 
 
Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics for all the variables included in this study. Con-
ventionally, for categorical variables the median should be reported but if the catego-
ries are ordered the mean can be used as well (Acock, 2008).  
 
     Table 4. 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Var. Min Max Median 
CO-RM conflict 46 0.739 0.444 0.197 0 1 1 
Contradiction 48 0.375 1.248 1.558 -2 2 1 
Foreign_AUM 48 4.958 0.458 2.126 1 6 6 
AML_prevalence 47 1.511 0.975 0.951 -2 2 2 
Decision_autority 46 1.391 0.856 0.732 -1 2 2 
 
The correlation analysis reported in Table 4.2 shows that all the explanatory var-
iables are positively and significantly correlated with the dependent variable (CO-RM 
conflict), except for Decision_authority. The latter variable has a negative correlation coef-
ficient, as expected, but it is not significant. Since foreign assets pose a higher money 
laundering risk, we see that there is a positive and significant correlation between 
AML_prevalence and Foreign_AUM (meaning that when a bank accepts foreign assets, 
it has thoroughly gone through all the AML checks).  
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Table 4. 2: Correlation analysis 
The table reports the Spearman correlation coefficients for the variables used in the logistic regression. 
***, **, * denote the corresponding statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 Conflict 
CO-RM 
AML_ 
prevalence 
Contradiction Decision_ 
authority 
Foreign_ 
AUM 
Conflict CO-RM  1     
AML_prevalence  0.2581*   1    
Contradiction  0.3865*** -0.0971  1   
Decision_autority -0.1631 -0.0616 -0.0171  1  
Foreign_AUM  0.4144***  0.4939 ***  0.0664 -0.0855 1 
 
Table 4.3 reports the logistic regression’s results. The univariate models in col-
umns (1) to (4) show that only the odds ratios for Contradiction and Foreign_AUM are 
statistically significant20: 2.08, p= 0.014 and 2.02, p= 0.016 respectively. As such, they 
both positively influence the odds of a CO-RM conflict. The odds ratios for 
AML_prevalence and Decision_authority are not statistically significant even if they move 
in the expected direction (1.69, p= 0.116 and 0.59, p= 0.299). The models in column 
(5) and (6) show that all the odds ratios are statistically sig-nificant and have the ex-
pected positive/negative influence on the dependent variable. In model (5), both the 
perceived Contradiction and the belief in AML_prevalence positively influence the 
odds of a conflict between the CO and the RM. They remain significant even after 
controlling for Decision_authority in model (7).   
Finally, when including all the variables in model (8), we see that only the odds 
ratio for Contradiction remains significant (2.26, p= 0.03). This means that if the score 
for the perceived contradiction AML compliance-profit maximization increases by 1 
unit, the odds for a conflictual situation with the RM increase by 126% ((2.26-1)*100). 
Simply stated, when the implementation of the AML law create dilemmas about the 
best courses of action, the parties involved in the implementation process will, most 
probably, find themselves in conflict with each other. 
 
 
 
                                                                
20  An odds ratio smaller (greater) than 1 will negatively (positively) influence the odds of an event. 
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      Table 4. 3: Logistic regression analysis 
The table presents the results of the logistic regression having as a dependent variable the CO-RM 
conflict. All the explanatory variables were described in the Empirical Methodology section. For all the 
variables we report Odds Ratios, (Coefficients) and (Standard Errors). ***, **, * denote the corre-
sponding statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Model specifications are (1) to (8) 
                                      
                              (1)              (2)          (3)            (4)             (5)                (6)                (7)                 (8) 
         
Constant  2.55 *** 
(0.937) 
(0.36) 
 1.27 
(0.236) 
(0.58) 
 6.46 
(1.866) 
(0.89) 
  0.17 
(-1.785) 
 (1.22) 
  0.78 
(-0.254) 
 (0.72) 
-2.329 
(0.1) 
(1.45) 
 1.40 
(0.338) 
(1.06) 
  0.18 
(-1.708) 
 (1.71) 
Contradiction  2.08 *** 
(0.736) 
(0.3) 
    2.48*** 
(0.906) 
(0.34) 
 2.24** 
(0.804) 
(0.37) 
 2.24** 
(0.808)   
(0.34) 
 2.26** 
(0.377) 
(0.38) 
AML_ 
prevalence 
  1.69 
(0.523) 
(0.33) 
   2.14* 
(0.76) 
(0.41) 
  2.09 * 
(0.738) 
(0.42) 
 1.42 
(0.351) 
(0.48) 
Decision_ au-
thority 
    0.59 
(-0.535) 
 (0.51) 
     0.71 
(-0.345) 
 (0.48) 
  0.75  
(-0.292) 
 (0.49) 
Foreign_ 
AUM 
    1.83*** 
(0.603) 
(0.25) 
  2.02** 
(0.704) 
(0.30) 
  1.7 
(0.530) 
(0.34) 
No. obs. 46 44 43 43 44 43 42 40 
No. EPV 12 12 11 11 6 5.5 3.7 2.75 
Chi2 (logit) 6.9 *** 2.64 0.25 6.78 *** 11.47 *** 12.41 *** 10.74 *** 12.90 *** 
Cox-Snell R² 0.139 0.058 0.030 0.146 0.229 0.251 0.226 0.276 
NagelKerkeR² 0.204 0.084 0.044 0.215 0.332 0.369 0.330 0.399 
Hosmer –Lemeshow Chi2 (p-value)  5.93(0.31) 3.28(0.77) 4.11(0.85) 2.07(0.98) 
 
As Verhage (2011) noted, the CO can find himself trapped between “the hammer 
and anvil”: he has to choose between destroying potential business opportunities and 
rigidly applying the AML regulations. According to Rizzo et al. (1970), role conflict (i.e. 
incompatibility in the role’s requirements) may result in intra-person conflict when the 
individual needs to manage his own values, resources and capabilities to answer all the 
demands of the role, but it can also lead to conflicts with other people inside the or-
ganisation, as they all have different expectations from him.  
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The odds ratio for AML_prevalence is positive but not significant (1.42, p= 0.465). 
Prior to the survey, the RMs we interviewed said they were very often annoyed by the 
CO’s propensity to strictly apply the law, without showing the minimum interest for 
the commercial priorities of the bank. “if my client buys a property, the compliance 
officer will call me and ask for the documents justifying the transaction. He gives me 
three days of time, even though he knows very well how long is the bureaucratic pro-
cess until a document is produced in Italy. And still, he insists ‘no document, no pay-
ment’” [RM1]. Post-survey however, the COs explained us that even if their job is to 
safeguard the bank from reputational and legal risks, they are aware of the fact that the 
bank needs to grow in order for their salaries to be paid. As such, they claim to be 
helping the RMs, even if they regrettably admit that “it is very difficult that a true 
friendship will develop between a CO and a RM” [CO2].  
Moving further, we see that the odds ratio for Decision_authority is negatively re-
lated to the CO-RM conflict, though not statistically significant (0.75, p= 0.554). The 
evidence about the causal link between decisional power and organisational conflict is 
mixed. Corwin (1969) found that the authority to make routine decisions provides 
more occasions for disputes to arise. On the other hand, the opportunity to participate 
in the decision-making process gives occasions for expressing minor forms of conflict 
and might prevent minor irritations from developing into major incidents. 
Finally, the odds ratio for Foreign_AUM is no longer statistically significant after 
controlling for AML_prevalence and Decision_authority. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
odds ratio is positive suggests that the additional checks that need to be done in the 
case of foreign funds could increase the probability of a conflict between the back and 
the front departments. This is particularly relevant for Switzerland, where more than 
70% of the assets managed by Swiss banks belong to non-Swiss clients.  
Researchers have been often warned that the use of logistic regression can be 
problematic when the outcome has few events available relative to the number of in-
dependent variables included in the model. In such cases, the estimated odds ratios 
can be biased and the validity of statistical inference may be adversely affected (i.e. the 
final model may be over fitted , see Peduzzi et al., 1996). Because of these problems, 
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several authors have drawn guidelines for the minimum events per variable (EPV) re-
quired in multivariate analysis. Using a theoretical approach, Harrell et al. (1985) sug-
gested that 10 to 20 EPV were necessary. Simulation procedures based on real data 
employed by Peduzzi et al. (1996) and Vittinghoff et al. (2006) concluded that 5-10 EPV 
and 5 EPV respectively, were enough. In our case, the number of EPV is below 5 only 
in two cases (3.7 and 2.75, see Table 4.3). Nevertheless, we see that the values taken 
by our main variable of interest (i.e. Contradiction) in these cases doesn’t register signif-
icant variations that could be attributed.   
In general, the interpretation of the pseudo R-squared is not recommended in 
the case of logistic regressions. Researchers however, often report the Cox-Snell and 
the Nagelkerke R-squared as alternatives to the usual (adjusted) R-squared in OLS re-
gressions. When considered individually, only the variables Contradiction and For-
eign_AUM are able to explain a significant portion of the variability in the CO-RM 
conflict (between 14% and 21%, see Table 4.3, columns (1) to (4)). In fact, the chi-
square statistic is significant only in these two cases (6.9 and 6.78 respectively). When 
taken together, the variables are able to explain between 27.6% and 39.9% of this var-
iability. Finally, the logistic regression model in column (8) has a chi-square of 12.90 
and is significant at 1 percent; this indicates that the combined effect of the explanatory 
variables is significant and jointly explains the occurrence of a CO-RM conflict. 
As an alternative to the chi-square test, I also report the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
test to check whether the scores predicted by the model significantly differ from the 
observed scores; since the result is not significant (H-S X²=2.08, p=0.98), we can con-
clude that Contradiction, Decision_authority, AML_prevalence and Foreign_AUM reliably 
distinguished between no CO-RM conflict and CO-RM conflict. 
Finally, when considering the different models reported in Table 4.1 one can 
notice that the number of observations varies. This is because the statistical software 
uses a list wise deletion by default, meaning that if there is a missing value for any 
variable in the logistic regression, the whole case will be excluded from the analysis. 
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4.7. Limitations 
  
 
The analysis presented in this chapter focuses on the potential conflict between the 
CO and the RM and it is the first one to empirically assess the origins of this conflict. 
In particular, I consider the rule observance vs. profit maximization contradiction in-
herent to AML regulations to be the main source of conflict between the CO-RM.  
 Nevertheless, this conflict could be determined by other factors than the intrin-
sic organisational role of these two actors - e.g. personality, educational background, 
culture, age, sex, tenure, professional experience, etc.  Moreover, certain organisational 
characteristics can also influence the occurrence of this conflict. According to Osborn 
and Hunt (1974) the environmental conditions can influence the effectiveness of the 
different types of organisational structures. For example, bigger banks put more pres-
sure on the achievement of new clients and this can exacerbate the CO-RM conflict, 
when the CO impedes the development of certain business opportunities and hence 
prevents the RM from reaching his assigned targets (and the associated bonus). Factors 
such as the type of clients served, the types of products offered, the degree of differ-
entiation and/or specialization and the organisational culture, will also determine the 
occurrence of a conflict.   
Unfortunately, the use of a questionnaire as a mean for data collection makes it 
very difficult to obtain information about all the factors listed above. In addition, one 
must bear in mind that surveys measure beliefs, feelings and perceptions, which can 
be different from the behaviour in the real life. As such, the COs’ answers can be 
biased, considering the delicate nature of the money laundering subject and the poten-
tial reputational damages connected to certain answers. 
Finally, it would be interesting to understand whether the CO-RM conflict exists 
during the normal business relationship with the client or whether it is the reporting 
duty and the ensuing investigations that triggers its appearance. Furthermore, by ob-
serving the frequency or severity of this conflict, one could understand which compli-
ance duties are more likely to influence the emergence of the conflict. Even if the lack 
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of information regarding all the above elements could jeopardize the study of the CO-
RM conflict, the aim of this work was to understand whether the specific nature of the 
AMLA’s requirements have any explanatory power on the CO-RM conflict. The re-
sults presented in the previous section showed that this was actually the case. 
 
4.8. Concluding remarks 
 
 
This chapter developed around the assumption that the supervising and reporting du-
ties stemming from the AML legislation can create a conflict between the CO and the 
RM. By employing a logistic regression methodology, we conclude that the acknowl-
edgement of a contradiction the AML requirements and the usual profit-boosting ob-
jectives of the bank increases the odds of a conflictual discussion between the CO and 
the RM. However, the CO’s propensity to strictly implement the law, the decision 
authority that is attributed to him and the amount of foreign AUM have no explanatory 
power since their coefficients are not significant.  
Overall, this evidence supports the recent findings of the E&Y (2012) “Banking 
risk management” survey which showed that one of the biggest challenges around 
banking culture is resolving potential conflicts between the sales driven front office 
culture and the risk control culture. 
The existence of this conflict has important implications not only for the finan-
cial institutions but also for the regulators. First of all, since the inception of the AML 
regulations, authors have pointed out that “compliance is a cost centre, not a profit 
centre” (Gallo and Juckes, 2005). Besides the investment in software and personnel 
training, one has also to consider the cost of foregone business opportunities. The 
CO-RM conflict, as any other organisational conflict, can generate additional costs for 
the financial institution due to: delay in decisions, distortion and suppression of infor-
mation, and disruptions of the chain of command (Rizzo, House and Lirtzman, 1970). 
73 
 
In fact, Jehn (1997) found that the negative emotionality associated with organisational 
conflicts leads to poor group performance and low member satisfaction.  
Secondly, as Braithwaite et al. (2007) point out, if the regulations are to be effec-
tive, they should be accepted and considered as needed by the regulated community. 
This means that if the public and business interests are not sufficiently aligned, com-
pliance is difficult or even impossible to achieve (Gunningham and Rees, 1997).  These 
two recommendations hold true also about the AML laws. The fact that the banks in 
our sample recognised an ongoing contradiction between AML rule observance and 
the bank’s profit maximisation function should push the regulators to evaluate the 
grounds upon which they expect to observe a compliant behaviour from the financial 
institutions. This means understanding the extent to which the requirements are going 
against the bank’s functional purpose and resources. Moreover, a further tightening of 
the law should consider the efforts and the difficulties incurred by the financial insti-
tutions to accommodate them. Finally, the lawmakers should also reconsider the in-
centives given to financial institutions for compliance. The existent literature on AML 
compliance has persistently underlined that the main reason for which banks involve 
in the fight against money laundering is the reputational risk caused by non-compliance 
(Masciandaro et al. (2001), Harvey (2004), Verhage (2011)). As such, the lawmaker 
should emphasise the adverse impact that the involvement in money laundering has 
for the banks’ reputation.  
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5. Compliance duties and bankers at 
work: Coping with tensions 
 
 
5.1. Introduction: Standing up to the AML compliance challenge 
 
 
Looking back over more than twenty years of anti-money laundering regulations, one 
can easily notice the important changes undergone within the banking environment, 
both at an organisational and operational level. As far as the organisational aspect is 
concerned, banks have organised dedicated compliance departments by hiring special-
ists that could spot suspicious cases of money laundering, draw up and implement 
internal AML directives and train employees. Moreover, the approval process of the 
new clients has become much more structured, such that the management gets often 
involved into the decision of on-boarding risky clients.  
On the other hand, banks have continuously faced significant operational limi-
tations due to AML procedures. First of all, banks must pay particular attention to the 
sanctions in place regarding the provision of financial services to clients residing in 
certain countries (consider for example the various sanctions lists – OFAC, UN, UK, 
etc.) as well as collaborating with financial institutions from countries not having a 
satisfying AML framework in place. Secondly, protecting the bank from possible rep-
utational and regulatory risks means turning down profitable business opportunities, 
especially when the boundary between black and white is blurred. Thirdly, the signifi-
cant financial and human resources that have to be continuously invested into the in-
ternal AML compliance machine as well as the red tape often created by the due dili-
gence procedures, divert the bank’s profit from other growing opportunities.  
76 
 
  Despite the costs it entails, there are several acknowledged benefits to compli-
ance: avoiding the criminal’s access to the banking system and hence the perpetration 
of crime, safeguarding the bank’s reputation, lowering regulatory risks, collecting ad-
ditional information about the client could prove useful for marketing purposes.  
This chapter aims at evaluating how the Swiss banking system has adapted to an 
AML compliant culture, which were the obstacles to overcome and where does it stand 
today. As a continuation of the previous chapter, which focused on the compliance 
officers, we are now interested in the relationship managers’ part of the story. As such, 
we investigate which were relationship managers’ initial reactions toward the require-
ments of doing a sort of financial ‘striptease’ of the client, if these initial problems have 
been overcome in time and which are the aspects that are still obstructing an efficient 
collaboration between the relationship manager (RM) and the compliance officer 
(CO). As it was the case in the previous chapter, we wondered whether the different 
objectives and ‘forma mentis’ these two actors have, can give birth to interpersonal 
conflicts. Last but not least, we tried to identify some communicational and operational 
strategies that could make their collaboration easier.  
After this introduction, the chapter is organised as follows: section two will 
briefly discuss the relevant findings in the AML literature regarding the challenges 
faced by banks when coping with AML requirements; section three is dedicated to the 
particularities of the Swiss AML apparatus and more precisely the financial intermedi-
aries’ due diligence duties; the research questions are formulated in section four; sec-
tion five describes the data collection process; sections six to eight go through the 
results collected from our interviews regarding the relationship managers’ first reac-
tions to the imposed AML duties, how they have integrated such duties into their daily 
working routine over the time, what are the perceived benefits of AML compliance 
and which are the problems that obstruct the collaboration between the RM and his 
colleagues from the compliance department; section nine concludes with several re-
marks regarding the future of AML compliance as dictated by actual and future regu-
latory changes as well as possible strategies meant to facilitate the collaboration be-
tween the relationship manager and the compliance officer.  
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5.2. The switch to an AML compliant culture 
 
 
Prior to the events of 9/11, the research interest in the AML field was rather limited 
and the majority of publications were made by criminologists and jurists (e.g. Levi, 
1992; van Duyne, 1998) or international organisations (e.g. UNODC, 1998; IMF, 
2001).  
The terroristic attacks of 2001 and the subsequent update of many national AML 
laws gave birth to a new stream of literature analysing these regulatory updates in the 
country-specific context: examples can be found for US (Johnson, 2002; Preston, 
2002), Canada (Murphy, 2003), Germany (Blöcker, 2003), France (Bardin, 2002), South 
Africa (de Koker, 2002), China (Ping, 2003) and Mexico (Vargas et al., 2003).  
Recent publications in the field focus on the economic impact and the practical 
issues associated with the implementation of the AML regulations. The constraints 
that governments face in terms of resources and access to financial information 
wouldn’t have allowed them to efficiently counteract money laundering. They have 
thus transferred the monitoring tasks to the financial sector, to the extent that nowa-
days “the entire intelligence gathering and target acquisition process is in the hands of 
the private sector” (Gallo et al., 2005:329). This shift of responsibility meant forcing 
the financial intermediaries to do what the public sector was previously required to: 
monitoring risk, assessing terrorist threats, defining the risk profiles of the politically 
exposed persons, dig into the clients’ private affairs, etc. (Pieth et al., 2003, Levi and 
Maguire, 2004).  
The transition of powers from the public to the private sector was not as smooth 
as expected. First of all, for the banks, it entailed considerable investments in the ac-
quisition of software and specific know-how. All the surveillance procedures meant 
acquiring global watch lists (used especially in the KYC (know-your-customer) proce-
dures) and electronic profiling tools together with the installation of software that 
could monitor financial transactions continuously (Levi and Wall, 2004; Shields, 2005). 
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Specific AML training has also been provided to all employees. In numbers, compli-
ance costs connected with the prevention of money laundering could vary from 8.374 
CHF per capita for small banks to 5.059 CHF per capita for large banks (according to 
a study focusing on Swiss wealth management industry carried out in 2003, see Bührer 
et al., 2005).  
Secondly, banks’ expertise and resources are aimed at the design and promotion 
of financial services, which is completely different from undertaking criminal prosecu-
tion (Geiger and Wüensch, 2007). To cover this gap, banks have hired compliance 
professionals that were supposed to have the required expertise for identifying poten-
tial money laundering cases. 
Thirdly, the duty to observe the AML requirements had an important impact on 
the commercial activities of the bank. Canhoto (2008) argues that AML/CTF compro-
mised the fiduciary duty of financial institutions to their clients, whereas Sinha (2014) 
claims that banks justify their moral blindness on the fact that critical inquisition of 
potential customers – legitimate or illegitimate – will simply turn them towards rival 
banks. Hence, on the one hand, banks can no longer accept certain types of clients, no 
matter how profitable they are; on the other hand, the questions asked for AML pur-
poses can violate the client’s privacy and deteriorate the trustworthy relationship be-
tween him and his RM, thereby pushing the client to leave the bank.  
Another important challenge experienced by banks when incorporating AML 
tasks into their working routine is the management of possible conflicts between the 
RM and the compliance officer. Since they belong to different departments, their pre-
assigned tasks and goals can sometimes be conflicting. As a matter of fact, there have 
been several cases in which the compliance officer’s duty of safeguarding the bank’s 
reputation can prevent the relationship manager from reaching his annual profit tar-
gets. Edwards and Wolfe (2004) underline the thick line between what may be deemed 
to be just acceptable by the compliance function and what may be just unacceptable. 
According to the authors, when an activity is on the cusp of being compliant RMs will 
be faced with conflicts of interest between maximising their bonus and dutifully draw-
ing the attention of the compliance officers.  
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Despite its importance for the bank’s performance, there are very few empirical 
studies regarding the CO-RM conflicts. Still, there is one point upon which various 
authors seem to agree: the little popularity enjoyed by the CO, considered as “bearer 
of the poisoned chalice” (Harvey, 2004), “business prevention officer” (Verhage, 
2011), “petty sovereign” (Favarel-Garrigues, 2008). As far as the CO’s relationship 
with the RM is concerned, Canhoto et al. (2013) noticed that “they are not easy bed-
fellows”, whereas a study by Ernst&Young (2012) noticed that one of biggest challenge 
around banking culture is solving the potential conflicts between the two actors, espe-
cially since many banks still have inadequate safeguards in place to mitigate RM’s con-
flict of interest (FSA, 2011). 
 
5.3. Research questions and methodology 
 
 
Building upon the existing findings about the controversies encountered during the 
implementation of AML compliance in the banking sector, this chapter aims to pro-
vide empirical evidence about the integration of these duties in the RM’s daily working 
routine. More precisely, we are interested in understanding whether and to what extent 
the RMs managed to deal with the new AML tasks in the beginning and whether after 
almost three decades since the AMLA’s introduction, they have accepted the compli-
ance duties as part of their job and duly cooperate with the compliance departments 
requests.  
Considering the significant different ways of doing business in the Swiss banking 
sector before 1998, we would expect a great opposition toward the new legislation at 
the time it was introduced. Hence, our first research question (RQ1) sets out to docu-
ment the initial reactions to the requirement of integrating compliance tasks into the 
business culture.  
As time unfolded and international pressures for tougher regulation grew, the 
employees should by now have started to exhibit greater acceptability of the AML 
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regulation and hence of the compliance officer. Hence, our second research question 
(RQ2): As of today, to what extent have the business oriented employees (such as the 
relationship managers) accepted the compliance duties as part of their job?   
If the RM exhibits a certain reluctance toward these duties, which are the under-
lying causes of this reluctance and can it trigger a conflict between the two units 
(RQ3)?  
Finally, if the above mentioned conflict exists, which are the best solutions/atti-
tudes to be adopted in order to mitigate it (RQ4)?   
The lack of private data in the AML field, has pushed many researchers to resort 
to the use of surveys and or interviews. For example, Webb (2004) interviewed thirty 
money laundering reporting officers in order to study their attitudes toward money 
laundering regulations. Favarel-Garrigues et al. (2008, 2011), Harvey and Lau (2009) 
and Verhage (2011) interviewed several AML actors among which compliance officers, 
bankers, law makers and law enforcement officials in order to have a complete picture 
about their duties, difficulties and the communication flows that were established 
among them. Masciandaro et al. (2001) used an indirect survey technique by asking 
bank managers how the clients reacted to the various requests made by the bank in 
order to fulfil its compliance obligations. 
Since this study aimed at understanding the RM’s difficulties in accepting and 
incorporating AML due diligence duties in his daily work, we collected data from 25 
RMs working in the cantons of Ticino, Zurich and Geneva – Switzerland’s main fi-
nancial centers-.  
Bearing in mind a precise framework of themes to be explored, the interviews 
were organised as a free-flowing discussion with the interviewee around the relevant 
themes. In the case of our research, the use of semi-structured interviews brought us 
three advantages. First, it allowed new ideas to be brought up during the interview as 
a result of the interviewee’s answers. Secondly, instead of asking direct, open ended 
questions to which the RMs could prove reluctant to answer, having a free discussion 
around a certain theme was more comfortable for our interviewees. In fact, the RMs’ 
reactions, fears and constraints observed while doing the first interviews helped us to 
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better refine our interview scheme. Thirdly, a ‘free’ narration of one’s personal experi-
ences allowed for real stories and concrete examples to emerge.  
The interview guide was divided in 7 different parts. We always tried to ask iden-
tical questions, even though the same sequence was not, in most of the cases, re-
spected. The first three parts were meant to set “the scene” and create a common 
ground between the interviewer and the interviewee.  
In the first part we asked general questions regarding the background, the years 
of experience and the type of clients managed by the RM.  
The second part asked the respondent details about the way in which he was 
introduced to the AMLA and what was his initial opinion about the due diligence and 
reporting duties.  
The third part tried to assess the impact that the observance of all the AML 
compliance duties has on the usual tasks of a RM: what percentage of his working time 
is dedicated to compliance issues and how this affects the quality of the service offered 
to the client.  
The fourth part explored the relationship between the RM and the compliance 
department, focusing on the pros and contras of the role that this department has.  
The fifth part aimed to understand which arguments were brought forward by 
the RM when requiring additional information from the client for due diligence pur-
poses. Additionally, we wanted to know whether the RM perceives an on-going con-
flict between the compliance duties and the request to preserve the trust established 
between him and the client and which are the measures to be taken in order to avoid 
tensioned situations.  
The sixth part was dedicated to the reactions, attitudes and measures taken in 
case doubts/suspicions of money laundering arise.  
The last part of the interview was conclusive and collected opinions about the 
future of the Swiss banking sector as a consequence of stiffer regulation.  
Before scheduling the interviews, we informed every participant about the pur-
pose and procedures of the research and about the modality of the interview. Addi-
tionally, we emphasised the voluntary nature of their participation and the measures 
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taken to guarantee anonymity. Since not all the participants agreed only 11 interviews 
were recorded as mp3 files. In most of the cases, the interviews were carried on at the 
interviewee place of work. The interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. Inter-
views were conducted in Italian in Ticino and in English in Geneva and Zurich.  
In order to trace additional participants or informants, we used the snowball 
method. The latter consists in asking the participants to recommend other people that 
could be interviewed (Babbie, 1995). The people through whom access is gained are 
called gatekeepers (Groenewald, 2004). 
 
5.4. Findings 
 
5.4.1. Introducing AML: A historic background and first reactions 
 
 
While a historical analysis of the Swiss banking system is out of the scope here, several 
elements must be mentioned in order to better understand the existing social and eco-
nomic circumstances at the time when AMLA was introduced. 
Switzerland’s armed neutrality and national sovereignty were the main elements 
attracting foreign capitals into the country during the eighteen century. However, it 
was during the following two centuries that the Swiss banking system registered an 
unprecedented growth, owed mainly to the stable political climate and to the formal 
codification of the Swiss banking secrecy in 1934.21 
After WWII, the unsettled political situation that reigned in Europe further 
pushed investors to transfer their savings into Switzerland. As Dick Martin22 empha-
sized during a recent interview23, the exponential growth verified during the years 
1960s to 1990s by the Swiss banking system gave birth to a ‘social phenomenon’: due 
                                                                
21 Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks (Swiss Banking Act of 1934) 
22 Member of the Swiss Council of States (since 1995) and former member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. 
23 Falò, RSI, the 3rd of September 2015 
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to the lack of personnel many banks started to ‘steal’ qualified workforce from other 
sectors such that they could accommodate the management of all the new clients. At 
the same time, the success and wealth exhibited by the banking employees encouraged 
younger generations to pursue predominantly banking careers. 
As the international attention to money laundering and organised crime started 
to unfold in the US in the early 1980s, Switzerland was among the first countries to 
introduce an AML framework. However, due to the mentioned historical outset and 
the Swiss culture of privacy, the introduction of the AML law in 1998 created major 
problems for the RMs that were now required to follow precise KYC procedures.  
In order to introduce their employees to the topic, banks started to organize 
AML trainings during which the new duties and the risks connected with the inob-
servance of the law were discussed: “We had seminars on the topic; we were all sitting 
in a meeting room, with an external specialist explaining all the changes, the cases to 
which we had to pay special attention; we were doing role-plays on certain types of 
clients” [RM 16]. At the end of the seminars, the employees “were given a test to 
control that we understood which were our duties and the responsibilities in case 
something went wrong” [RM 20].  
The first argument raised by the RMs against the AML law was that it required 
them to carry out a task that belonged to another entity, i.e. the authorities: “The main 
problem was that we were assigned a task which was definitely not ours: to play the 
role of the policemen and gather intelligence information” [RM9]. Another RM 
showed his frustration regarding the matter: “For me it was obvious that certain tasks 
were to be handled by the public prosecutor. Then, these investigative tasks have been 
assigned to the financial system” [RM21].  
A second problem was the huge responsibility that the AML law placed on the 
RMs’ shoulders as they were asked to run a first screening of the new clients and at-
tentively monitor the transactions of the existing ones: “I was very critical toward this 
law because I saw it as an obstacle for the business. Moreover, it was a sensitive issue 
for the banker as he was responsible for identifying what was unusual. Since we had a 
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lot of payments to verify, we had to learn how to identify unusual cases by really un-
derstanding the profile of the client’s business” [RM 14].  
The great majority of our respondents perceived this burden to be unfair since 
they did not have enough sensibility toward the matter, specifically underlying the fact 
that “we are bankers, not policemen” [RM20]. As a matter of fact, existing studies such 
as Favarel-Garrigues et al. (2008) already underlined that financial professions were not 
meant to identify and manage suspicious transactions. Moreover, in a country where 
banking secrecy and the respect for privacy reigned, the requirement to dig deeper into 
the client’s personal affairs created a certain confusion among the RMs: “My ex-boss, 
who has been working as a RM for the last 40 years thought it was unimaginable to 
start asking the client how much he earns, whether he is married and has children, 
whether he and his wife had agreed on the separation of assets” [RM3]. As our re-
spondents have indicated, prior to AMLA, the bank had no interest and legal obliga-
tion to collect information that was not connected with the account’s purpose and 
expected transactions.  
In order to quantify the magnitude of the changes brought up by the new law it 
is enough to consider the rudimentary due diligence checks that were typically made 
by the banks prior to its introduction: “The biggest effort that I had to put 40 years 
ago when I started working was controlling that the name of the account holder cor-
responded to that on the ID of the person I had in front of me. The bank knew in 
very broad terms what the client was doing for a living. Many clients said they were 
“businessman”. But we would never investigate what kind of business they were in. 
Maybe the RM would have some additional details, but they weren’t written anywhere” 
[RM4]. As our results show, the practice of not interfering with the client’s private 
sphere seemed to be common across Switzerland at that time, as another RM indicated: 
“There were fewer questions. The client would bring his suitcase packed with bills, we 
would ask for an ID and his occupation. Very often, the client would say, in very broad 
terms, that he is an entrepreneur. But nobody would ask him in which industry, since 
when and all the other information” [RM20]. 
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Beside the responsibility of identifying suspect cases, the AML law imposed an-
other heavy responsibility on the RM: the legal responsibility for facilitating money 
laundering. Prior to AMLA, banks were given only the right to report suspicious 
money laundering cases (according to Art. 305ter introduced by the Swiss lawmaker in 
the Penal Code in 1994). However, it was the AML law that forced Switzerland to align 
to the international standards by introducing the obligation to report any actual or 
potential case of money laundering. As they managed the clients’ interaction with the 
bank, relationship managers were now required to collect all the necessary information 
such that the bank fulfilled the newly introduced due-diligence requirements. Failure 
to do so exposed the bank to a significant legal and reputational risk, which ultimately 
spilled over the RM himself. In fact, almost half of our respondents considered them-
selves to be the “scapegoat” if something went wrong: “We are the first ones to be 
interrogated and fined if something happens” [RM5].  
Even though they understood that there was no room for errors “If the judge 
calls you up, you cannot tell him ‘sorry I didn’t know’” [RM3], the respondents could 
not refrain from mentioning their frustration regarding the bank’s behaviour in such 
cases: “We were asked to pay attention to any money laundering attempt, as we will be 
responsible if the client manages to use the bank to launder his dirty money” [RM 19]. 
As a matter of fact, several respondents in our sample said that the bank would “aban-
don” them: “If I commit an error when evaluating an operation/account opening pro-
cedure I will be the one to meet the public prosecutor” [RM4].  
Another problem exacerbating the acceptance of the new AML law was the op-
position that the clients were making toward the RM’s requests. This was especially 
the case with existing clients for whom it was difficult to understand why the bank has 
suddenly started to ask them so many questions: “Discretion and privacy are at the 
heart of private banking services. At the beginning, the clients were very reluctant to-
ward our requests” [RM14]. Many RMs recall that besides the specific AML training, 
they did not receive any guidelines on how the new modus operandi was to be com-
municated to the client. As a consequence, they leveraged on their experience and on 
their argumentative capacities in order to make the conversation as less embarrassing 
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as possible: “At the beginning, we used to apologise in front of the client, blaming the 
law for the questions we were asking” [RM26].  
However, as our respondents indicated, it was not always easy to obtain the 
needed information by simply putting forward the argument of the new requirements 
imposed by the AML law. Beside the challenge of educating the clients, the RMs were 
confronted with another challenge: convincing those clients whose privacy was being 
“invaded” not to leave the bank: “the educational process toward the clients has been 
difficult and painful and we lost several clients due to these legislative changes” 
[RM13].  
Hence, the introduction of the AML law not only placed a lot more professional 
and legal responsibility on the RMs’ shoulders, but it also made it harder for them to 
reach their annual client acquisition and retention targets thus increasing their risk of 
losing their job. 
 
 
5.4.2. AML compliant culture: where we stand today 
 
 
As the fight on money laundering became tougher, a whole compliance industry 
started to develop, providing the financial industry with several intelligence tools meant 
to facilitate their decision making process (Verhage, 2011): criminal databases, com-
pany information registers, negative news matching software, unusual transactions 
monitoring programs. Besides these IT investments, banks also deployed significant 
resources to create dedicated AML compliance departments meant to oversee the im-
plementation of the KYC and CDD procedures. This section sets out to document 
how these procedures have been introduced in the banking culture and how the RMs 
feel about having to deal with them on a daily basis.  
A first assessment of the respondents’ answers indicates that despite the initial 
reluctance toward the AML duties, they have quickly understood that the way of doing 
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business was set to change. Such change was dictated not only by the growing interna-
tional pressures upon Switzerland’s banking secrecy as a consequence of both 9/11 
events and the 2009 economic turmoil but also by the significant developments of the 
cyberspace that made banks more vulnerable to fraud attempts. In fact, over the last 
years the regularisation of the banking sector has developed to such extent that a me-
dium-size bank would be expected to have a compliance department for any service it 
offers: current accounts, credits, investment products, trading, etc.  
One important finding is that these regulatory developments have inevitably 
pushed for a greater collaboration between the sales/front office employees and the 
compliance department: “The commercial department has been continuously increas-
ing its sensibility toward the compliance issues. If in the past, these two were running 
in an almost parallel manner with small occasional intersections, today we work in 
tandem.  Our collaboration is very tight during the account opening procedures but 
also during the life of the account” [RM1]. As further investigation will show, this 
collaboration between the RM and the CO has become fruitful for three reasons.  
First, more than 50% of the respondents indicated that the presence of a dedi-
cated department that independently evaluates and supervises the client’s transactions 
makes them feel more secure. More precisely, since the RM might disregard some im-
portant points during the meeting with the client, the ‘four eyes’ principle entails lower 
operational errors: “It’s true that all the compliance requests may stress the client, but 
I feel safer knowing there is somebody else controlling the account opening requests. 
Sometimes, the compliance officer sees and understands things that I missed” [RM9]. 
By evaluating the account opening profile, the CO can make sure that the bank has 
collected the KYC information requested by the law, while controlling if the client is 
involved in any criminal investigation or judicial proceeding. Moreover, since he sees 
the picture from a detached perspective: he is able to issue a bias-free judgement re-
garding the possibility of proceeding with the account opening “Today we see him as 
a support to the business, whereas 5-7 years [ago] we considered him a kind of scare-
crow for the clients. He is our partner, who makes sure that my reasoning is valid” 
[RM26].  
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A second reason for which the CO could facilitate the RM’s work is because of 
the greater objectivity with which the former can evaluate a case. When meeting a 
client for the first time, the RM might tend to focus his attention on the financial 
aspects of the business while leaving aside details such as the client’s personal back-
ground and economic history that can prove useful in understanding how he has ac-
cumulated his wealth. Since the CO is not paid for bringing new clients to the bank, 
he is not in danger of getting “enchanted” by the client’s financial potential; rather, he 
is expected to duly verify if the client could have rightfully acquired the wealth he 
possess given his age, occupation, family background/connections. The same logic 
applies to existing clients: since the CO is not “emotionally involved” with the client, 
he can evaluate the client’s behaviour in an objective way, which makes it more easy 
for him to spot unusual transactions: “We might tend to underestimate some risks if 
we have been managing an account for the last 30 years and nothing strange happened. 
I will always remember what my teacher at the driving school told me: ‘if I am driving 
on a street for the first time I will notice each sign on the road, but if that is the street 
I’m driving to get home, at a certain point I will know all the signs by heart and so, I 
will not pay attention to them anymore. Let’s imagine that a certain point a sign is 
changed: who is more likely to have an accident? The first or the second person?’ The 
same logic goes for RM with old and new clients. You are more careful and maybe also 
more suspicious when it comes to new clients” [RM3].  
Thirdly, about 30% of our sample considered that the obligation to construct a 
detailed KYC profile allowed them to better understand the client’s needs. Not only 
the RMs considered this information useful for marketing purposes but also as an in-
dicator of how to better focus their energy on those “healthy business opportunities 
in which the clients’ situation is clear” [RM6].  
As far as the integration of the compliance duties in the RM’s everyday work is 
concerned, our data suggest that the increasing client awareness regarding the banks’ 
AML obligations has significantly facilitated the process. Both those RMs that worked 
before AMLA’s introduction and the younger ones indicated a good level of client 
awareness when it comes to current AML practices. This trend is due not only to the 
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international attention that the fight against money laundering has increasingly gained 
over the years, but also to the proportions taken by the war on terror since the events 
of 9/11. Moreover, in order to be able to protect their clients from cyber and identity 
fraud, banks were forced to collect more detailed information about their counterpar-
ties. An early survey by Masciandaro et al. (2001) reports that banks’ customers are well 
aware of the existence of AML laws, even if 44.5% of the respondents thought that 
most clients regard the information collection as a violation of their confidentiality.  
As mentioned in the previous section, at the time of AMLA’s introduction, the 
clients’ opposition toward the RM’s due diligence requests was a significant barrier to 
overcome when trying to reconcile compliance and commercial objectives. Whereas 
in the beginning the common strategy adopted by the RM for getting along with the 
clients was blaming the law itself, in recent times we notice different arguments that 
are put forward when requesting additional information from the client. In most of 
the cases the RMs would tell reluctant clients that the bank’s AML policy is meant, 
first of all, to protect the clients themselves: “The great majority of our clients are 
businessmen, so I expect them to understand my need for cooperation. If they refuse 
to give me details, I usually ask them ‘would you be placing an order with a supplier 
that doesn’t give you all the information you require?’ It’s important for the client to 
understand that these questions are more important for him than they are for us: for 
sure he would not like to read a headline about his bank failed to duly apply the AML 
directive” [RM24]; secondly, the information collected for CDD purposes enables the 
bank to better meet the client’s needs: “one must not stand in front of the client with 
a survey and after each question tick the box . . . I find this very uncomfortable and 
intrusive. Instead you should exhibit interest in the client’s story, what were the suc-
cessful factors that allowed him to build his wealth, etc. It’s a mix of communication 
and psychology; one has to make the client understand that we need those information 
in order to build a long-term, trustworthy relation and offer him the services that better 
suit his needs” [RM6]. 
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Another important factor facilitating the adoption of a compliant culture by the 
RM was the responsibility that the latter was assigned when knowing and understand-
ing the client to such an extent that he should be able to spot any unusual behaviour. 
More than 60% of our respondents claimed that the probability of being held liable 
for unknowingly facilitating money laundering is an important deterrent when accept-
ing clients whose intended business purpose is not clear; moreover, bearing this re-
sponsibility in mind, they also find it easier to collect the additional information re-
quested by the compliance department “I am always straightforward with my clients. 
I know I have to obey the rules and if there is something that is not clear I have no 
problem in contacting the client and asking for clarifications. It’s true that we have a 
relationship based on trust, but is still a working relationship…and the client pays me 
to do my job” [RM4]. 
The results presented above reveal how the bank and hence the RM have signif-
icantly changed the way in which they perceive and interact with their clients in now-
adays. Differently from the past 2-3 decades when banks would eagerly pursue profits 
at any costs, the AML responsibility has pushed them to see the client not only as an 
opportunity but also as a liability. The various frauds against banks, suffered as a con-
sequence of poor due-diligence procedures together with the many judicial cases in 
which the client has blamed the bank in front of the authorities for aiding him in com-
mitting (fiscal) crime, has definitely showed the banks that compliance has its ad-
vantages. A testimony from one respondent summarize the current way in which the 
RM perceives the client: “I would say that 30 years ago there was kind of a romantic 
relationship between the RM and the client, with each of them following his personal 
interest while making everything that was needed for their relationship to work. Today, 
this kind of romanticism diminished since the RM has understood that he can be used 
by the client. In the case of an investigation, very often the client blames the RM for 
the crime he committed. This is mostly the case for fiscal crimes; over the years, we 
slowly started to think about our clients as a liability” [RM23]. In fact, many respond-
ents stress the fact that even if in the private banking industry the personal contact 
between the RM and the client is much more intense than in the retail banking, it’s 
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better to avoid friendships with the clients: “We should never see the client as a friend. 
Actually, your friends and relatives should never be your clients, as the money involved 
may ruin your relation. You go playing tennis with your clients, have lunch, discuss the 
news but still he is only a client, not a friend. To my opinion, a tiny bit of suspicion 
should always exist regarding a client” [RM21].  
This section has underlined the encouraging progress that have been made re-
garding the switch to a compliant banking culture, totally different than the one that 
reigned in Switzerland before AMLA’s introduction. As the next section will show, 
there are still certain jolts that prevent a smooth collaboration between the CO and 
the RM. Still, we can safely conclude that as previous field studies in the AML compli-
ance sector have shown, the AML compliance procedures have become routinely em-
bedded into the work of financial institutions (Canhoto et al., 2013) and most bankers 
perceive them as part of everyday work (Subbotina, 2009). 
 
 
5.4.3. Relationship managers’ reluctance toward compliance duties: 
causes and effects 
 
 
One of the major drawbacks of compliance that has been repeatedly mentioned in the 
AML compliance literature is the administrative burden associated with its implemen-
tation. More precisely, beside the costly investments in designated software and per-
sonnel training, AML rule observance also requires a considerable amount of time for 
collecting the required information, filling in the clients’ profile forms and verifying 
the credibility of the provided information. A decade ago, a study by Gully-Hart (2005) 
reported that a private banker devoted approximately 30% of his time to all the regu-
latory matters. Nowadays, our respondents testify that such a percentage corresponds 
to the average time dedicated only to AML compliance matters. They nevertheless 
distinguish between the account opening phase and the ongoing monitoring of the 
account, as the first one requires significantly more time (i.e. ranging from 40% to 
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60%). Another important difference that needs to be mentioned is between the RMs 
managing resident clients and the ones managing foreign clients, with the latter indi-
cating a higher time that needs to be devoted to AML practices (i.e. 50% as compared 
to 25-30%).  
Even though they value the safety associated with the requirement of ascertain-
ing the clients’ origin of funds, RMs underline that the time needed for compliance 
matters grows at the expense of the one available for clients’ needs: “The compliance 
requests are complicating the daily business because they are forcing me to dedicate 
time to certain activities which do not produce real business” [RM1]. This “diversion 
of resources from other aspects of the bank’s work” (Johnston, 2006) creates frustra-
tion among the RMs as they have less time for doing what they are originally supposed 
to. In fact, both the old and the young RMs in our sample indicated that the financial 
advisory discussions are rather limited when meeting with the client and that the recent 
economic, political and regulatory developments have created the need for a RM that 
acts as “factotum”: “We are not only bankers; often we are lawyers, compliance offic-
ers, fiscal advisors . . . the role of the banker changed significantly. If 30 years ago was 
enough for us to have a certain background, today the requirements for a certain cul-
ture and preparation have increased” [RM1]. Moreover, in most of the cases, the chal-
lenge lies not only in acquiring all these professional skills, but also in being able to 
develop the interpersonal ones: “Lately is very usual that I go visiting a client to speak 
about his financial situation and instead I find myself playing the role of the psycholo-
gist for 1 hour and 45 minutes” [RM5].  
Beside the increased workload, the compliance duties pose another burden to 
the RM’s daily work, as tougher regulations are limiting his possibility of pursuing cer-
tain business opportunities. As such, the RM often finds himself under the pressure of 
reaching annual profit targets while coping with an immense amount of legal require-
ments: “We have the feeling that we are becoming more and more controlled, and not 
only with regard to AML. We are experiencing a conflict because we have the pressure 
to increase the profit while taking care of all these legal requirements . . . it is like 
‘climbing a mountain wearing chains’” [RM14]. This inherent conflict of interest between 
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“the commercial ethos and regulatory injunctions” (Favarel-Garrigues et al., 2008) can 
significantly affect the RM’s commitment to meet the assigned AML duties (Simonova, 
2011). Typically, the cases the RM’s salary and bonus depends on the new Assets under 
Management (AUM) he can bring to the bank, and as such, he might tend to disregard 
some of the compliance aspects, constructing a superficial client profile. In fact, a study 
ran by FSA on 27 banking groups in the UK reported that front-line staff, particularly 
RMs, dismissed or withheld negative information about the client when the bank could 
profit significantly from the business relationship (FSA, 2011). When asked about the 
temptation to “close an eye” just to meet AUM targets, most of our respondents 
acknowledged that the pressure exercised by the bank is an important factor impacting 
the RM’s attitude toward his commitment to AML tasks: “Is hard when you know you 
can gain some AUM, but it depends also on the bank . . . some may be more aggressive 
on the objectives. This pressure makes it harder for the RM because he knows he can 
be fired at the end of the year” [RM17].  The RM’s fear of losing his job if failing to 
reach his yearly AUM target is further exacerbated by two recent developments which 
significantly limited the banks’ growth opportunities: the severe drop in net new money 
growth registered after 2008 and the shift to a tax compliant banking sector. A report 
by PWC regarding the Swiss Private Banking industry indicates that AUM per em-
ployee have declined by roughly 40% from 2006-2007 to 2011, while mentioning that 
above average growth can only be achieved by stealing market share from competitors 
and/or by reducing the outflows from existing clients through retention measures 
(PWC, 2013).  
Given the current banking environment, acquiring new clients has become some 
sort of “treasure-hunt” where one must juggle regulatory requirements, market-spe-
cific difficulties, bank objectives and career plans. Combining all these issues success-
fully is a challenging task, even for more experienced RMs. The latter expressed their 
frustration about the duty of growing the bank’s AUM, while taking all the responsi-
bility both in front of the client when communicating changes/operational restrictions 
and in front of the authorities in the case of an investigation. These conflicting behav-
iours expected from the RM can negatively influence his performance, increasing the 
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perceived stress and dissatisfaction as suggested by Rizzo, House and Lirtzman’s 
(1970) study on role conflict. In fact, the current legal limitations have cut off some of 
the RM’s past enthusiasm as he continues to see the “red light” from the compliance 
officer: “before I was the one providing, authorizing and implementing the solution . 
. . today I can say I am rather an ambassador than a captain” [RM13]. 
Beside the decreased performance, another important problem created by the 
obstacles that the RM must continuously overcome is the experience of interpersonal 
conflicts with the colleagues from the compliance department. An early study by Kahn 
et al. (1964) found that persons reporting role conflict testified a lower trust, personal 
empathy and lower esteem toward the persons who imposed the pressure while also 
avoiding communication with these persons. The tensioned and often conflicting re-
lationship between the RM and the CO has been typically considered to be due to the 
different backgrounds and professional objectives that the two of them have (Verhage, 
2011, Favarel-Garrigues et al. 2011, Simonova, 2011). Regarding the first aspect, a legal 
background as well as a previous experience in the regulatory industry allows the CO 
to better understand the regulatory risks for the bank when drawing and enforcing the 
AML internal policy. However, the legal/compliance language can sometimes be dif-
ficult to understand by the RMs, especially when they do not find any added value in 
doing so: “Sometimes is annoying because instead of answering my questions, he just 
sends me the law articles . . . I am not a lawyer and I shouldn’t spend my time on 
reading them instead of taking care of what I am supposed to” [RM9]. Since he is 
required to identify potential cases of money laundering, the CO should possess some 
sort of “investigative mind-set” that allows him to distinguish those grey cases that 
meet the conditions of being reported to the authorities. In several cases though, they 
may tend to be overzealous and exhibit a certain behaviour that the literature has pre-
viously defined as ‘defensive’ or ‘umbrella’ reporting, meaning that they would report 
any suspicion just to be on the safe side (Harvey, 2004; Levi, 2007). In fact, several 
respondents have mentioned the CO’s tendency of overreacting to certain elements 
that do not pose any threat to the bank’s integrity: “Today, their approach is: we as-
sume that the client is a criminal, so he must prove us the contrary. My approach is: 
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the client is not a criminal, but he must prove that he is ‘clean’. These are two totally 
different things” [RM2]. 
Whereas they share a common goal – i.e. contribute to the bank’s profitability – 
as members of separate departments, the CO and the RM take a different view regard-
ing the way in which the said goal can be attained. To a certain extent, this can be due 
to the specific objectives each of them has: safeguarding the bank’s reputation versus 
increasing the bank’s client and assets base. In some cases, the compliance department 
decisions would limit the bank’s growing opportunities, even though the commercial 
department fights to do the opposite. The challenge lies in understanding the thin line 
between what is deemed to be acceptable from a compliance point of view and what 
is to be considered suspicious. One problem signalled by the majority of our respond-
ents is the CO’s lack of empathy for the business: “99% of them never saw a client 
and they never take the common sense of life to understand our needs” [RM13]. As 
the bank’s communication interface with the clients, the RM often finds himself forced 
to manage delicate discussions with the clients; this is especially the case with old cli-
ents to whom requesting certain documents/explanations feels like betraying the sort 
of friendship that has been created over the years.  
Beside their different background and objectives, we believe there is yet another 
element that hinders the collaboration between the two departments: the way in which 
they perceive risk. As banks are financial institutions which profitability depends on 
their ability to both leverage upon and hedge against risk, we can expect some clashes 
between the employees attitudes toward this concept. Due to the phenomenon they 
are supposed to counteract, AML laws have been inevitably designed in such a way as 
to consider the hazardous aspect of risk. Hence, the CO’s actions and decisions are 
guided by the need of protecting the bank from the risk of being used for criminal 
purposes. However, risk can also present itself as an opportunity (Demetis and Angell, 
2007). Given his growing objectives, the RM will, by default, size any new client as an 
opportunity.  
In Chapter 4 we saw that compliance officers usually face tensioned discussions 
with their colleagues from the front office (75% of the cases, N=46). As far as the 
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RM’s opinion toward the same matter is concerned, our results show no different pic-
ture. In fact, more than 70% of our sample interviewees have experienced a conflict 
with the compliance colleagues:  
 “Ah, some CO are more Catholic than the Pope” [RM13] 
 “Yes, there is a conflict. Some compliance officers are really business stoppers 
that unfriendly dig into things that are not relevant…sometimes they really are a pain 
in the neck.” [RM15] 
 “The CO is not the eternal God who came down on Earth” [RM2] 
 “Among us we always say that who runs the bank is the compliance department, 
given that they decide whether ‘you can’ or ‘you cannot’” [RM5]. 
 “We still live in different worlds and sometimes they really give me the impres-
sion that they enjoy nagging us as they hope to find something criminal” [RM10]. 
 
Nevertheless, we must emphasise that no single respondent held a categorical 
view against compliance and that the mentioned conflictual situations regarded specific 
episodes that the RMs recalled from the personal or other colleagues experience. Over-
all, we collect a positive general attitude and acceptance of the AML compliant culture 
as described in the previous section, with some particular cases of conflicts, depending 
on the CO’s and RM’s eagerness of defending their assigned professional objectives.  
5.5. Conclusions and hints for a smoother collaboration between the 
relationship manager and the compliance officer 
 
 
After having described the changes brought by the AML law into the Swiss banking 
context and the difficulties encountered when coping with compliance requests, this 
concluding section sets out to document several strategies meant to facilitate the col-
laboration between the CO and the RM. 
As a consequence of FATF’s decision to include tax evasion as a predicate of-
fence for money laundering, the majority of its members have adhered to Automatic 
Exchange of Information agreements that are to become effective in the next couple 
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of years.24 Moreover, since the Swiss “White Money Strategy” and the many European 
tax amnesty programs were implemented, a huge percentage of the offshore funds that 
were deposited inside Swiss Banks left the country or have been duly declared to the 
fiscal authorities. The same goes for the American clients, for the supervision of which 
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (a.k.a. FATCA) has been implemented. In 
this given picture, the likelihood that somebody who wants to hide criminal/untaxed 
money will choose Switzerland is very low. As such, we can expect that the compliance 
controls that have to be run when onboarding new clients will be considerably lighter, 
at least with regard to tax matters. Consequently, there should be fewer arguments that 
could possibly trigger a conflict between the RM and the CO. 
On the other hand, given the creativity displayed by criminals when exploiting 
regulatory loopholes it is difficult to believe that by tightening tax controls financial 
institutions will incur lower money laundering risks. Nowadays, the use of cash has 
increasingly become unusual – at least in the developed countries – forcing (criminal) 
people to revert to the use of banking facilities. In fact, the most frequently used in-
strument by money launderers is banking institution (Ping, 2010) and the vast majority 
of convicts hold their financial assets in banks (van Duyne, 2003). As such, even 
though it is true that lately the international fight on money laundering has been (cov-
ertly) focusing on tax offences (Davies, 2007), there is still a great deal of controls and 
supervision to be done by the compliance officers with regard to other types of frauds 
and economic crimes. Moreover, as banking regulation will continue to become 
tougher, the RM will struggle searching for growing opportunities while fighting oper-
ational limitations. Hence, he will inevitably find himself arguing over certain cases 
with the compliance department. After surveying the respondents’ stories about the 
conflictual interactions they have had with the compliance colleagues, we were inter-
ested in understanding whether there are any strategic operational and communica-
tional moves that could soothe the collaboration between the two departments. Below 
are summarized our findings regarding both the RM and the CO: 
 
                                                                
24 2017-2019 
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A: The compliance Officer 
 
 Have no religious, political or national prejudices. The CO should evaluate 
each case objectively and give the right weight to the client’s potential risk associated 
with his country of residence, political association and religious beliefs; 
 Do not be alarmed by important amounts. Whereas the AML legislation has 
established that certain thresholds could arouse money laundering suspicions, the CO 
should always try to see the bigger picture behind a client’s financial background: an 
amount that can be high for an affluent client can be “peanuts” for a wealthy one.  
 Evaluate a client’s case thoroughly before making any questions to the RM and 
clearly state the information/documents that are to be obtained such that the client is 
disturbed as less as possible. By requiring all the information at once, the RM will feel 
more at ease with the client. Moreover, the CO should be aware that certain documents 
take time to be produced and unless they are vital for reconciling any money laundering 
suspicion, the business should not be discontinued until the receipt of said documents.  
 Provide explanations as to why additional information is needed. Unless clearly 
explained how the missing information affects the bank’s integrity, the RM will not 
understand the necessity of bothering the client with requests that he deems to be 
superfluous. Furthermore, a detailed explanation should also be given when the com-
pliance decides that certain transactions cannot be undertaken. In both cases, the RM 
will be better prepared in front of the client and will be able to explain him the bank’s 
decision. 
 
 
 
B: The relationship Manager 
 
 Take a long term approach when on-boarding risky clients; whereas such cli-
ents can seem profitable, their specific financial behavior can later become problematic 
and complicate the RM’s daily business. As such, the incentive of taking responsibility 
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(in front of the bank and/or of the authorities) for risky cases should always be bal-
anced with respect to the gaining opportunities.  
 Do not blame the compliance for the requests addressed to the client. Such 
conduct not only demonstrates a low commitment toward the bank’s internal policies 
but also endangers the future collaboration with the CO, seen rather as an enemy and 
not as a partner. As suggested by Edwards and Wolfe (2004) the compliance function 
is to be recognised within a wider partnership approach, which takes account of good 
compliance and ethical practice. Ethics are distinguishable from rules as 'rules tell you 
how to act while ethics tell you how to think before acting'. 
 Take a proactive approach and try anticipating what kind of complementary 
information the CO could ask. This will not only save time for both the RM and the 
CO but it would also avoid unnecessary communications with the client. Moreover, 
being thoroughly when collecting the needed information, the RM can better under-
stand the drawbacks that the compliance is likely to identify regarding the client’s sit-
uation. As such, not only the RM will manage to close ex-ante some information gaps 
but he will also avoid telling the client that certain transactions can be undertaken 
whereas later on will be blocked by the CO. 
 Do not have a “tick the box” attitude; try to understand why the CO asks for 
certain documents and how the absence of such documents can put the bank at peril. 
Once said documents have been provided, run a first check and see if they answer the 
CO’s needs; otherwise, inform the client that the quality of the produced documents 
is not satisfying. 
 Do not take possible conflicts personally and do not leverage on possible 
friendships with the compliance colleagues. Be aware of the CO’s duty of protecting 
both the RM and the bank against regulatory and reputational risks.  
 
Whereas these lofty recommendations may smooth the interaction between the 
two professionals, we believe that the different tasks that the two of them must ac-
complish will always leave room for tension, at least to some degree. The RM will 
favour risk-taking for growth objectives, while the CO will try to mitigate regulatory 
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and reputational risks by blocking shady business opportunities; this conceptual gap 
will inevitably lead to clashes as to where the threshold for risk taking must stand. In 
conclusion, banks will have to dedicate continuing attention to the RM-CO conflict, 
encouraging a broader acceptation of the compliance culture inside their institution 
and putting in place remuneration schemes that can diminish the potential for unnec-
essary risk taking. 
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6. Concluding remarks  
  
 
 
The main research interest pursued by this thesis was understanding whether the AML 
compliance duties have been integrated into the banking culture. Over the last three 
chapters we have been presenting empirical evidence regarding the banks’ reactions to 
such compliance requests, going from the internal due diligence and reporting 
measures put in place (Chapter 3) to the interaction schemes developed among the 
interested departments (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first study of this type in Switzerland. In addition, it is the first study that empir-
ically assesses the (conflictual) relationship between the compliance officer and the 
relationship manager. 
As a general conclusion we can say that the banks’ financial and socio-cultural 
efforts in coping with AML requirements have been continuously increasing. Pushed 
by the desire of protecting their reputation, banks have implemented extensive internal 
AML policies that are supposed to mitigate money laundering risks by training front 
line employees on how to monitor clients’ financial activity and report potential suspi-
cious transactions. Despite their initial opposition toward these new tasks, relationship 
managers understood that compliance was key to continuing doing their job and was 
meant to protect them from potential legal risks. In fact, considering the continuous 
evolution of AML regulations we can say that banks had a noticeable openness toward 
disseminating an AML compliant culture among their employees. Nevertheless, we 
noticed certain compliance aspects that relationship managers refuse to accept and 
which can lead to internal conflicts.  
In the future, banks must continue to invest in the development of a better col-
laboration between relationship managers and compliance officers, by taking into ac-
count their different professional backgrounds, roles and objectives. Moreover, we be-
lieve that finding the right balance between reaching growth targets and observing 
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AML duties will be an important challenge for the banking sector. In this sense, the 
management will have a key role as an advocate of change. In many cases, compliance 
is just an advisory function, providing its assessment on the potential risks (reputational 
and criminal) associated with a client. Especially for a risky client, the final responsi-
bility as to whether on-board him or support him in a certain transaction ultimately 
lies with the top-management. Hence, designing and enforcing a solid decision-making 
process, which is proportionate to the bank’s risk appetite, facilitates the acceptance 
of compliance. As relationship managers and compliance officers are on the same hi-
erarchal level, the management has an important role in solving conflicts and differ-
ences of opinion among the two. Adopting a top-down approach which is meant to 
disseminate a compliance-friendly culture can indeed be a solution to many disputes 
between the relationship manager and the compliance officer, making both parties to 
accept and respect the other’s role. 
We believe some of the regulatory updates applicable since the 1st of January 
2016 will continue to impact the Swiss banks’ investments in compliance knowledge 
and will intensify the interaction between front employees and compliance officers.  
For example, banks are now required to identify the controlling person of a cor-
porate structure and, few exceptions25 allowed, the controlling person must always be 
a natural person. A three-stage cascade needs to be used for the identification of con-
trolling persons: (a) natural persons owning more than 25% of the company’s voting 
rights or share capital; (b) if there are no controlling persons according to the first 
stage, the controlling persons who exercise control over the company by other dis-
cernible means need to be indicated; c) if no controlling persons are identified in the 
first and second stages, the highest managing director (e.g. CEO or similar) must be 
identified as a substitute. With the exception of small companies for which the owner 
is almost always the authorized signatory, in the rest of the cases banks will be faced 
with a knowledge gap, as they are required to run a due-diligence check on an individual 
                                                                
25  Listed companies, public authorities, banks and other financial intermediaries, companies or associa-
tions with an exclusively non-commercial purpose and no relationship to any high-risk countries, simple 
partnerships, and other collectives such as condominium owner and common ownership collectives. 
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who has no active role on the account. The relationship managers will often find them-
selves in a delicate position as they will have to provide the KYC profile of an individ-
ual they never met personally, relying exclusively on information provided by the cor-
porate directors/authorized signatories on the account. The mentioned lack of per-
sonal contact with the indicated controlling person can lead to resistance on RM’s side 
when it comes to compliance requests for additional investigations. 
The introduction of aggravated tax misdemeanor as a predicate offence to 
money laundering will lead to an increase in the number of SARs filled in by banks; 
consequently, also the banks’ costs associated with reporting activities will increase. 
However, this is mostly the case for non-European clients as the tax amnesties carried 
out in various European countries in the latest years pushed many banks to exit unde-
clared clients already. 
Another regulatory novelty in the Swiss AML landscape is the broadening of the 
definition of “PEP” (politically exposed person) to include domestic PEPs and PEPs 
belonging to intergovernmental organizations. As PEPs are considered to be the risk-
iest clients of the bank, multiple controls are put in place to ensure that their transac-
tional activity is properly monitored. For example, each bank must conduct a yearly 
review of their PEP clients in order to check if (a) there has been any material change 
in the PEP’s financial standing, (b) there is any negative media coverage on the person 
(reporting him as involved in a scandal/legal case) and (c) the transactions concluded 
are in line with the pre-announced purpose of the account. The results of the review 
are typically submitted to the management who must decide whether the relationship 
with the client can be continued or is to be terminated. In most of the cases, the man-
agement’s decision will be based on a pre-advice previously issued by the compliance. 
Beside the yearly review, the RM and the CO are also involved during the year in the 
strict monitoring of the PEPs’ transactions, due to the high risk of corruption associ-
ated with these clients. Given all the due-diligence tasks described above, it is clear that 
the broadening of the definition of PEP will create additional work for both the RM 
and the compliance officers, increasing thus the likelihood of a dispute between the 
two. 
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Beside the local legislation, international initiatives also contribute in adding ad-
ministrative burden on the Swiss banks’ shoulders. For example, the upcoming 
OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS) will enable the governments of adhering 
countries to automatically exchange financial information with other governments, al-
ready starting with 2017. As it was the case for FATCA, banks will need to develop a 
suitable reporting process, design the specific forms, collect the requested information, 
hire dedicated specialists and train interested employees accordingly. From an Auto-
matic Exchange of Information perspective, the RM’s tasks consist in collecting the 
client’s signature that authorizes the bank to transmit his financial information to his 
home tax authorities. However, this new transparent context will have consequences 
also on the CO-RM relationship. On one side, even if bank profits will shrink, the shift 
to a fully tax-compliant client base is likely to ease the compliance officer’s work in 
certain cases and hence diminish the conflict between himself and the relationship 
managers. However, the likelihood that RMs will refuse a compliance request to collect 
additional information or supporting documentation from the client and instead push 
forward the argument “the funds are declared to the tax authorities, the client has 
nothing to hide” is very high. Such approach is not to be condemned, given that un-
declared assets have been Switzerland’s (and other similar offshores centers like Hong 
Kong and Singapore) main deficiency when it came to recent AML regulation. Indeed, 
Davies (2007) pointed out that the continuous development of the AML standards by 
the international organizations are in reality targeting tax evasion and an enrichment 
of the state’s knowledge about its citizens’ financial activity. Nevertheless, banks and 
relationship managers should be aware that tax compliance is just one part of the much 
bigger anti-money laundering compliance universe. A waiver signed by the client al-
lowing the bank to disclose his financial information to the home country does not 
offer a complete “protection” for the bank against ultimate beneficial ownership mat-
ters, corruption or other potential future frauds.  
Professionals in the Swiss banking industry often express disappointment to-
wards the behavior of the Swiss Government, which has too easily gave up in front of 
the international pressures on banking secrecy and tax evasion, without requesting any 
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benefit in exchange. For example, the introduction of FATCA has pushed banks to 
invest significant resources in documenting the US status of each individual and/or 
corporate client and exchanging the relevant information with the US authorities. 
However, Switzerland is not automatically notified about Swiss citizens holding US 
accounts, even though reciprocal exchange of information is possible under certain 
terms of the Intergovernmental Agreement it signed with the US. Moreover, given the 
amount of information obtained on US taxpayers through FATCA’s standards, the US 
decided not to adhere to OECD’s Common Reporting Standards, avoiding thus any 
duty of automatically exchanging information with the participating countries. This 
unilateral flow of information and efforts deployed into complying with FATCA has 
created a lot of frustration among several OECD jurisdictions. Indeed, the US financial 
institutions are not obliged to exchange any information on their accountholders. Such 
collaboration would be particularly important in the international fight against money 
laundering/tax evasion when considering the millions of shell companies incorporated 
in Delaware (defined as a “heaven for transnational crime” by Transparency Interna-
tional), Nevada and Wyoming. In these states, lax corporate rules prevent disclosure 
of the beneficial ownership, encouraging foreign investors in seek of a safe shield 
against home tax authorities to transfer their (undeclared) assets to the US. 
The findings of this thesis regarding the impact of the AML regulation on the 
banking sector together with the requirements of the recent and upcoming regulatory 
updates underline the significant costs entailed by compliance. Remains though open 
the question as to whether the AML burden is proportional to what is expected to be 
achieved. The lack of consistent and complete data on the number of convictions and 
amount of assets confiscated as well as the impossibility to quantify the costs of non-
compliance, do not allow us to provide a reliable result of AML compliance benefits.  
Given the continuous development of IT solutions targeting the financial sys-
tem, we believe that future research should investigate the effects of the automation 
of some AML compliance tasks. Even though automation entails important cost sav-
ings, it may also create difficulties in those cases in which the interaction between com-
pliance officers and relationship managers is necessary. Moreover, attention should be 
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given to the impact that the Common Reporting Standard had on the banks’ business 
model, which were the costs associated with its implementation and what benefits (if 
any) it brought in for the banks. 
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Appendix  
 
 
 
Survey Structure 
 
 
Thank you for accepting to take part on this survey. 
Please complete this survey only if you are working in the Legal or Compliance De-
partment or you have enough knowledge about the internal AML policy of your bank. 
Please answer all questions. If for whatever reason, you choose not to answer a partic-
ular question, a "No answer" option is always available. You need maximum 20 
minutes to answer all questions. Your comments are welcome! 
There are 31 questions in this survey. 
 
SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
[A1]  Which is your employment position inside your institution? 
Please write your answer here:…….. 
 
[A2] Approximately what percentage of your time is dedicated to anti money launder-
ing /counter terrorism financing (AML/CTF) matters? Please choose only one of the 
following: 
o less than 10%  
o 10% to 25% 
o 26% to 50% 
o 51% to 75% 
o 76% to 100%  
 
[A3]  For how long have you been working inside this department? Please choose only 
one of the following: 
o Less than one year  
o One to five years 
o Five to ten years 
o More than ten years 
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[A4] To which of the following categories does your institution belong? Please choose 
only one of the following: 
o Cantonal bank  
o Major bank  
o Private bank  
o Trade bank  
o Asset management bank 
o Foreign controlled bank  
o Branch of foreign controlled bank  
o Regional and savings bank  
o Other  
 
[A5] To the best of your knowledge, what is the proportion of foreign assets under 
management in your institution? Please choose only one of the following: 
o 0 %  
o < 10%  
o 10 to 25% 
o 25 to 50% 
o 50 to 75% 
o >75%  
o Don’t Know  
 
 
SECTION B: AML POLICY INSIDE YOUR BANK 
 
 
[B1]  Does your bank outsource the AML compliance functions? Please choose only 
one of the following: 
o Yes. Please move to question [C9] 
o No  
 
[B2] During the client acceptance procedure does your institution check the available 
lists of persons/ special countries or other sources of information to verify the profile 
of the client? Please choose only one of the following: 
o Always 
o Usually 
o Half of the time 
o Seldom 
o Never 
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[B3] Does your bank verify the reasons behind a customer`s choice to open an ac-
count in a foreign jurisdiction? Please choose only one of the following: 
o Always 
o Usually 
o Half of the time 
o Seldom 
o Never 
 
[B4] Does your bank accept clients that haven`t been personally identified (e.g. via 
internet or third party introduction)? Please choose only one of the following: 
o Always 
o Usually 
o Half of the time 
o Seldom 
o Never 
 
 
[B5] Does your institution screen transactions against lists of persons, entities or coun-
tries issued by the competent authorities? Please choose one of the following: 
o Always 
o Usually 
o Half of the time 
o Seldom 
o Never 
 
[B6] What are the estimated total costs of AML compliance (including staff, proce-
dures, software) in proportion to the total costs of your bank? Please choose only one 
of the following: 
o Less than 5%  
o Between 5 and 10%  
o Between 11 and 20%  
o More than 20%  
o Other 
 
[B7] How often do you train relevant employees with regard to the following issues: 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 
 Never Just 
Once 
Every 6 
months 
Every    
1-2 years 
Every 5 
years 
Identification and reporting of transaction that 
must be reported to Government authorities  
     
Examples of different forms of money launder-
ing involving the bank`s products and service  
     
Internal policies to prevent money laundering      
Trade-based money laundering      
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[B8] To what extent you consider the Swiss AML Law to be successful in fighting the 
money laundering phenomenon? Please choose only one of the following: 
o Large extent 
o Certain extent 
o Not sure 
o Limited extent 
o Not at all 
 
SECTION C: ISSUES IN IMPLEMENTING AML/CTF COMPLIANCE 
 
[C1] To what extent do you consider the AML policy of your institution to be stricter 
than other Swiss banks' AML policies? Please choose only one of the following: 
o Large extent 
o Certain extent 
o Not sure 
o Limited extent 
o Not at all 
 
[C2] To what extent do you find the duty to require documents for customer due 
dilligence procedures to be:  Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
   
 
Large 
extent 
Certain 
extent 
Not 
sure 
Limited 
extent 
Not at 
all 
Intrusive      
A normal business procedure      
An administrative burden      
     
[C3] To what extent is the information and feedback (technical assistance) provided 
by MROS (Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland) and prosecuting author-
ities useful in carrying out your AML tasks?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
o Large extent 
o Certain extent 
o Not sure 
o Limited extent 
o Not at all 
[C4]  Through how many layers of decision making a suspicious activity report (SAR) 
must pass before being transmitted to MROS? Can you mention it/them? Please 
choose all that apply and provide a comment: 
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First level: _______________________   
Second level: _____________________ 
Third level: ______________________   
Fourth level: _____________________ 
Fifth level: ______________________   
Other: __________________________ 
  
[C5]  To what extent you consider that you are given enough authority to make day 
to day decisions on problems that arouse routinely in the course of applying AML law 
provisions? Please choose only one of the following: 
o Large extent 
o Certain extent 
o Not sure 
o Limited extent 
o Not at all 
 
[C6] Several studies have proven that the job of a compliance officer is very stressful 
and that very often he finds himself in a tensioned relation with his colleagues working 
in the sales department. To what extent do you perceive a contradictory position of 
AML compliance and the commercial interests of the bank? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
o Large extent 
o Certain extent 
o Not sure 
o Limited extent 
o Not at all 
 
[C7]  To what extent do you consider that the requirements stemming from the AML 
law should prevail when compared to the commercial interests of your institution? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
o Large extent 
o Certain extent 
o Not sure 
o Limited extent 
o Not at all 
 
[C8] Did you ever have any tensioned discussion with your colleagues from the sales 
department? Please choose only one of the following: 
o Yes  
o No 
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[C9] To your best knowledge, how many SARs were sent to MROS by your institution 
during the last year (2011)?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
o 0  
o Less than 5  
o Between 5 and 15  
o Between 15 and 50  
o More than 50  
o Other 
 
[C10] To what extent do you think your institution is under or over reporting suspi-
cious activities to MROS? Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 
     (1) Underreporting            (3) Fair reporting           (5) Over reporting 
        Ο           Ο                   Ο        Ο        Ο 
  
[C11] Has your bank been involved in any regulatory or criminal enforcement action 
resulting from violations of any AML laws or regulations in the past 5 years? Please 
choose only one of the following: 
o Yes  
o No  
 
 
SECTION D: THE COMPLIANCE OFFICER IN THE AML COMPLEX 
 
 
[D1] To what extent you consider Switzerland to be vulnerable to money laundering 
transactions? Please choose only one of the following: 
o Large extent 
o Certain extent 
o Not sure 
o Limited extent 
o Not at all 
 
[D2] In your opinion which financial instruments are mostly preferred by money laun-
derers? Please choose all that apply: 
o Checking (current) account   
o Savings Account  
o Certificate of deposit  
o International wire transfers  
o Transactions involving real-estate properties  
o Other: 
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[D3] How clear (in practical terms) do you consider the Swiss AML Law to be? 
       Very Unclear                    Very Clear           
     1   2   3   4    5  
     Ο   Ο   Ο   Ο   Ο 
  
[D4]  For which reasons should a bank engage in the money laundering fight? 
Please number each box in order of preference from 1 to 6 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Reputational risks       
Regulatory risks       
Social and moral concerns       
Understand the client`s profile       
Protect the integrity of the banking system       
Avoid criminal liability       
 
 [D5] To what extent do you agree with the following affirmations about the positive 
and negative impacts that the compliance with the AML law could have on the entire 
financial institution? Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
 
[D6]  As a consequence of the latest FATF-GAFI decisions, Switzerland may be 
obliged to consider tax evasion as a crime. To what extent do you consider this fact to 
increase the compliance burden? Please choose only one of the following: 
o Large extent 
o Certain extent 
o Not sure 
o Limited extent 
o Not at all 
 
[D7] Further Comments 
Please write your answer here: 
________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
 Large 
extent 
Certain 
extent 
Not 
sure 
Limited 
extent  
Not 
at all 
It protects the reputation of the bank      
It increases the awareness of these risks for 
the financial institution 
     
It has a proactive involvement in developing 
new products, services or marketing activities 
of the bank 
     
It slows down the business      
It scares clients off      
It is costly      
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Tables – Survey 
 
 
Table A. 1: Banks’ opinion regarding Switzerland’s vulnerability to money laundering, 
the efficiency of AMLA and the rigidity of their internal anti-money laundering policy 
Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they agree with each statement on a scale of -2 (not at all) 
to +2 (large extent). Panel A reports summary statistics for the responses from all the banks surveyed.  Col-
umns (1), (2) and (3) present the number of respondents choosing that particular answer. Column (4) reports 
the average rating, where higher values correspond to agreement to a larger extent. Column (5) reports the 
results of a t-test of the null hypothesis that each average response is equal to 0 (neither agree nor disagree) 
The ***,** and * denote rejection at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Panel B presents a comparison of the 
average scores for each question when the sample is split according to the banks’ and respondents’ charac-
teristics reported in Table 3 and Table 4. The “Contradiction” criterion is an indicator for whether or not a 
firm perceive a contradictory position between AML rule observance and the profit maximization function 
of the bank. The sample for all comparisons in Panel B varies depending on whether the respondent provided 
or not the information. ***,** and * denote a statistically significant difference across groups at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Unconditional averages 
 
Large or 
Certain 
extent 
Not 
sure 
Limited 
extent or 
not at all 
Average 
Points 
H₀: Aver-
age rating 
=0 
(1) Switzerland is vulnerable to money laun-
dering transactions? 
36 2 13 0.57 (***) 
(2) The Swiss AML Law is successful in 
fighting the money laundering phenomenon? 
39 4 8 0.88 (***) 
(3) The AML policy of your institution is 
stricter than other Swiss banks' AML policies? 
27 7 6 0.54 (***) 
 
Panel B: Conditional averages 
Column (1)            (2) Canton (3)Years in dept.        (4) AML tasks       (5) Size 
Quest. Avg. GE ZH TI    <5Y >5Y    Full Part Small Large 
(1) 0,57 0,57 0,68 0,22    0,42 0,72    1,06***  0,34 0,36* 0,75 
(2) 0,88 0,60 0,86 1,63*    0,6** 1,20    1,27**   0,75 0,80 0,96 
(3) 0,54 0,10* 0,92 0,75    0,79 0,62    1,00   0,59 0,80 0,63 
 
Contd.  (6) Ownership             (7) AUM           (8) Contradiction           (9) SARs              (10) Sanctioned 
Avg. CH F CH F No Yes   No Yes No Yes 
0,57 0,78 0,45 0,50 0,48 0,33 0,72   0,21 ** 0,85 0,53 1,00 
0,88 0,89 0,91 1,00 0,82 1,00 0,87   0,79 0,92 0,92 0,50 
0,54 0,53 0,80 0,46 0,75 0,75 0,68   0,71 0,77 0,67 1,00 
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   Table A. 2: Banks motivations for fighting money laundering 
Points are assigned as follow: 6 points for a #1 Ranking, 5 points for a #2 Ranking, 4 points for a #3 Ranking, 
3 points for #4 Ranking, 2 points for a #5 Ranking and 1 point for a #6 Ranking. See header of Table A.1 for 
additional table and variable description. 
Panel A: Unconditional averages 
Reason #1 
Rank 
#2 
Rank 
#3 
Rank 
#4 
Rank 
#5 
Rank 
#6 
Rank 
Total 
Points 
Average 
Score 
(1) Reputational risk 22 16 6 2 6 0 254 4.88 
(2) Regulatory risk 5 15 15 10 7 0 209 4.02 
(3) Social and moral concerns 6 4 4 7 14 17 138   2.65 
(4) Understand the client`s profile 4 1 3 10 10 24 115 2.21 
(5) Protect the integrity of the bank-
ing system 
9        8 9 12 9 5 189 3.63 
(6) Avoid criminal liability 6 8 15 11 6 6 187 3.60 
 
 Panel B: Conditional averages 
Column (1) (2)  Canton (3) Tenure     (4) AML tasks        (5) Size 
Reason Avg. GE ZH TI < 5Y > 5Y Full Part Small  Large 
(1) 4,88 4,93 4,89 4,78 4,92 4,85 4,69 4,97   4,88 4,84 
(2) 4,02 4,07 4,14 3,56 3,92 4,12 4,13 3,97   3,68 ** 4,24 
(3) 2,65 2,87 2,46 2,89 2,46 2,85 2,81 2,58   2,60 2,68 
(4) 2,21 2,20 2,29 2,00 2,23 2,19 2,13 2,25   2,44 1,96 
(5)  3,63 3,53 3,50 4,22 3,81 3,46 3,63 3,64   3,76 3,68 
(6) 3,60 3,40 3,71 3,56 3,65 3,54 3,63 3,58   3,64 3,60 
Contd.  (6) Ownership (7) AUM (8) Contrad. (9) SAR (10) Sanctioned 
Reason Avg. CH F CH F No Yes No Yes No Yes 
(1) 4.88 5.11 4.76 5.38* 4.83 5.22  4.73    5.21 * 4.70 4.98 4.50 
(2) 4.02 4.22 3.91 4.14 3.82 4.11  3.93 4.00 4.00 3.93 4.00 
(3) 2.65 2.33 2.82 2.07 2.65 2.50  2.77 2.26 2.81  2.48* 3.67 
(4) 2.21 2.00 2.32 2.21 2.09 2.11  2.20 2.53 2.00    2.48** 1.33 
(5)  3.63 3.39 3.76 3.36 3.29 3.94  3.53 3.57 3.81 3.78 3.17 
(6) 3.60 3.94 3.41 3.86 3.35 3.11 3.83* 3.42 3.67   3.38* 4.33 
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Table A. 3: Banks’ opinion regarding the positive and negative impacts of AML compli-
ance on the financial institution 
The following table reports the respondents’ answer to the question: To what extent do you agree with the 
following affirmations about the positive and negative impacts that the compliance with the AML law could 
have on the entire financial institution? 
See header of Table A.1 for additional table and variable description. 
Panel A: Unconditional averages 
Impact Large or 
Certain 
extent 
Not 
sure 
Limited 
extent or 
Not at all 
Average 
Points 
H₀:Average 
rating =0 
(1) It protects the reputation of the bank 40 0 6  1.56 (***) 
(2) It increases the awareness of these risks 
for the bank 
45 2 1  1.38 (***) 
(3) It has a proactive involvement in develop-
ing new products, services or marketing activ-
ities of the bank 
19 15 18 -0.06 - 
(4) It slows down the business 21 5 26 -0.21 - 
(5) It scares clients off 14 10 28 -0.48 (***) 
(6) It is costly 31 5 16  0.37 (**) 
 
Panel B: Conditional averages 
 
   (1)            (2) Canton    (3) Tenure (4) AML tasks      (5) Size 
 
Avg. GE ZH TI <5Y >5Y Full Part Small  Large 
(1)  1.56  1.67  1.57  1.33  1.54  1.58 1.81**  1.44  1.52  1.56 
(2)  1.37  1.33  1.39  1.40  1.20**  1.57  1.44  1.34  1.50*  1.21 
(3) -0.06  0.13 -0.25  0.22 -0.08 -0.04 -0.31  0.06  0.16* -0.32 
(4) -0.21 -0.20 -0.11 -0.56 -0.19 -0.04 -0.38 -0.14 -0.20 -0.20 
(5) -0.48 -0.33 -0.36 -1.11 -0.54 -0.42 -0.75 -0.36 -0.44 -0.52 
(6)  0.36  0.13  0.64 -0.11  0.19  0.54  0.31  0.39  0.36  0.32 
  (6) Ownership (7) AUM (8) Contradiction (9) SAR (10) Sanctioned 
 Avg.   CH F CH F   No Yes   No Yes   No  Yes 
(1)  1.56  1.61  1.53  1.54  1.61  1.50  1.60  1.53 1.56  1.57  1.17 
(2)  1.37  1.44  1.34  1.17  1.47  1.64**  1.23   1.60 1.33  1.32*  1.80 
(3) -0.06 -0.17  0.00  0.00 -0.09  0.06  0.00  0.05 -0.15 -0.07 -0.17 
(4) -0.21 -0.28 -0.18 -0.23 -0.30 -0.56**  0.00  -0.58**  0.11 -0.15 -0.67 
(5) -0.48 -0.94** -0.23 -0.69 -0.57 -0.89*** -0.17  -0.89** -0.11 -0.40 -1.00 
(6)  0.36  0.17  0.47  0.23  0.21  0.06  0.47  0.05**  0.63 -0.25**  1.17 
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Table A. 4: Banks’ opinion regarding the duty to require documents for customer due  
diligence procedures 
The following table reports the number of banks answering the question: To what extent do you consider 
the duty to require documents for customer due diligence procedures to be…. 
 
Panel A: Unconditional averages  
 
Large or 
Certain 
extent 
Not 
sure 
Limited ex-
tent or Not 
at all 
Average 
rating 
H₀: Aver-
age rating 
= 0 
(1) Intrusive 
(2) A normal business procedure 
  8 3 36 -0.94 *** 
42 0   5  1.40 *** 
(3) An administrative burden 21 3 22 -0.17 - 
 
Panel B: Conditional Averages 
 
(1) (2) Canton (3)Time in dept. (4) AML tasks (5) Size 
 
AVG   GE ZH TI    <5Y >5Y Full Part Small Large 
(1) -0.94  -0.77 -0.93 -1.29    -0.96 -0.91 -1.31*  -0.79 -0.83  -1.05 
(2) 1.40   1.15  1.56  1.29     1.44  1.36   1.79*   1.24   1.61*   1.17 
(3) -0.17 -0.38**  0.15 -1.00 -0.50**  0.17 -0.15  -0.18 -0.21  -0.18 
 
Contd. (6) Ownership (7) AUM (8) Contradiction (9) SAR (10)Sanctioned 
 AVG CH F CH F No Yes No Yes No Yes 
(1) -0.94   -1.33* -0.75 -1.14 -0.90  -1.06 -0.86  -1.26*  -0.73  -0.89    -1.5 
(2) 1.4    1.75*  1.23   1.77* 1.22   1.63  1.30   1.42   1.45   1.49   1.83 
(3) -0.17 -0.27 -0.13 -0.36 -0.23  -0.56*  0.00 -0.63**  0.22  -0.26  -0.33 
 
 
Table A. 5: Banks’ opinion regarding AMLA’s clarity (in practical terms) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Count % of Total GE ZH TI 
(1)  Very Unclear 1 2 1 0 0 
(2) 1 2 0 1 0 
(3) 12 23 4 6 2 
(4) 26 50 8 15 3 
(5)  Very Clear 12 23 2 6 4 
Total 52 100 15 28 9 
Average rating    3,90 3,67 3,93 4,22 
